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Introduction
Housing tenure structures dier considerably across OECD countries. Typi-
cally, the share of owner-occupied housing is very high in Southern European
countries (Spain, Italy, Greece), while relatively low in Austria, Germany,
France, the Netherlands and in some Nordic countries such as Sweden, Fin-
land and Denmark (see Catte et al. [2004]). This share has increased in most
OECD countries during last two decades. Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Nether-
lands and Belgium registered the largest increases from the eighties to the
mid of the rst decade of the century. In the UK, the homeonwership rate
increased steadily up to 2005, then dropped sharply in the last few years (see
gure 1).
High homeownership rates and their increments have been in part de-
termined by pro-ownership policies implemented throughout most OECD
countries. Such policies can take the vest of tax reliefs for mortgage inter-
est payments, exemptions for capital gains taxation applied to residential
property, or generous subsidies for low-income families to reduce the costs of
homeownership.
Although the orientation of several governments, particularly in Europe,
has been to promote homeownership, economists have raised several concerns
about the consequences of large homeownership shares on the functioning of
the labour market. The analysis of the relation between the housing tenure
and the labour market dates back to mid nineties, when Andrew Oswald
pinned on high homeownership rates the blame for the high unemployment
rates in Europe (Oswald [1996], Oswald [1997], Oswald [1999]). Making use
of aggregate data, Oswald found a strong positive statistical association be-
tween the two rates at the international and regional level. Thus, his receipt
to reduce unemployment was strikingly at odds with the prevailing political
wisdom: \We can put Europe back to work . . . by reducing homeownership"
(Oswald [1999])1.
Oswald identied ve mechanisms that drive the positive impact on unem-
1Nickell [1998] and Nickell and Layard [1999] also found a positive and signicant im-
pact of the homeownership rate on unemployment rate for a panel of OECD countries.
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Figure 1
The Evolution of Homeownership Rates in the UK (1992-2010)
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1. Data from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey. Calendar quarters are used from August-June
1992 to January-March 2010.
2. Rates are computed at the person level. The series is not seasonally adjusted.
ployment. These are mostly related to the idea that the mobility constraints
imposed by homeownership introduce frictions in the labour market which
harm its eciency. The rst and most important, is a direct eect. Owner-
occupiers incur higher transaction costs for selling home and moving to a
new accommodation, which can be even higher whenever capital gains for
houses are taxed and there are no exemptions. The other four mechanisms
can be thought as externalities of homeownership. Second, where the rental
market is thin, everyone, regardless of the housing tenure, can have dicul-
ties in nding the accommodation close to the job they aspire to, so that
ecient job matchings are hindered. This is the case even for mobile people
who would be happy to move for job reasons, such as young still living in the
family-home in a kind of free-rent status. Third, owning the accommoda-
tion hampers also job-to-job changes and prolong poor job matchings hence
harming the whole economic system eciency. Fourth, owner-occupiers are
more likely than renters to lobby for deterring entrepreneurs from investing in
their residential area. Fifth, since owners commute much more than renters,
CONTENTS 7
and over longer distances, higher homeownership rates in the area lead to
higher transport costs and possibly to congestion costs, which make getting
to work more costly for everyone and act as a sort of unemployment benets
in increasing the relative attractiveness of not working.
Although the argument underlying a positive relationship between home-
ownership and unemployment originates from macroeconomic evidence, its
theoretical foundations are mainly microeconomic and a vast part of the
empirical research carried out subsequently has been based on micro data.
The typical test of the so-called \Oswald thesis" consists in estimating the
homeownership eect on the the duration of the unemployment spell or, less
often, on the probability to be unemployed. The expected sign is positive,
along the main idea that higher mobility costs due to property holding reduce
the willingness to accept job oers which require a residential move. Fewer
studies, and only recently, have focused on the employment duration, testing
whether homeownership can reduce job nding rates also for people already
employed.
Generally, empirical tests on micro data nd no support for the Oswald
hypothesis, and in most cases even that homeowners have shorter unem-
ployment spells and lower likelihood to be unemployed, which are exactly
counter-Oswald results. However, homeownership seems to increase job sta-
bility by hampering job-to-job changes for people already employed.
As regards unemployment outcomes, the existing literature has put for-
ward two possible reasons for the falsication of the Oswald hypothesis. The
rst one looks at the dierent eect of mobility costs on job search behaviour
in the local and in the non-local labour market. In fact, homeowners may
have higher reservation wages for jobs which require a residential move (non-
local market), but also lower reservation wages for jobs which do not (local
market), so that job nding rates for the latter may be as high as to oset
the lower rates for jobs in a distant area. Thus, whether the total job nding
rate is lower for homeowners or for renters is just an empirical matter which
depends on the magnitude of these two opposite eects.
The second explanation points out the need for a renement in the def-
inition of the residential status. On the one hand, one should distinguish
between owners who have to comply with mortgage payments and outright
owners, as housing nancial commitments can bear higher pressure to return
to work or to keep on with the current job. For mortgage-holders, these
nancial constraints can counteract the eect of the reduced mobility due to
ownership. On the other hand, unemployment outcomes can be dierent also
for private and social renters. In fact, below-market rent, long waiting lists,
security of tenure and the restricted transferability within social housing, can
harm the relative performance of social renters.
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In this work, we aim at investigating the validity of the \Oswald thesis"
taking into account the recent renements by following both a theoretical and
an empirical approach. The focus will be on UK micro data. In particular,
we will make use of the two leading UK Surveys, the UK Quarterly Labour
Force Survey and the British Household Panel Survey.
In the rst chapter, we investigate the relation between job search eort
of unemployed and housing tenure. We test this relation focusing on the
impact of the UK Jobseeker's Allowance reform introduced in the UK in
October 1996, whose main aspect was a strengthening of search requirements
for eligibility to the unemployment benet. We revisit a simple model of
search in which we introduce moving costs and housing costs to capture the
two channels through which the degree of attachment to the accommodation
inuences search behaviour. Our theory suggests that a tightening in job
search requirements, as implied by this reform, raises movements o benet
of non-employed with low search intensity and that this eect should adjust
in size depending on the dierent housing tenure. We draw a dataset from the
Labour Force Survey for the period 1995-1997, and by means of a Dierence-
in-Dierences approach we analyze the impact of the reform on the claimant
outow. Average Treatment Eect estimates suggest that the impact of the
reform is related to housing tenure. Specically, renters account for a major
portion of claimants who were crowded out of the benet without nding a
job, while the eect on outright owners and mortgagers is lower. Empirical
evidence from our dataset clearly conrms that mortgagers search for a job
more intensively than renters, as our model predicts. This latter nding is
consistent with a higher estimated treatment eect for renters, since a high
initial search intensity seems the key to insulate oneself from the impact of
the tightening of search requirements.
In the second chapter we attempt to reconcile the empirical evidence with
the argument in favour of a negative eect of homeownership on exit rates
from unemployment. Taking into account some likely reasons for the falsi-
cation of the Oswald's thesis, we provide evidence which supports it. At rst,
in a theoretical model of endogenous job search adapted to distinguish be-
tween local and non-local labour markets, we show that homeowners higher
moving costs imply unambiguously lower search and lower job nding rates,
even though an opposite eect works for jobs which do not require a move.
Then, in the empirical analysis we make use of data drawn from the British
Household Panel Survey to compare job search intensity measures by hous-
ing tenure. In dening the residential status, we distinguish between outright
owners and mortgage-holders, and between social and private renters. We
nd that, controlling for housing costs and for the four-fold tenure deni-
tion, non-employed outright owners have denitely a lower attachment to
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the labour market than renters, and that this eect is even more evident
when we compare them to private renters.
In the third chapter, we analyse the impact of the housing tenure on
labour market outcomes using individual data from the UK labour Force
Survey. We estimate both a binary model for the probability to be unem-
ployed and a hazard model for exits out of unemployment. In both models
we test for endogenity of housing tenure. In the binary model, exogeneity is
rejected so we perform endogenous multinomial treatment eects estimates.
In the hazard model, we nd no evidence of unobserved heterogeneity thus
estimates are performed assuming exogeneity. Results show that mortgagers
have the lowest probability to be unemployed and the highest job nding
rates, while social renters exhibit the worst performance. Whether private
renters perform better than outright owners is a matter of debate: while
we have no evidence in favour of this claim, the evidence in favour of the
opposite is only modest.
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Chapter 1
Housing Tenure and Job Search
Behaviour. A Dierent
Analysis of the Impact of the
UK Jobseeker's Allowance
1.1 Introduction
During recent decades, a lot of research has been carried out about the impact
of unemployment benets on the duration of unemployment, job search eort
and re-employment rates, both in the short and in the long term. While the
main focus has been on the level and the duration of unemployment benets,
only scant attention has been payed to the role of eligibility criteria, typically
job search requirements and administrative burdens, which are to be met in
order to be eligible for benet.
Theoretical models of search (i.e. Mortensen [1986]) suggest that stricter
search requirements aect search behaviour, lower the reservation wage of
unemployed workers and raise the proportion of non-claimants in the non-
employment pool. These theoretical predictions have found some empirical
conrmation. Meyer [1995] shows from experimental evidence for the US
that tighter job search requirements reduce claimant spells, while there is
no evidence of any eect on re-employment rates meaning that at least a
portion of those who have left the claimant pool are not reintegrated into
employment. These early ndings have been also conrmed by Card et al.
[2007], who found that many workers leave the unemployment pool without
This chapter is the result of a research conducted with Francesco Arzilli, former Ph.D.
Student at the University of Pisa.
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returning to work.
Recently, Manning [2009] and Petrongolo [2009] investigated the eects
of the introduction of the Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA), which represented
a key change into the UK welfare system, and, using two dierent sources
of data and dierent time horizons, they both found that tighter search
requirements were successful in moving individuals o the claimant count but
less successful in moving unemployed workers into employment. Specically,
Manning showed that the removal eect was larger for claimants with low
initial levels of job search activity. This is known as the \weeding out" eect.
Taking these last two papers as background, we develop our contribu-
tion looking for the interaction between the eect of the introduction of JSA
and the role of the home ownership. The original question we would like to
answer, is whether there is any dierence in search behaviour between indi-
viduals who are dierently attached to their accommodation, and whether
this can account for dierent eects of the tightening of search requirements
on the claimant outow. In fact, there are several contributions that look at
these two issues separately, home ownership and tighter search requirements,
but none of them have focussed yet on how these could interact each other.
In order to analyze the role of home ownership on the job search be-
haviour, we enrich the search theoretical model proposed by Mortensen [1986]1
by incorporating moving and housing costs into the analysis. In particular,
we identify three dierent housing tenure categories according to dierent
moving and housing costs (outright owners, mortgagers and renters) and
we explore how JSA, with stricter job search requirements, has aected the
claimant status of workers who belong to these categories.
We provide empirical evidence using data from the Labour Force Survey,
and by means of a Dierence-in-Dierences approach, we estimate the eect
of JSA on the claimant outow rate. Our results largely conrm the view
that a tightening of search requirements implied a strong increase in the
claimant outow but that only a negligible portion of non-employed who left
the claimant count ended up in employment. Moreover, this eect is higher
for claimants with a low level of search intensity, as Manning [2009] found.
We then explore the role, if any, of housing tenure in aecting the size of the
treatment eect. Since the treatment operated in a dierent way according to
the search behaviour of non-employed, and since our model predicts dierent
search intensity levels for people with dierent housing tenure, we aim at
testing whether the estimated treatment eect diers by housing tenure.
Our results point out that renters account for a major portion of claimants
1In particular we refer to the simplied version of Manning [2009] and Petrongolo
[2009].
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who were crowded out of the benet without nding a job, while the eect
on outright owners and mortgagers is lower. Empirical evidence from our
dataset clearly conrms that mortgagers search for a job more intensively
than renters, as both our model predicts and earlier evidence pointed out.
This latter nding is consistent with a higher estimated treatment eect for
renters, since a high initial search intensity seems the key to insulate oneself
from the impact of the tightening of search requirements.
The paper is organized as follow. In section 1.2 we review related liter-
ature and we discuss how this paper contributes to it. Section 1.3 describes
the changes JSA introduced and its main characteristics, and provides pre-
liminary evidence on its eects. Section 1.4 proposes a search model to
represent the eect of JSA also considering moving costs and housing costs.
Section 1.5 describes the data used in this paper. Section 1.6 presents the
methodology used to conduct our analysis. Section 1.7 shows the main nd-
ings on the eect of JSA on the claimant outow rate and how this eect
is related to initial search intensity. Section 1.8 is the bulk of our analysis
on the role of housing tenure in shaping the impact of JSA, and provides
additional evidence on the relation between home ownership and workers'
behavior. Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 Relation to Existing Literature
Our contribution is related to two dierent strands of literature. The rst
one deals with welfare reforms and the impact of stricter job search require-
ments on the behaviour of unemployment benet claimants. As Grubb stated
(Grubb [2000]), \a strong requirement for job search or acceptance of suitable
work may in theory oset the disincentive eects that arise when benets are
paid without such criteria"2.
Most of the empirical evidence about the eect of job search requirements
on the time spent on benet is based on US social experiments carried out in
the 70s and 80s. Early studies were conducted by Meyer [1995] who provides
a useful survey and evaluation of these experiments. He nds that the com-
bination of tighter search requirements and job assistance reduces claimant
spells3. More recently, Klepinger et al. [1997] found a negative impact of
stricter eligibility criteria on benet duration while Ashenfelter et al. [2005]
found that the estimated eect is quite small.
2See Grubb [2000] for a discussion of the expected eects of eligibility conditions, for a
brief survey of them and for a general evidence of their impact.
3See Johnson and Klepinger [1994].
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In the UK there has been one randomized experiment, the Restart Pro-
gram in 1986, which can be considered as the precursor of the UK JSA.
The Restart randomly assigned claimants who had spent at least twelve
months on benets to a treatment program consisting of tighter search re-
quirements and counseling in order to speed up the process of nding a job.
Dolton and O'Neill [1996] found that the Restart program increased the exit
rate from unemployment, in particular towards employment, but that the
eect for women was only short-term (Dolton and O'Neill [2002]).
With regards to previous analysis of the impact of JSA, there is a wide
consensus about the eect on the claimant status. According to Trickey et al.
[1998], Rayner et al. [2000] and Manning [2009], JSA had a signicant im-
pact on the ows out of claimant status, but, as it is argued by Manning
[2009], there is no compelling evidence that either movements into employ-
ment or search activity were increased with the JSA. His results have been
conrmed by Petrongolo [2009] who investigated the long-term eects of the
introduction of JSA4. In particular, she found that JSA has had a positive
impact on the claimant unemployment exit rate, but also a positive eect on
exits into other benets and a negative impact on the probability of working
for up to four years after the unemployment spell5.
The data and the methodological approach we use to assess the impact
of JSA on claimant outows are closely related to Manning [2009]. We dif-
ferentiate from his estimation technique mainly in the way we deal with the
seasonality issue. Then, once his main ndings are largely conrmed, we aim
at testing whether the eect of a tightening in job search requirements, as
implied by JSA, diers by the housing tenure.
The second strand of literature, to which our work refers, looks at the
relation between the housing tenure and workers' behaviour. In this context,
the most prominent contributions are probably from Oswald (Oswald [1996],
Oswald [1997], Oswald [1999]) who provided strong evidence for an aggre-
gate positive relationship between unemployment and the home ownership
rate. His key explanation is that home owners face higher transaction costs
than renters (to sell and buy housing) when they consider a move to a new
location to accept a job oer, so that they should experience longer unemploy-
ment spells, at least if compared to private renters. While several empirical
studies conrm that home ownership hampers the propensity to move resi-
dence for job reasons (Van den Berg and Van Vuuren [1998], Henley [1998],
4She used data from the Lifetime Labour Market Database (LLMDB) administered by
the Department for Work and Pensions which provides information on labour histories of
selected individuals from 1978 onwards.
5Moreover, she found that JSA reduced the level of earnings and the number of weeks
worked once re-employed
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Munch et al. [2006], Battu et al. [2008]), some later tests of the Oswald's hy-
pothesis, with both macro and micro-data, have provided evidence for its re-
verse6. Green and Hendershott [2001a] and Green and Hendershott [2001b]
found from the US evidence that unemployment rates of household heads
are aected less by tenure than those of the population as a whole; also
Barrios Garca and Rodrguez Hernandez [2004] contradict the Oswald the-
sis stating that the provinces of Spain with lower unemployment rates are
associated with higher home ownership rates7.
The Oswald's hypothesis has been rejected also by several micro-data
studies (Goss and Phillips [1997], Coulson and Fisher [2009], Flatau et al.
[2003], Munch et al. [2006], Battu et al. [2008]). Their typical nding is that
home owners have a shorter duration of unemployment than renters, which is
mostly true for mortgagers with a high mortgage debt. This literature points
out that the higher are housing costs, the higher is the incentive to become
re-employed more rapidly, thus high leveraged owners are supposed to search
for a job more intensively than renters. Moreover, since home owners concen-
trate their search eort in the local labour market, the negative eect of the
immobility in the housing market may be oset by higher job nding rates
in the local labour market (Munch et al. [2006], Rouwendal and Nijkamp
[2008]).
According to the channels between housing tenure and the job search
behaviour identied by this literature, we give our contribution both from a
theoretical and an empirical perspective. At rst, we plug in mobility and
housing costs in a standard job search model to analyze their likely eect on
the optimal search of unemployed. Then, we use our data to check whether
comparisons in job search outcomes of claimants with dierent housing tenure
are consistent with the model's prediction.
1.3 The JSA: Characteristics and Preliminary
Evidence
The JSA, which is the current system of welfare for the unemployed in the
UK, was introduced on 7 October 1996. Before the JSA, the welfare sys-
tem for the unemployed consisted of an unemployment insurance scheme
called Unemployment Benet (UB) and an unemployment allowance scheme
of Income Support (IS). The JSA has a contributory component, known as
6Rouwendal and Nijkamp [2008] and Havet and Penot [2010] provide a survey of stud-
ies which tested the Oswald's thesis.
7First Oswald and later Green and Hendershott used OECD countries' and regions'
data in which neither Spanish regions nor provinces were included.
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contJSA, which replaced the UB scheme, and a means tested component,
known as incJSA, which replaced the IS element8. IncJSA is far the most
important component, since many of unemployed have insucient National
Insurance contributions for entitlement to contJSA and some have a level
of contribution which requires their contJSA payments to be topped up by
incJSA. For example, in December 1996, 76.1% of recipients of JSA were
receiving incJSA against 29.3% who were getting contJSA; one year later, in
December 1997, 75.5% were receiving incJSA versus 29.8% on contJSA9.
The relevant changes of this reform can be allocated to two dierent ar-
eas of the whole unemployment benet system. JSA slightly modied the
level and the duration of the contribution-based benet, but it also implied
major changes in the eligibility conditions10. With JSA, the entitlement pe-
riod for the contribution-based benet was reduced to 6 months from 12
months under the previous system, and the dierence in level between UB
and IS was eliminated so that both contJSA and incJSA have now exactly
the same payment rate and the same conditions as the former IS scheme.
The UB and IS payments were very similar except for young people, who
received about 20% less under IS than under UB. Therefore, the reduction
aected only a small category of people getting the contribution-based ben-
et. Moreover, since only a modest portion of unemployed claimants receive
the contribution-based benet, it is widely accepted that changes in this area
has aected a really small fraction of claimants (Manning [2009], Petrongolo
[2009]).
The second and most signicant change was represented by the substan-
tial increase in job search requirements for eligibility and in the related ad-
ministrative burden. All claimants have to sign a Jobseeker's Agreement in
which they set out to actively look for a job and they state the period of
work and the types of jobs they are available for. Within this agreement,
they also commit themselves to undertake certain steps in order to nd a
job and to increase the chances of nding it, such as how many times at
least they are going to contact employers and a Jobcentre. Claimants have
to keep a thorough record of the steps taken, and at fortnightly interviews,
the Employment Ocer checks wether this record complies with what has
8The contJSA has a limited duration of 6 months maximum, while the incJSA has
potentially unlimited duration.
9Data taken from the Labour Force Survey using seasonal datasets. Percentages add
up to more than 100%, as claimants can be eligible for both incJSA and contJSA at the
same time.
10Pointer and Barnes [1997] provide a detailed description of institutional and admin-
istrative aspects of JSA. See Finn et al. [1997] for a description of the previous UB/IS
scheme.
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been detailed in the agreement. Furthermore, the Employment Ocer can
instruct claimants to take certain steps and to apply for specic jobs and,
in case of being still unemployed after 13 weeks, they can be subjected to
sanctions or disqualication. Regardless of the eectiveness of the new rules,
the extra administrative hurdle and a stronger contact with the Employment
Service may alone account for a large portion of the observed movements o
benet, as some evidence suggests11.
Some basic analysis can bear witness to the eect the introduction of
JSA had on the claimant count. Figure 1.1 presents a comparison between
the series of the claimant count and the number of unemployed according to
the ILO denition (ILO unemployed are those who are available to start to
work within 2 weeks and have been looking for a job in the past 4 weeks).
The claimant count started falling after 1992 and stopped only recently, but
the drop has been remarkable on and soon after October 1996, when JSA
was introduced12. Also the number of ILO unemployed drops soon after JSA
though there is an evident overall decreasing trend in the series. This drop
may be due to whatever reason, yet as long as we assume that it is, at least
partially, explained by JSA, we can not conclude that JSA increased exit
rates from unemployment towards employment since some of the claimants
who dropped o the register may also have become inactive according to
ILO denition. Before 1995 the two lines were following almost the same
path, but after that they started to diverge. This gap became very wide
right after the introduction of JSA and it has increased more and more since
then, which means that, while JSA removed several individuals from the
claimant count, most of them did not stop looking for work according to the
ILO denition. The lesson we draw is that, given the stricter conditions and
administrative hurdles unemployed have to meet in order to be eligible for
JSA, ILO unemployment search standards are now far from those required
for JSA eligibility. Also, we argue, there may have been a large increase
in the number of unemployed who prefer to look for a job independently,
without being forced to contact the Employment Service.
11For example, evidence from social experiments shows that many claimants who are
subjected to treatment involving monitoring and job search assistance drop out of the
claimant status since they do not comply with obligations. See Dolton and O'Neill [2002]
and Johnson and Klepinger [1994].
12Administrative data on claimant ows also show that the decline in the claimant count
seems to have been caused by a jump in the outow rather than by a reduction in the
inow.
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Figure 1.1
Claimant Count and ILO Unemployment
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1. Data for the claimant count series are drawn from administrative records of the welfare system;
they can be found at www.nomisweb.co.uk. Data for ILO unemployment series are drawn from
Labour Force Survey; they can be found at the ONS website.
2. Both series are monthly and seasonally unadjusted. Numbers are in thousands.
1.4 A Simple Search Model with Housing Tenure
In this section we present a simple job search model which represents a useful
tool to investigate the impact of tighter job search requirements. Manning
[2009] and Petrongolo [2009] proposed a simplied version of the traditional
Mortensen's (Mortensen [1986]) search model with an exogenous wage dis-
tribution and endogenous search eort13. The relevant change we make in
this framework is allowing for a dierent housing tenure status.
Individuals, who can be unemployed or employed, are innitely lived and
maximize lifetime utility in continuous time. When unemployed, individuals
receive b as unemployment compensation, which is xed and independent
of the wage, and search for a job with eort s, where s measures the time
13See also Barron and Mellow [1979].
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subtracted from leisure for job search activity. We assume that only the un-
employed search for jobs, since this is the relevant aspect aected by the JSA
reform, and since this simplies notation without aecting our main theoret-
ical results. Search activity yields a cost c(s) and inuences the probability of
moving into the employment pool by generating a job oer arrival rate (s).
As typical in this modeling, costs are convex in eort, while returns are con-
cave, so that c0(s) > 0 and c00(s) > 0, 0(s) > 0 and 00(s) < 0. The unemployed
receive job oers at the rate (s), where wage oers are sampled from the
c.d.f. F (w). The acceptance rule dictates that the unemployed will accept
any job oer whose wage is at least equal to the reservation wage.
First, in this standard search framework, we add moving costs by assum-
ing that they aect the job nding probability. Namely, moving costs act as
a wedge between the reservation wage and the wage level the unemployed
would be actually willing to accept. The idea we want to capture is that
job oers dier not only in wage level, but also in location. Some jobs are
located further than others from the unemployed's accommodation, so that
accepting an oer may require a moving. People who are less mobile will
reject some job oers that others may accept, and this implies a lower job
nding probability. As long as individuals may bear dierent moving costs
depending on the housing tenure, this idea can simply highlight the channel
through which the degree of attachment to the accommodation aect search
behaviour.
Owners, either outright or mortgagers, have a higher degree of attachment
towards the property than renters. Also, it seems reasonable that outright
owners have a stronger attachment to the accommodation than mortgagers
since time spent in the current accommodation should be longer on average
and since transaction costs for moving home may be higher. So, we assume
thatMo > Mm > Mr, where M are moving costs, i.e. a proxy for mobility. This
is also consistent with Oswald (Oswald [1996], Oswald [1999]), according to
whom owners occupiers are supposed to be less mobile than renters since they
are less prone to accept a job oer far from their current accommodation14.
Secondly, we bring into the model housing costs. When looking for work
the unemployed faces the cost function c(s), where c translates hours devoted
to search in utility loss, that is, in its monetary cost given the standard
risk neutrality hypothesis. We assume that the unemployed has also to bear
a housing cost H, whose amount depends on the housing tenure status15.
14Empirical evidence is also provided by Van den Berg and Van Vuuren [1998],
Munch et al. [2006] and Battu et al. [2008] who suggest that homeowners are less likely
to change residential location in order to accept a job outside the local labour market
because of their higher moving costs.
15This cost is not related to the unemployment status, since also employed people have
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Housing costs matter in this framework since people have a higher pressure
to nd a job the higher are these costs. In particular, we assume that Hm >
Hr > Ho, which is consistent with empirical evidence supporting the view
that people who bear the cost of a mortgage have higher housing expenditure
than either outright owners and renters (i.e Rouwendal and Nijkamp [2008],
Goss and Phillips [1997], Flatau et al. [2003])16. Moreover, this is also a likely
explanation for the repeated nding that high leveraged owners have lower
unemployment spells than renters17.
Let U and W denote the present-discounted value of expected income
stream of, respectively, an unemployed and an employed worker, included
the imputed return from non market activities. The unemployed worker
enjoys the benet b, bears the cost c(s) +H and he expects to move into the
employment pool at the rate (s). U satises the following equation:
rU = max
s;wR
fb  c(s) H + (s)
Z
wR+M
[W (w)  U ] dF (w)g; (1.1)
where r is the discount factor. The job nding rate is (s)[1 F (wR+M)] and
is decreasing in moving costs M . Employed workers earn a wage w, they bear
the cost for the house tenure and they face an exogenous risk of job loss ;
W satises the following:
rW (w) = w  H + [U  W (w)]: (1.2)
Since U is the present value of the expected utility stream of an unem-
ployed, rU represents (given also risk neutrality) the instantaneous income
derived from that. The reservation wage wR is dened as the wage level such
that employment and unemployment are equally valuable, i.e. W (wR) = U .
Thus, since the present value of a future income stream given a wage equal
to x is W (x) = x=r, the reservation wage will be equal to the instantaneous
income of the unemployed rU (rW (wR) = rU = wR). Dierentiating 1.2 we get
W 0(w) = 1=(r+ ) so, after integrating by parts, we can rewrite 1.1, which also
to bear it. We will plug this cost in the employed's value function, but this will not have
any role since we rule out on-the-job search.
16We will provide below further results in support of this assumption comparing out-of-
pocket housing costs of mortgagers and renters with data drawn from the British Household
Panel Survey.
17Plugging in the parameter H as a xed cost ow is an easy way to allow for dier-
entiation in income ows. We are basically making the ad hoc assumption that the only
source of variation in the income related to housing tenure is due to housing costs, while
one can argue that owners could have a higher income than renters despite a lower housing
cost. In other words, there could be dierent channels by which this income eect can
operate, but here we want just to focus on the likely eect of housing costs.
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implicitly dene the reservation wage, as:
wR = rU = max
s
fb  c(s) H + (s)
(r + )
Z
wR+M
[1  F (w)] dwg: (1.3)
The unemployed worker will chose the optimal search eort s such that:
c0(s) =
0(s)
(r + )
Z
wR+M
[1  F (w)] dw; (1.4)
where marginal costs of search eort are equal to marginal benets, which
are represented by the gain from employment weighted for the higher job
oers arrival rate.
Using the implicit function of wR we can determine the shape of indier-
ence curves in the space (s; b). Dierentiating 1.3 with respect to wR and b
we have dwR = db   (r + ) 1(s)[1   F (wR +M)]dwR, so the eect of b on wR is
clearly positive as usual:
dwR
db
=
r + 
r +  + (s)[1  F (wR +M)] > 0: (1.5)
Dierentiating 1.3 with respect to wR and s we get dwR =  c0(s)ds + f(r +
) 10(s)
R
wR+M
[1  F (w)] dwgds  (r + ) 1(s)[1  F (wR +M)]dwR, so the eect of
s on wR depends on the level of s:
dwR
ds
=
r + 
r +  + (s)[1  F (wR +M)] f
0(s)A  c0(s)g ; (1.6)
where we set A = (r+) 1
R
wR+M
[1 F (w)] dw. The eect of s on the reservation
wage is zero at the optimal level s, since the term in braces is zero, while
is positive (negative) for s < (>)s. When s > (<)s a further increase in s
lowers (increases) wR so the worker requires an increase (decrease) in b to keep
the reservation wage constant. The indierence curves are thus as drawn in
gure 1.2 for two dierent levels of b, where we point out that an increase in
b lowers the optimal search eort and increases the reservation wage18.
Given this theoretical framework we can now investigate the eect of
tighter eligibility rules on optimal search and on the claimant outow. This
framework can be slightly modied to allow for eligibility rules by condition-
ing the receiving of unemployment benets on the keeping of these rules.
18The relationship between s and b is negative as an increase in b makes unemployment
relatively more attractive than employment and thus reduces the return to searching.
ds
db
=   
0(s)[1  F (wR +M)]
r +  + (s)[1  F (wR +M)] [c
00(s)  00(s)A] 1 < 0:
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Figure 1.2
The Choice of Search Intensity
Following Manning [2009] and Petrongolo [2009], we study this element by
introducing a threshold level of search activity s which has to be exerted in
order to be entitled to claim the benet. Unemployed workers whose search
eort is equal or greater than s are classied as claimants, while individuals
who exhibit a search eort below s are considered non-claimants and they
receive an income lower than the claimants' one19. We can thus dene two
level of benets bH and bL whose dierence is the search related benet, i.e.
the income that the worker receives if he chooses a search eort above the
threshold.
In this context we can simulate the eect of the JSA reform just by
looking at the eect of an increase in the threshold level s as in gure 1.3.
When the threshold is set at s
0
it does not bind and the worker will chose the
interior solution sL, which is associated to the utility level rU
0
. The increase of
search requirements from a low level s
0
to a higher level s
00
aects the optimal
search eort which moves from sL to the corner solution s
00
, and lowers the
indierence curve where the individual will be positioned from rU
0
to rU
00
,
which is characterized by a lower reservation wage (the discontinue bold line
represents the benet rule whenever the threshold is s
00
). Further increases
19As specied in Petrongolo [2009], the income of non-claimants is not necessarily zero
since they may receive other not search related benets (i.d. health-related benets).
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Figure 1.3
The Impact of Stricter Eligibility Conditions
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in the search threshold will be followed by one-for-one increases in optimal
search, at least up to the level s^, where the unemployed is indierent between
meeting the rules and leaving the claimant status, since the pairs (bH ; s^) and
(bL; s

H) lie on the same indierence curve. Yet, any increase in the threshold
from below to above s^ would actually lead to a drop in the optimal search
back to the level sH, because the marginal costs the unemployed would incur
to meet the higher requirements would be higher than the marginal benets
in terms of higher unemployment income and job oers arrival rate (this
eect of discouraging unemployed people to provide search level for a job has
been considered as the \unintended" consequences of the JSA).
The economics of this model is thus not able to predict the sign of the
eect of a tightening in search requirements on the average search activity
of the unemployed. The lowest graph in gure 1.3 plots the optimal search
activity against the search requirements as implied by this model and clearly
shows that changes in these requirements may either not aect or aect in
both ways the actual search intensity. A tightening of the rules would not
aect the optimal search intensity for workers who have very high (s  s^)
or very low search eort (s < sL). In fact, the former will continue to be
claimants despite the change in the policy, while the latter will be non-
claimants both before and after such a change. The targeted workers who
are aected by the introduction of the JSA are those who exert a search
intensity in the middle range sL < s < s^: all of these are initially claimants
but, after the introduction of the JSA, some of them will nd optimal to
increase search eort to continue to be claimant while others will be better
o by reducing it and thus they will stop to claim.
In order to shed some light on the role of housing tenure on optimal
search intensity, we refer now to equation 1.4, which holds in equilibrium,
and, by means of the envelope theorem, we study the sign of the dierences in
optimal search of the three housing tenure categories. Indicating with so, s

m
and sr the optimal search levels of respectively outright owners, mortgagers
and renters, we obtain the following dierences:
sm   so = s(Mm;Hm)  s(Mo;Ho) =
ds
dM
(Mm  Mo) + ds

dH
(Hm  Ho); (1.7)
sr   so = s(Mr;Hr)  s(Mo;Ho) =
ds
dM
(Mr  Mo) + ds

dH
(Hr  Ho); (1.8)
sm   sr = s(Mm;Hm)  s(Mr;Hr) =
ds
dM
(Mm  Mr) + ds

dH
(Hm  Hr); (1.9)
where (Mm Mo) < 0, (Mr Mo) < 0, (Mm Mr) > 0, (Hm Ho) > 0, (Hr Ho) > 0,
(Hm  Hr) > 0 by assumption.
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Applying the implicit function theorem to equation 1.4 we can study
the sign of ds=dM and ds=dH. From 1.4 we dene (s;H;M) = c0(s)   (r +
) 10(s)
R
wR(s
;H;M)+M [1  F (w)] dw = 0, thus we have20:
ds
dH
=   H
s
> 0; (1.10)
ds
dM
=  M
s
< 0: (1.11)
Equations 1.10 and 1.11 show clearly the relation between housing tenure
and search behaviour of the unemployed. This relation operates through
two dierent channels. First, the higher are housing costs the higher is the
need for income, so the unemployed will increase the time subtracted from
leisure for search purpose in order to raise the probability of nding a job.
Secondly, the higher are moving costs the lower are returns to search since the
probability of accepting a job oers is lower, thus the unemployed will reduce
search intensity. The expression (ds=dM)M picks up the \mobility eect",
which is negative (positive) whenever M > (<)0, while (ds=dH)H picks up
the \housing cost" eect, which is positive (negative) whenever H > (<)0.
The mobility eect alone suggests that the optimal search activity should
be lower the higher is the degree of attachment to the accommodation, thus
renters should exhibit a higher search intensity than both mortgagers and
renters, and mortgagers higher than renters. Anyway, if we account also for
the housing cost eect these outcomes may be reinforced or weakened, if not
reversed. If we compare mortgagers with outright owners, the housing cost
eect would simply reinforce the former leading to the conclusion that mort-
gagers should unambiguously exhibit higher search intensity than outright
owners (sm so > 0): the rationale of this outcome is that owners who are still
paying the accommodation look for work in a wider area and have to nd a
job more quickly in order to sustain the cost of the mortgage. We obtain the
same outcome also for renters with respect to outright owners, at least for
renters who bear higher housing costs (sr  so > 0). If we compare mortgagers
with renters, the housing cost eect has opposite sign with respect to the mo-
bility eect, instead, so the sign of sm   sr depends on the balancing of both.
20We use the following derivatives, where we set A = (r + )
 1 R
wR+M
[1  F (w)] dw,
which is positive:
s = c
00(s)  00(s)A > 0;
H =   
0(s)[1  F (wR +M)]
r +  + (s)[1  F (wR +M)] < 0;
M =
0(s)[1  F (wR +M)]
r +  + (s)[1  F (wR +M)] =  H > 0:
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As long as we assume (consistently with empirical literature cited above and
our following results) that mortgagers face higher housing costs, the issue
whether mortgagers have higher search activity than renters is basically an
empirical matter.
1.5 Data
We draw our data set from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS), a quarterly
national-wide survey which collects address-based interviews of about 60,000
households for each quarter. Each individual is interviewed in ve consecutive
quarters, and we exploit this panel component building categorical variables
which report ows among dierent labour market status. Even though our
econometric methodology does not rely on a panel analysis, the panel struc-
ture of the survey allows us to follow cases for two subsequent quarters, so
that our outcome variable is typically whether or not an individual leaves a
particular status, as unemployment benets claimant.
From 1992 to 2006 the LFS has been conducted on a seasonal-quarter ba-
sis, that is interviews were referred to Spring (March-May), Summer (June-
August), Autumn (September-November) and Winter (December-February).
From 2006 onwards, however, the LFS is being conducted on a calendar-
quarter basis and interviews refer to Quarter 1 (January-March), Quar-
ter 2 (April-June), Quarter 3 (July-September) and Quarter 4 (October-
December)21. Since JSA reform was introduced on Monday the 7th October
1996, we postpone all calendar quarters by one week in order to set this date
as the starting point of both the treatment and the 4th quarter of 1996.
Each LFS's quarter contains hundreds of variables which cover many
features of the UK labour market and provide detailed pieces of information
on individual characteristics. We focus mainly on variables sets which refer
to individual labour market status, search behaviour and housing tenure.
The survey provides a specic variable which reports whether or not an
individual is claiming unemployment related benets. The questions about
housing tenure form the basis for our analysis of dierent treatment eects
by sub-groups. The survey provides information enough to split the sample
into three categories according to dierent housing tenures: owners outright,
21The switching from seasonal to calendar quarters has introduced several discontinuities
in the data les up to 2006, since they were all rearranged in order to t the calendar
pattern. This major change aected many of the variables over the relevant period for
our analysis, so that we preferred to deal with the old seasonal quarters les. Then we
reallocated cases in order to t the calendar pattern. Sampling weights refer to the old
person weight variable pwt03.
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owners still paying with mortgage or loan, and renters. The survey gives also
further details about renters that we exploit to test whether dierences in
some relevant features matter in explaining dierent responses within this
group.
1.6 Methodology
Our aim is to estimate the Average Treatment Eect (ATE) of the JSA
reform on a number of outcome variables, typically ows out of the claimant
status22. In order to do this we use claimants interviewed in the 3rd quarter
of 1996 (which we will call wave 1) as treatment group, and we look at their
status in the next quarter (which we will call wave 2). In the 3rd quarter they
are not treated yet but in the 4th they are, so the choice to move or not from
the initial status is aected by the new rules. Of course we cannot impute
all of these moves to the reform as these may also have been observed in the
counterfactual settings, that is without the treatment. Thus, to identify the
causal eect we use claimants in the 2nd quarter of 1996 (wave 1) as control
group, and we look at their status in the next quarter (wave 2). Treatment
and control groups are close enough in date to allay fears that dierences in
their behaviour could be aected by aggregate factors23.
Dierences in response between treatment and control groups we build in
this way are what we expect to be due to JSA reform, at least so long as these
groups are similar in observable characteristics, as this is the case. Anyway,
since treatment and control groups dier in quarters, ATE estimates would
be biased if claimant outows had any seasonal pattern. In order to control
for seasonality we generate treatment and control groups in the same way by
means of two new cohorts drawn from the adjoining years 1995 and 1997, and
we dierence out the average seasonal eect using a Dierence-in-Dierences
technique. The baseline equation we estimate appears like this:
yi = 0 + 1d96i + 2d97i + 3jsai + 4jsai  d96i + Xi + ui; (1.12)
22Our approach is very close to that of Manning [2009].
23We emphasize that there could be some overlapping between treatment and control
groups since some claimants interviewed in 3rd quarter can belong either to wave 1 of the
treatment group or to wave 2 of the control group. When we compute our regressions
the outcome variable and the regressors refer typically to the 2nd quarter for the control
group and to the 3rd quarter for the treatment group: this means that for every claimant
interviewed in the 3rd quarter who belongs to both treatment group (in wave 1) and
control group (in wave 2), we use two distinct observations which refer to two dierent
variables sets, at least regarding variables which can vary over time, as the ow outcome
variable and regressors such duration since last job, age, education, region and so on.
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where yi is the outcome variable, jsai is a dummy that takes 1 if i belongs
to treatment group and 0 if i belongs to control group, d96i and d97i are year
dummies. The vector Xi contains variables we can plug in to control for
observable characteristics. Including controls anyway hardly changes treat-
ment eect estimates and this is exactly what we expected since treatment
and control groups are very similar in these observables. The coecient of
the interaction term, 4, is the Dierence-in-Dierences coecient and cap-
tures the causal eect of the program. The outcome variable yi represents
typically whether the claimant, either being part of the treatment group or
the control group within the cohort, stops claiming at wave 2 and we run
regressions pooling the three cohorts for 1995, 1996 and 1997.
The series of the claimant outow rate typically exhibits some seasonality
in that the rate of claimants in the 3rd quarter who move o in the 4th is
usually higher than the rate of those in the 2nd quarter who move o in the
3rd. If we run two separate regressions just only for the 1995 cohort (here
no one is receiving treatment), and just only for the 1997 cohort (here all are
receiving treatment), we estimate a dierence in the outow rate between
treatment and control groups of 3% and 1.9%, respectively (the latter is not
signicant)24. This means that the way by which we create treatment and
control groups is by itself prone to deliver a positive dierence in claimant
outows regardless of the treatment; so if we did not account for seasonality
we would probably overestimate the causal eect.
These coecients also suggest us that we would probably overrate the
true seasonal eect if we accounted for only 1995. In theory one extra cohort
would be enough to identify the causal eect, as Manning does using only
1995. But, if we use one only extra cohort, the seasonal eect estimate is too
sensitive to the choice of the particular year for the comparison, so we prefer
to use both cohorts as we think this can better remove the seasonal eect.
Moreover, we focus on just the two adjoining years to exploit the persistence
in the series.
One could be concerned about some anticipatory eects of the JSA, es-
pecially on the basis of its retroactive nature25. The LFS collects weekly
interviews, so it does not seem unreasonable that some people whose refer-
ence week is very close to 7th October 1996 behaved in a dierent way of
24We emphasize that we distinguish treatment and control groups just by the quarters
they refer to, regardless of being actually treated or not, since, obviously, all individuals in
1995 are not treated and all individuals in 1997 are treated. So, for example, the coecient
for 1995 cohort is the estimated dierence in the outow rate between 4th and 3rd quarter.
25All existing UB and IS claimants as of 7th October 1996 are automatically transferred
to the JSA system, and new rules are enforced also in the meantime until they ll a
Jobseeker's Agreement, which is supposed to be done soon after 7th October.
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what they may have done without the awareness of the imminent change of
rules. Anyway, we think this concern should not apply to registered claimants
but only to people who face the decision to claim just few weeks before the
JSA introduction. In fact, people who are already claiming and may be un-
willing to meet new imminent stricter rules should not have any reason to
stop claiming before their introduction. This seems to be conrmed by our
sample, since if we estimate a \ctitious" treatment eect for claimants be-
longing to the last week or to the last two weeks before the JSA introduction,
we get a negligible and insignicant coecient. However, non-claimants who
would be willing to claim under ongoing rules but not under the new ones,
may have some disincentives to sign up just for few weeks. If this is the case,
the anticipatory eect should have worked by dropping potential claimants
in the wave 1 of the treatment group who have never signed up and who
otherwise would have been crowded out of the claimant count after the in-
troduction of JSA. This means that our estimated treatment eect may have
been even higher.
1.7 The Impact of JSA on Claimant Outows
Results in table 1.1 show both the magnitude and the way the treatment
operated. This reports probit estimates of the eect of JSA on the ows
out of claimant status into dierent economic activity status. Claimants
who stop claiming can end up in either employment or non-employment,
where non-employment means either unemployment or inactivity. The rst
row of the table refers to the ow out of claimant status whatever is the
destination, while 2nd and 3rd split up the total outow between non-
employment and employment destinations, and 4th and 5th split outows
into non-employment between unemployment and inactivity destinations.
Columns 1 and 3 report estimates of the gross treatment eect, while columns
2 and 4 report DiD estimates. Columns 3 and 4 correspond to 1 and 2 but
they show whether ATE estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of the vec-
tor of variables Xi. First of all, as we already pointed out, we notice that
adding controls to the baseline regression hardly aects the treatment eect
estimates, so for simplicity we will focus on just the rst two columns.
The 1996 sample alone suggests a 10.3% treatment eect on the total
claimant outow (see column 1), but this exercise is blurring the true causal
eect of JSA since it does not control for seasonality. When adding 1995
and 1997 cohorts, this coecient drops to 7.7%, revealing a seasonal eect of
around 2.6%26. However, this coecient does not tell anything about people
26The coecient from the 1996 sample is simply the dierence (weighted for sam-
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Table 1.1
Impact of JSA on claimant outflows: from claimant in wave 1
Average Treatment Eect on: 1 2 3 4
Flow out of Claimant Status 0.1028 0.0765 0.1025 0.0761
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Flow into non-employment 0.0737 0.0696 0.0710 0.0656
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Flow into employment 0.0291 0.0071 0.0299 0.0094
(0.004) (0.571) (0.002) (0.441)
Flow into unemployment 0.0468 0.0558 0.0429 0.0511
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Flow into inactivity 0.0269 0.0172 0.0245 0.0151
(0.000) (0.064) (0.000) (0.079)
Dierence-in-Dierences No X No X
Controls No No X X
Number of observations 5958 16836 5904 16289
Notes:
1. Reported coecients are marginal eects of a probit model for a change of the dummy from 0 to
1; p-value in brackets. Observations are weighted by survey sampling weights. The DiD coecient
is obtained dierencing out the seasonal eect obtained with both 1995 and 1997 cohorts.
2. The basic sample are claimants in wave 1. The outcome variable takes 1 only if claimant stops
claiming in wave 2. In computing ows into economic activity status, the outcome variable takes
1 if and only if claimant stops claiming in wave 2 and at the same time moves into the relevant
economic activity status.
3. We use as controls age, age squared, sex, race (white, black, asian, other), education, regional
dummies and dummies for degree of attachment to the labor market (that is duration since last
job and whether ever worked).
who were moved o the claimant count, so we cannot actually conclude at
this point that JSA was able to fulll both its purposes, basically to move o
the claimant count cheating claimants and people who were not assiduous
in searching a job, and to increase ows into employment by encouraging
greater search activity among claimants. The second intended eect seems
far from having worked, indeed. When splitting up claimant outows be-
pling weights) between the claimant outows of 3rd and 2nd quarters, that is the per-
centage of claimants in July-September quarter who became non claimant in October-
December (38.88%) minus the percentage of claimants in April-June quarter who became
non claimant in July-September (28.6%). This 10.28% dierence cannot be totally put
down to JSA, as we observe an increase in claimant outows between 3rd and 4th quar-
ters, though far smaller, also for both 1995 and 1997, highlighting a seasonal pattern.
The ctitious treatment eect is 3% for 1995 and 1.9% for 1997, so if we subtract the
seasonal eects' weighted average (2.63%) from the gross treatment eect of 1996 we get
precisely a causal eect of 7.65%. This means that the claimant outow rate in October-
December 1996 was higher than that we might have observed without JSA by 1/4 times
(i.e. (38.9-31.2)/31.2, where 31.2% is the outow rate for wave 1 plus the average seasonal
eect).
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tween movers into non-claimant non-employment status (second row of table
1.1) and into non-claimant employment status (third row), ATE estimations
reveal the whole story: rst transitions are far more important with a DiD
coecient of 7%, which accounts for almost all of claimant outows, while
outows into employment are basically negligible. The 1996 sample suggests
a signicant increase of 2.9% in the outow to employment, but this is mainly
due to seasonality as the ATE drops to a small and not signicant 0.7% when
using the whole sample. So, our results strongly conrm the view that JSA
reform had a sizeable impact on the claimant outows, but it did not operate
by addressing these into employment. Interestingly, we also notice that sea-
sonality in claimant outows almost entirely concerns ows into employment,
as the coecients in second row of table 1.1 are very similar.
The large estimated impact on claimants who end up in non-employment
suggests that JSA has been very eective in moving o the claimant count
people \who were not assiduous in their job search or were claiming fraudu-
lently" (Rayner et al. [2000]). This \weeding out" eect may have accounted
for large savings in the welfare expenditure, but it is also arguable whether
the state of people who lost this benet should not be of any concern27. Many
of them may just have a search activity level high enough to be registered as
ILO unemployed but not as high as to meet the stricter eligibility restrictions.
The rationale of any unemployment benet, which is also even stronger for
the JSA, is to sustain search eort of unemployed who do want a job, not to
sustain people with low income. Thus we think it is worth trying to distin-
guish job seekers who are really willing to work from people who exert the
minimum eort called for to receive benet.
If we look at rows 4 and 5, we can tell more about people who exit the
claimant status and end up in non-employment. The ATE on the outow
into unemployment is signicant and 5.58% is a very large size if we consider
that the estimated outow rate for the treatment group is 8.91%, i.e. our
model predicts that the outow in the counterfactual setting would have
been only 8.91-5.58=3.33%. The treatment eect on the outow into non
claimant-inactivity is anyway not signicant at a 5% level and quite small
27Regarding the fate of people who drop o the register, Petrongolo [2009] and
Machin and Marie [2004] provide two dierent pieces of evidence. Petrongolo nds a
positive eect of JSA on exit rates from unemployment into other benets, such as Inca-
pacity Benets, so that savings in the welfare expenditure may not have been as high as
believed. Machin and Marie study the relationship between crime and the introduction of
JSA and they nd that crime rates rose more in areas most aected by JSA, that is where
the increase of outow rate was higher. Moreover, they observe an overall increase of the
outow rate to destination \nowhere", which refers to people who drop o the register
but do not end up into employment, into full time education or training, or into other
benets.
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as it is 1.72 percentage points out of an estimated outow for the treatment
group of 10.51%. Basically, most of claimants who dropped o the register
kept on seeking for a job and this gives a picture of how tighter have become
entitlement criteria than those which have to be met in order to be registered
as ILO unemployed. This is consistent with gure 1.1 which clearly shows
that JSA reduced the proportion of claimants in the unemployment pool. We
interpret these ndings as supportive of the view that expenditure savings
were not the only implication of the \weeding out" eect28.
Another way to check the operating of the \weeding out" eect is to esti-
mate the treatment eect for dierent groups by search activity dimensions.
The LFS provides information both about last time the interviewed searched
for work and about the number of search methods he experienced in the last
4 weeks. As our theoretical conclusions suggest, claimants who self-report
as exerting a low level of search eort are supposed to be the most aected
by the JSA. Following Manning [2009] we split the claimant non-employed
sample into 4 categories according to the last time they searched for work
and to their willingness to work29. Table 1.2 shows the results when we apply
our usual technique to these 4 groups separately, where search activity levels
refer to wave 1. Comparisons between these groups cannot be very precise
since the size of group 1 (search in last week) is far higher than that of the
others. Anyway, DiD estimates in column 2 clearly suggest that the smallest
treatment eect regards people who have searched in the past week, and this
is exactly what we expected on the ground of our theoretical predictions. A
pejorative reading of the table may awaken some worries about the reliability
of these results, since we can also notice that the treatment eect for group
2 is far larger than that of both groups with the smallest search intensity,
and the coecients of the latter lose signicance when controls are added.
28The analysis so far uses as a basic sample people who are claimant in wave 1 without
any restrictions in their activity status. For the purpose of disentangling claimant outows
by economic activity destination within the not-in-employment category, a more rened
analysis should focus on just claimant unemployed in wave 1. We argue that unemployed
who lose the right to claim, but still keep on looking for job as unemployed instead of
ending up inactive, can be a good proxy of people who embark job search not just for the
purpose of exploiting the benet. When restricting the sample to claimant-unemployed in
wave 1 we drop employed and inactive people who account for a small part of the claimant
pool, thus if we replicate the exercise of table 1.1 results are very similar.
29The LFS provides search measures only for non-employed people, but this is no concern
of ours since we are not dealing with on-the-job search. Therefore, the sample we use for
this analysis picks up only individuals not in employment in wave 1. We have already
pointed out that a portion of these individuals, even though small, end up in employment
in wave 2. We drop these observations as here our purpose is to focus on just the \weeding
out" eect.
1.7. The Impact of JSA on Claimant Outows 33
Table 1.2
Impact of JSA on claimant outflow by search activity in wave 1
Average Treatment Eect on: 1 2 3 4
(4) Do not want work 0.0826 0.1283 0.0992 0.1112
(0.128) (0.056) (0.088) (0.115)
observations 348 1012 346 945
(3) Want work, no search in past 4 weeks 0.1506 0.1026 0.1466 0.0843
(0.002) (0.097) (0.004) (0.193)
observations 426 1094 418 1029
(2) Search in past 4 weeks 0.1980 0.2031 0.2461 0.2100
(0.001) (0.011) (0.000) (0.011)
observations 226 650 223 634
(1) Search in last week 0.0839 0.0751 0.0834 0.0721
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
observations 3401 9706 3365 9400
LOW SEARCH vs HIGH SEARCH
(2,3,4) Low Search 0.1374 0.1416 0.1348 0.1248
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
observations 1000 2756 987 2608
(1) High Search 0.0839 0.0751 0.0834 0.0721
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
observations 3401 9706 3365 9400
Dierence-in-Dierences No X No X
Controls No No X X
Notes:
1. The basic sample are claimants non-employed in wave 1. People who end up in employment in
wave 2 (whether they stop claiming or not) are dropped. Notes to table 1.1 apply here.
Anyway, if we run a regression pooling observations of groups 1, 2 and 3 we
get a DiD of 14.2%, which is almost twice as large as the coecient for group
1 and statistically dierent (also regressions with controls reveal a signicant
dierence in the coecients).
Table 1.3 shows similar results when we split the sample by number of
search methods used in the past 4 weeks. When looking at column 2 we
observe a signicant and quite large treatment eect for the 5 groups with
lowest numbers, while it gets smaller and not signicant at a 5% level for
claimants who exerted 5, 6 or 7 search methods. Surprisingly, the treatment
eect for claimants who reported the highest number of search methods is
signicant and quite large, and this denitely clashes with our theoretical
predictions. This result may be partially explained by misleading responses
when interviewed. In fact, people are asked to report out of 12 search meth-
ods which ones they adopted, so claimants who answer they adopted most,
if not all, of them, may just trying to emphasize their search eort while
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Table 1.3
Impact of JSA on claimant outflow by number of search methods in
wave 1
Average Treatment Eect on: 1 2 3 4
0 0.1230 0.1249 0.1221 0.1099
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.021)
observations 774 2106 764 1974
1 0.0848 0.2611 0.1066 0.2465
(0.211) (0.008) (0.101) (0.016)
observations 161 407 143 348
2 0.1585 0.1379 0.1604 0.1297
(0.003) (0.037) (0.002) (0.054)
observations 263 731 257 669
3 0.1118 0.1244 0.1220 0.1398
(0.001) (0.009) (0.000) (0.003)
observations 450 1357 446 1263
4 0.0926 0.0864 0.0847 0.0777
(0.002) (0.025) (0.004) (0.041)
observations 581 1682 574 1635
5 0.0711 0.0167 0.0735 0.0179
(0.007) (0.586) (0.002) (0.545)
observations 706 2009 697 1977
6 0.1041 0.0580 0.1044 0.0587
(0.000) (0.071) (0.000) (0.060)
observations 771 2159 765 2138
7 0.0706 0.0660 0.0613 0.0482
(0.022) (0.091) (0.024) (0.178)
observations 478 1356 473 1337
8+ 0.0397 0.1366 0.0680 0.1375
(0.376) (0.037) (0.126) (0.026)
observations 216 655 199 649
LOW SEARCH vs HIGH SEARCH
(0,1,2,3,4) Low Search 0.1168 0.1208 0.1155 0.1148
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
observations 2229 6283 2197 5899
(5,6,7,8+) High Search 0.0796 0.0544 0.0810 0.0528
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004)
observations 2171 6179 2154 6109
Dierence-in-Dierences No X No X
Controls No No X X
Notes:
1. The basic sample are claimants non-employed in wave 1. People who end up in employment in
wave 2 (whether they stop claiming or not) are dropped. Notes to table 1.1 apply here.
this may have not actually been as high as reported. Even in this case, we
get very convincing results if we run two regressions pooling observations of
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groups with, respectively, the lowest and the highest search numbers and we
compare treatment eects estimates: the DiD calculated on groups with re-
ported numbers from 0 to 4 is more than two times larger than that computed
on groups from 5 to 8+ numbers, and statistically dierent.
Both of these tables show results consistent with those Manning obtained
in similar exercises, and overall they seem to support the view that JSA
removed from the claimant count especially people with low levels of search
activity30.
1.8 Search Behaviour and Treatment Eect
by Housing Tenure
The message we draw by the empirical analysis of the eect of JSA seems clear
cut. The tightening of search requirements had a sizeable impact in moving
o benet non-employed people, but only a negligible portion of them entered
employment. Moreover, this \weeding out" eect involved especially those
with a low level of search intensity. Now, our purpose is to check whether
these results t our theoretical predictions about both search behaviour and
the eect of JSA on the claimant status, with regard to dierent housing
tenure categories. Since the treatment operated in a dierent way according
to search intensity of non-employed, and since our model predicts dierent
search levels for people with dierent housing tenure, it is natural to test
whether the estimated treatment eect diers by housing tenure.
In order to run the empirical analysis on housing tenure we restrict the
basic sample dropping few individuals who get housing related benets31.
In our model, housing related benets would work as a reduction of housing
costs, implying a lower optimal search intensity, therefore, this element would
bias dierences in treatment eect among housing tenure categories, should
30Of course, both variables we use represent a crude measure of the actual search eort
of an unemployed, so it is not surprising that our regressions are not able to capture a
continuous relationship between them and the treatment eect. Anyway, we think that
these measures are reliable enough, in that it looks like existing a correlation between
these measures and not only the abstract concept of the probability of meeting search
requirements, as tables 1.2 and 1.3 point out, but also between them and the probability
of nding a job. For example, if we split up our sample of non-employed claimants between
people who remain in non-employment and people who end up in employment, we observe
very dierent distributions over these search eort's measures. Tables are available upon
request.
31The LFS provides information about housing related benets, like housing benet,
which applies to only renters, and council tax benet or rebate, which can apply to owners
too.
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not the distribution of benets be uniform over these categories. In our
sample the percentage of individuals getting housing related benet is anyway
very small, around 3%, and renters account for a huge 85% of this quota.
Moreover all of these observations regard 1997, so we have observations for
neither 1996 nor 1995. Since in our sample mostly renters claim housing
related benets, if we kept these observations we would introduce a bias
in dierences in treatment eect between renters and both other groups,
operating through the 1997 seasonal eect32.
Table 1.4 shows treatment eect estimates when we run separate regres-
sions for each housing tenure sample. These ndings are interesting. Even
though the JSA reform had in general a sizeable impact on the claimant
outow, it had no eect on the outright owners' sample. Only mortgagers
and renters were aected by the reform and their impact was large: 8 and
almost 10 percentage points, respectively. The lower part of the table shows
whether dierences in treatment eect are statistically signicant. While
both eects on mortgagers and renters are statistically dierent from that on
owners outright, there is no dierence between them.
These gures cannot distinguish claimants who exit the claimant status
and remain non-employed, from those who end up in employment. It is in-
teresting to disentangle the general eect accounting for the two ows, and
to split up each of them with regard to the housing tenure. Table 1.5 shows
the results of this exercise. As we remember from the previous section, JSA
had no eect on the ow into employment, on average; we learn now that
this eect is not even signicant for any one of these categories, neither are
there dierences between them. According to these results we would ex-
pect to nd a similar pattern for ow into non-employment and ow into
any status, but the left part of the table shows remarkably dierent results
from those general of table 1.4. In fact, we notice an outstanding change
in dierences in treatment eect between mortgagers and both other cate-
gories. The dierence in treatment eect between mortgagers and outright
owners shrinks from 11.6% to 3.6% and it is no more signicant, while the
dierence between renters and mortgagers increases from 2.8% to 4.9% and
it becomes signicant at a 10% level. The most striking change regards the
decomposition of the eect on mortgagers, which appears quite balanced in
size between ow into non-employment and into employment. Even if the
eect on ow into employment is not signicant, the coecient of ow into
32Given the small number of observations and that these apply only to 1997, we think
the most suitable way to prevent this bias is to drop these individuals instead of allowing
for a dummy for housing related benets. We also tried to include these cases plugging in
a dummy referring to people who claim or not housing related benets, but dierences in
treatment eects by housing tenure categories are largely unaected.
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Table 1.4
Treatment effects on claimant outflow by housing tenure: from
claimants not-in-employment to any economic activity
DiD by housing tenure DiD p > jzj obs
DiDo -0.0329 (0.489) 1762
DiDm 0.0802 (0.010) 4445
DiDr 0.0966 (0.000) 7964
Dierences by housing tenure Coecient p > jzj obs
DiDm  DiDo 0.1157 (0.053) 6207
DiDr  DiDo 0.1331 (0.010) 9726
DiDr  DiDm 0.0279 (0.437) 12409
Notes:
1. DiDo = DiD over the sample of outright owners, DiDm = DiD over the sample of mortgagers,
DiDr = DiD over the sample of renters. The basic sample are claimants non-employed in wave
1. The sample contains both \stayers", i.e. those who remain non-employed in wave 2, whether
they move o the claimant status or not, and \movers", i.e. those who end up in employment in
wave 2, whether they move o the claimant status or not. Notes to table 1.1 apply here.
2. The upper part of the table reports Dierence-in-Dierences estimates from three dierent regres-
sions by housing tenure, where controls are always included.
3. The lower part reports dierences in DiD estimates between two housing tenure categories. These
estimates come from three regressions which pool observations of two by two categories. Every
regression includes all usual variables for the DiD, and also interactions between each of them and
a dummy for housing tenure: the dierence between DiDs we report is just the coecient of the
triple interaction term between the dummy for housing tenure and the interaction term jsa  d96.
Table 1.5
Treatment effects on claimant outflow by housing tenure: from
claimants not-in-employment to not-in-employment and to
employment
DiD by To not-in-employment To employment
housing tenure DiD p > jzj obs DiD p > jzj obs
DiDo 0.0059 (0.863) 1762 -0.0293 (0.396) 1762
DiDm 0.0417 (0.056) 4445 0.0395 (0.149) 4445
DiDr 0.1009 (0.000) 7964 -0.0034 (0.789) 7964
Dierences by
housing tenure Coecient p > jzj obs Coecient p > jzj obs
DiDm  DiDo 0.0364 (0.378) 6207 0.0786 (0.146) 6207
DiDr  DiDo 0.0940 (0.031) 9726 0.0195 (0.533) 9726
DiDr  DiDm 0.0491 (0.090) 12409 -0.0288 (0.215) 12409
Notes:
1. Notes to table 1.4 apply here. The outcome variable for the analysis of outows into non-
employment takes 1 only if the individual is neither claimant nor employed in wave 2; it takes 0
in all other cases. The outcome variable for the analysis of outows into employment takes 1 only
if the individual is both non-claimant and in employment in wave 2; it takes 0 in all other cases.
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non-employment is still signicant, but this latter is now too small to yield
a signicant dierence from that for outright owners.
A rst interesting reading can be given of the ndings above. Mortgagers
account for a relevant portion of movers33. Of course, the sample of movers
is too small to yield signicant dierences in treatment eects between mort-
gagers and both other categories, yet this result may be a symptom of mort-
gagers being crowded in the upper part of the search intensity distribution.
This would not let us conclude that mortgagers exert more eort than oth-
ers, on average, since if we look at the stayers sample we notice that outright
owners are the least prone to be weeded out, suggesting that these may ac-
tually have the highest search intensity. We look now into this point more
thoroughly, providing descriptive statistics about search intensity.
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 show whether dierences in High Search percentages
by housing tenure are signicant34. They represent a broad-brush test of
search behaviour's outcomes predicted by our theoretical model. Our model
predicts a higher optimal search eort, the higher are housing costs, and the
lower is the degree of attachment to the accommodation, so we expect that
mortgagers and renters exhibit higher search intensity than outright owners.
Moreover, mortgagers should exhibit higher search intensity than renters so
long as the \housing cost eect" is larger than the \mobility cost" eect. The
latter prediction relies on a specic assumption about housing costs' size of
the dierent housing tenure.
Unfortunately, the LFS lacks measures on housing costs so we cannot test
this assumption over the sample we use. Yet we can provide some evidence in
support of it using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)35.
We draw individual data from the sixth wave, which regards the period from
1st September 1996 to the end of April 199736 and we regress the net housing
costs variable on a dummy which takes 1 for mortgagers and zero for renters.
Results are reported in table 1.8. The coecient of the dummy owner reveals
a dierence in means of $105, which drops to $60 if we control for dierences
in the gross household income between mortgagers and renters. In the third
regression we plug in the dummy noemp and its interaction with owner to
33The raw percentage of mortgagers in the movers' sample is 46.7%, while they account
for a smaller 30.9% in the whole sample.
34Search measures refer to wave 1.
35The BHPS is an ongoing annual survey which follows any individuals of the original
sample collected in 1990, which accounted for about 5,000 British households, making
a total of approximately 10,000 adult members (16+). The same individuals are re-
interviewed in successive waves and, if they split-o from original households, all adult
members of their new households are also interviewed.
36Most of the interviews are carried out by the end of December.
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Table 1.6
Testing differences in High Search: search categories
STAYERS
Dierences in
High Search (HS) Coecient Std. Err. p > jtj [95% Conf. Interval] obs.
HSm  HSo 0.0362 0.0130 0.005 0.0109 0.0617 4763
HSm  HSr 0.0514 0.0084 0.000 0.0348 0.0679 10584
HSr  HSo -0.0151 0.0121 0.214 -0.0389 0.0087 8705
MOVERS
Dierences in
High Search (HS) Coecient Std. Err. p > jtj [95% Conf. Interval] obs.
HSm  HSo -0.0077 0.0171 0.653 -0.0411 0.0258 1544
HSm  HSr 0.0163 0.0132 0.220 -0.0097 0.0422 2158
HSr  HSo -0.0239 0.0178 0.180 -0.0589 0.0111 1346
ALL
Dierences in
High Search (HS) Coecient Std. Err. p > jtj [95% Conf. Interval] obs.
HSm  HSo 0.0324 0.0109 0.003 0.0111 0.0537 6307
HSm  HSr 0.0602 0.0072 0.000 0.0461 0.0743 12742
HSr  HSo -0.0278 0.0104 0.008 -0.0483 -0.0074 10051
Notes:
1. The basic sample are claimants non-employed in wave 1. \Stayers" are those who remain non-
employed in wave 2, whether they move o the claimant status or not, and \movers" are those
who end up in employment in wave 2, whether they move o the claimant status or not. The
\All" part of the table pools the two samples. Statistics allow for sample weights.
Table 1.7
Testing differences in High Search: numbers of search methods
STAYERS
Dierences in
High Search (HS) Coecient Std. Err. p > jtj [95% Conf. Interval] obs.
HSm  HSo 0.0992 0.0159 0.000 0.0681 0.1303 4763
HSm  HSr 0.0883 0.0105 0.000 0.0677 0.1089 10584
HSr  HSo -0.0109 0.0146 0.455 -0.0177 0.0394 8705
MOVERS
Dierences in
High Search (HS) Coecient Std. Err. p > jtj [95% Conf. Interval] obs.
HSm  HSo 0.0506 0.0271 0.062 -0.0025 0.1039 1544
HSm  HSr 0.0492 0.0194 0.011 0.0112 0.0872 2158
HSr  HSo 0.0015 0.0281 0.958 -0.0536 0.0565 1346
ALL
Dierences in
High Search (HS) Coecient Std. Err. p > jtj [95% Conf. Interval] obs.
HSm  HSo 0.0996 0.0139 0.000 0.0723 0.1269 6307
HSm  HSr 0.1099 0.0092 0.000 0.0919 0.1279 12742
HSr  HSo -0.0103 0.0131 0.430 -0.0361 0.0154 10051
Notes:
1. See table 1.6. Statistics allow for sample weights.
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Table 1.8
Difference in net housing costs of mortgagers and renters
Net monthly housing costs (1) (2) (3) (4)
Owner 105.1 (6.7 ) 60.3 (8.0 ) 34.9 (10.3 ) 32.0 (11.0 )
Gross household income 0.049 (0.005 ) 0.046 (0.005 ) 0.041 (0.005 )
Noemp -63.1 (10.0 ) -51.7 (9.9 )
Noemp*Owner 65.4 (12.7 ) 53.8 (12.4 )
Controls (age, household size, No No No X
education, region)
Constant 167.0 (5.9 ) 101.8 (6.8 ) 132.0 (9.9 ) 153.8 (22.2 )
n 6305 6305 6299 6275
R2 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.23
Notes:
1. Standard errors are in brackets
2. The dependent variable is the monthly housing expenditure: for renters is the gross rent minus
rent rebates or allowances, for mortgagers is the last instalment on the mortgage or loan. Owner
is a dummy which takes 1 for mortgagers and takes 0 for renters, noemp is a dummy which takes
1 for non-employed and 0 for employed. Controls are age, household size, educational dummies,
regional dummies.
3. The gross household income is the sum of incomes from all sources perceived in the last month,
before tax and other deductions. This sum is then divided for the McClements scale factor,
which allows for the eects of household size and composition on needs when making income
comparisons. We use the particular scale factor built for comparisons in incomes before housing
costs are deducted.
check wether the dierence in housing costs holds also for non-employed peo-
ple, who represent our main focus in this paper (noemp=1 if non-employed,
noemp=0 if employed)37. The out-of-pocket housing expenditure for non-
employed mortgagers is on average $100 higher than non-employed renters,
and this dierence slightly drops to $86 if we add further controls for age,
household size, education and region. This nding conrms for Britain that
mortgagers face on average signicantly higher out-of-pocket housing costs
than renters, and supports our assumption with regard to the sample of non-
employed we are dealing with. Incidentally, we also note that the dierence
in housing costs is mostly evident for non-employed, while it is far lower for
employed, which is only $32. In relative terms this result is even more strong
since housing costs are on average higher for employed than non-employed.
Statistics on search intensity measures of claimants are not wholly consis-
tent with our predictions, yet. The \All" part of tables 1.6 and 1.7 shows the
relevant statistics for this analysis. Both of our measures suggest that mort-
gagers exert, on average, higher search intensity than outright owners and
than renters. The former nding conrms theoretical expectations. In order
37When we control for the unemployment benet claimants the dierence in housing
costs is the same for claimants and non-claimants, but this test is not very reliable since
the subset of claimants within the BHPS sample is too small.
1.8. Search Behaviour and Treatment Eect by Housing Tenure 41
to be consistent with the theory, the latter calls for a larger \housing cost"
than \mobility cost" eect. Contrary to model's predictions, search measures
are not higher for renters than outright owners: both are even slightly lower
for renters, though only the rst one shows a signicant dierence.
At this stage, we have all empirical results we need to discuss our view
about the housing tenure puzzle. The discussion will evolve by means of two-
fold comparisons between the three housing tenure categories: (1) mortgagers
versus renters, (2) mortgagers versus outright owners, (3) renters versus out-
right owners. We think our theoretical framework is able to explain dier-
ences in outcomes between mortgagers and renters we observe in the data.
Indeed, the latter show that dierences in both search intensity measures
are signicant both among stayers and within the overall sample, while only
dierences in search methods' numbers are signicant among movers. This
is straight evidence for mortgagers exerting higher search eort than renters.
As a consequence, we argue, the introduction of JSA moved o benet more
renters than mortgagers among those who remained non-employed. Mort-
gagers were able to insulate themselves from the impact of tighter search
requirements either because their search eort was already above the new
threshold, or because they found worthwhile to increase it in order to keep
on claiming. Regardless of the way, the reason has been the same: hous-
ing costs of mortgagers are so much higher than renters that they cannot
aord to lose the unemployment benet. We point out that the dierence in
housing costs is supposed to be high enough to oset the impact of moving
costs, which works in the reverse direction by lowering returns to search for
mortgagers38.
The comparison in outcomes between mortgagers and outright owners
is consistent with our theory when looking at search behaviour, but it is
not when looking at dierences in treatment eect on the claimant out-
ow. Reported search intensity measures are in fact signicantly higher for
mortgagers, while the estimated treatment eect on stayers is not higher for
outright owners. Since search intensity is signicantly dierent also in the
stayers sample, we would expect to observe a higher \weeding out" eect for
outright owners. In brief, mortgagers search more than outright owners be-
cause they have higher housing costs to cope with and they are more mobile,
but this is not reected into lower probability to be crowded out when search
requirements are tightened39. Our theoretical model provides a possible solu-
38Of course, nothing can assure that housing costs are actually higher for mortgagers in
our sample, but existing empirical evidence does support this assumption in general.
39One possible explanation for this contradiction could appeal to a dierent distribution
in search intensity between mortgagers and renters whenever we observed thicker tails for
mortgagers, but the evidence we have come up with does not support that.
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tion to this puzzle in that it allows for a dierent search behaviour response to
the treatment. Insofar, we have ignored the occurrence of a treatment eect
also on search activity, but, according to our theoretical model, we expect to
observe a group of claimants who react to tightening of search requirements
by modifying their optimal search: within this group some claimants will
nd optimal to increase search in order to meet the higher threshold, while
others will nd optimal to reduce it. Thus, our comparison in the \weeding
out" eect of mortgagers and outright owners would be fully consistent with
our theoretical predictions as long as we observed a higher (and positive)
treatment eect on search activity of outright owners. We will explore this
later.
Finally, our theoretical model fails in predicting a higher search intensity
for renters than owners outright. Dierences in search intensity measures
between these groups are never signicant but in the overall sample for the
rst variable, where search is even higher for outright owners. Moreover,
coecients are generally larger, though not signicant, for this category.
Both housing costs' and moving costs' eects look like not operating in this
comparison, since they should push for an increase in search incentives of
renters. Anyway, in spite of a similar search eort, renters have been strongly
aected by the stricter search rules, while outright owners avoided entirely
their impact (see table 1.5, left part)40. We may sort it out if in turn we
observed a higher treatment eect on search activity of outright owners.
This issue may account for the large observed dierences in the \weeding
out" eect, but it could not explain why renters and outright owners exert a
similar search activity although the former have to cope with higher housing
and moving costs.
According to comparisons between DiD estimates of dierent housing
tenure categories, outright owners seem more able at avoiding the eect of
JSA than it may be gathered by the search activity distribution in wave 1. In
fact, outright owners search less than mortgagers but this is not reected in
a higher treatment eect for the former, and the treatment eect on renters
is far higher than that on outright owners despite no dierences in search ac-
tivity. One explanation of these ndings could appeal to a dierent variation
in search activity as a response to JSA. For example, outright owners may
have stronger incentives than other categories to increase their search eorts
in order to keep on claiming, and this should show in a higher estimate of
the treatment eect on search intensity.
In tables 1.9 and 1.10 we report estimates of the average treatment eect
40As in the previous comparison, no major distributional eects seem explain this con-
tradiction.
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Table 1.9
The impact of JSA on search activity: search categories
Samples Coecient p > jzj obs.
Whole Sample 0.01 0.723 11971
Outright Owners 0.10 0.280 1436
Mortgagers 0.07 0.242 3296
Renters -0.03 0.365 7239
Notes:
1. The base sample is made of only stayers since we cannot observe search measures for people who
are employed. We consider claimants who both leave and remain in the claimant pool.
2. The dependent variable is the variation in the search variable between wave 2 and wave 1 for each
group. Since the search variable can take four values which are the integers in the range from 1
to 4, the dependent variable can take all integers in the range from -3 to 3. The values of the
search variable are recoded so that higher numbers mean higher search intensity, thus a positive
coecient means an increase in search intensity.
3. Results come from an ordered probit model. Given that the DiD coecient is very robust to the
inclusion of controls, these are not included in order to avoid the problem of choosing proper values
of them to compute coecients. We estimate the parameters of the index model by means of an
ordered probit and then we compute the expected values of the dependent variable conditioning
for being part either of the treatment group or of the control group and for each of the three years.
The matrix of regressors here is Xi = [d96i d97i jsai jsai  d96i], so, for example, the expected
values of yi for the treatment group in 1996 is computed conditioning on Xi = [1 0 1 1]. We
estimate the average treatment eect of JSA subtracting from the dierence in expected values
for 1996 the weighted average of dierences for 1995 and 1997.
Table 1.10
The impact of JSA on search activity: number of search methods
Samples Coecient p > jzj obs.
Whole Sample 0.16 0.029 11971
Outright Owners 0.40 0.054 1436
Mortgagers 0.37 0.013 3296
Renters 0.02 0.821 7239
Notes:
1. Notes to table 1.9 apply here.
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of JSA on both search measures. Methodology is identical to the previous
analysis, except that the dependent variable is now the dierence between
search intensities in both waves. For example, when we use the four-fold cat-
egorization of search activity, we build a variable whose range is made of all
integers between -3 and 3, where 3 indicates a transition from \do not want
work" in wave 1 to \search in last week" in wave 2. We estimate the coe-
cients of the index model by means of an ordered probit, then we compute
the eect of JSA as Dierence-in-Dierences in the expected values of the
dependent variable for dierent groups. When we focus on the whole sample,
JSA seems to have a positive eect only on the number of search methods,
though the coecient is tiny. Anyway, as we pointed out in section 1.3, the
expected eect on the average search intensity of claimants in wave 1 is am-
biguous: some may increase search intensity in order to stick to new rules,
while others may reduce it and stop claiming41. When we focus on specic
sub-samples by housing tenure, we do not obtain any signicant coecient
using the rst variable, but results for the number of search methods are in
part consistent with what we expected. In fact, table 1.10 shows that the
eect for renters is zero, while it is positive and signicant for outright own-
ers and mortgagers42. Even though the estimated eects are small, this table
suggests that JSA increased the number of search methods of both owners'
categories while it had no eect on renters. These results are in line with
the estimated dierence in the \weeding out" eect for outright owners and
renters, since they suggest that the former may have been able to avoid the
eect of new requirements just by increasing their search eort. Anyway, the
evidence provided overall by tables 1.9 and 1.10 for this case is mild and it
is still unexplained why the \weeding out" eect was not higher for outright
owners than mortgagers.
1.9 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the relation between the optimal search inten-
sity and the housing tenure exploiting the variation from the UK Jobseeker's
Allowance reform of 1996. The introduction of JSA brought many changes
41Manning Manning [2009] explores more in depth this issue rst focusing on claimants
in wave 2 and then looking at distributional eects. Anyway he does not nd compelling
evidence for a clear eect of JSA on the search activity of anyone within the distribution.
42We recall that we are using non-employed claimants in wave 1 as base sample, so some
of them may have moved o benet and thus reduced their search intensity in wave 2.
What we are interested in, is not that the average eect was positive for specic categories,
but that it was larger for some of them.
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to the unemployment benets scheme but the most signicant was repre-
sented by the substantial increase in job search requirements for the eligibil-
ity. Existing evaluation of this reform has accounted for a strong \weeding
out" eect, which means that a major impact of the reform was directed to
claimants with low search eort who moved o benet without nding a job.
Our empirical analysis largely conrms this view and on top of this it points
out that housing tenure matters in shaping the eect of this reform.
To investigate the impact of tighter job search requirements we use a
simple search model, where we introduce moving and housing costs in order to
capture the two dierent channels through which the degree of attachment to
the accommodation aects search behaviour. We make use of this theoretical
framework to compare outcomes of three distinct housing tenure categories:
outright owners, mortgagers and renters. The existing literature we refer to
has usually focussed on comparisons between renters and owners in general,
while only sometimes it has pointed out some peculiarities of mortgagers. We
provide a general framework within which it is possible to analyze separately
and then to compare behaviour and outcomes of these three distinct groups.
Using a Dierence-in-Dierences approach we investigate these insights
by means of a dataset drawn from the Labour Force Survey. Treatment eect
estimates on the claimant outows are strongly related to housing tenure, and
we argue that this result is driven by dierences in search behaviour, which
in turn is aected by housing costs and mobility. Our analysis sheds further
light on the comparison between mortgagers and renters as it reveals that
higher search intensity has prevented mortgagers to be crowded out of the
claimant stock as much as renters has been.
The role of outright owners seems less clear cut, instead. Search intensity
measures provided by our dataset report higher numbers for outright owners
than we may expect given both moving and housing costs' eects. Also,
they are the category with the lowest estimated treatment eect on claimant
outow, but we would expect, according to their reported search intensity,
an impact higher than that for mortgagers and similar to that for renters.
Anyway, we do not think that these failings undermine the validity of our
theoretical foundations. Rather, we interpret these as signals of a missing
element of the puzzle, whose investigation is left for further research.
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Chapter 2
The Puzzle of Job Search and
Housing Tenure: a
Reconciliation of Theory and
Empirical Evidence
2.1 Introduction
During the nineties Andrew Oswald1 studied the relationship between the
unemployment rate and the homeownership rate for OECD countries and he
argued that homeownership was one of the major culprits of high unemploy-
ment given the observed strong positive correlation. The most inuential
microeconomic interpretation of this nding has focused on the supposed
lower job nding rates of unemployed people who own the home. In fact,
since homeownership hampers propensity to move for job reasons, homeown-
ers should have longer unemployment durations than otherwise comparable
renters2While there is abundant evidence supporting the rst element of this
rationale3, several empirical studies have found no support for the second,
and in most cases even the opposite, that is lower unemployment durations
for homeowners4.
1See Oswald [1996], Oswald [1997] and Oswald [1999].
2Other interpretations explored in the literature refer to the eect of homeownership on
the probability to be employed and on the employed's probability to become unemployed.
3See Van den Berg and Van Vuuren [1998], Henley [1998], Munch et al. [2006],
Van Vuuren [2009] and Battu et al. [2008].
4See Goss and Phillips [1997], Coulson and Fisher [2002], Flatau et al. [2003],
Munch et al. [2006], Van Vuuren [2009] and Battu et al. [2008].
47
48 Chapter 2. Job Search: Reconciling Theory and Evidence
The existing literature5 has provided two possible explanations for this
paradox. The rst one looks at the dierent eect of mobility costs on
job search behaviour between the local and the non local labour market.
The second has focused on the importance of making distinctions among
homeowners, in particular between mortgage-holders and outright owners,
and among renters, in particular between social and private renters, since
results can be very dierent by subgroups.
With regards to the rst explanation, Munch et al. [2006] point out that
the lower propensity of owner-occupiers to move for job reasons does not
necessarily imply that they have lower exit rates from unemployment. In
fact, homeowners may have higher reservation wages for jobs which require
a residential move, but also lower reservation wages for jobs which do not,
so that job nding rates in the local labour market may be as high as to
oset the lower rate for jobs in a distant area. Whether or not the total job
nding rate is lower for homeowners is just, they argue, an empirical matter
which depends on the magnitude of these two opposite eects. However,
Van Vuuren [2009] shows that in the model of Munch et al. [2006] the hazard
rate out of unemployment should be always lower for homeowners, but in a
special case, that is when homeowners can receive unemployment benet
only for a xed period, while renters never run out of it. Even in this case,
the theoretical eect of homeownership is ambiguous.
The second explanation takes into account some controversies with the
original Oswald's denitions of residential status. At rst, when compar-
ing homeowners and renters one should account for the role of mortgage
payments in confounding the relation between mobility costs and job search
behaviour. Committed housing expenditures such as the mortgage and the
rent should increase exit rates from unemployment through higher pressure
to return to work. Given that outright owners do not cope with these ex-
penses and that rent payments should be on average lower than mortgage
payments, this interpretation is consistent with the observed unemployment
duration for mortgage-holders being typically the lowest among dierent res-
idential statuses6. Second, also social and private renters do not behave the
same way7. Social renters may have lower mobility due to lock-in eects sim-
5See Rouwendal and Nijkamp [2008], and Havet and Penot [2010] for a survey of this
literature.
6Rouwendal and Nijkamp [2008] and Arzilli and Morescalchi [2011] provide evidence
for mortgagers having higher housing costs than renters on average.
7Social housing is a form of housing tenure in which the property is owned by Local
Authorities or by Housing Associations, usually with the aim of providing accommodation
at below-market rent or even rent-free.
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ilar to those which hamper homeowners mobility8. For example, long waiting
lists, security of tenure and the restricted transferability within social hous-
ing may cause social renters to be less prone to move for job reasons than
private renters9. Moreover, also the housing costs eect diers by tenant
status since social renters pay below-market rent.
Our contribution consists in rening the empirical analysis by taking into
account simultaneously housing costs and the distinctions among all the rele-
vant residential statuses, with the purpose of bringing out the empirical eect
of the main mechanism underlying the Oswald's hypothesis10. We start by
building a theoretical framework with endogenous search which models the
Oswald's eect as in Munch et al. [2006]. Homeownership rises the reserva-
tion wage and reduces the optimal search in the non local labour market, but
has opposite eects locally. In line with the ndings of Van Vuuren [2009],
our model overcomes the theoretical ambiguity of the model of Munch et al.
[2006] in that the negative eect of homeownership on non local outcomes
turns out to be unambiguously stronger. In particular, the endogenisation
of search allows us to evaluate the marginal impacts of homeownership on
both local and non local optimal search and then to compare them. As a net
eect, homeownership reduces the optimal search and the job nding rate,
which means that the Oswald's hypothesis is still veried.
In the theoretical model we ignore the role of housing costs but we are
aware that the eect of housing costs may revert the Oswald's outcome empir-
ically. Hence, the comparison in the model is intended to be between owners
with no mortgage payments and private renters. We do allow for housing
costs in the empirical analysis, where observed outcomes are confounded by
this eect.
We carry out our empirical analysis using data from the British House-
hold Panel Survey (BHPS), which provides job search eort's measures for
unemployed. We use these categorical measures as dependent variables and
we regress them on the housing tenure dummies using a random eects pro-
bit and controlling for several individual (or household) characteristics. The
BHPS provide us with a measure for housing costs, which we plug in the
regression in order to purge search dierentials of the housing costs eect.
Moreover, we control for dierent tenure statuses among homeowners, be-
8See Flatau et al. [2003], Battu et al. [2008], McCormick [1983],
Hughes and McCormick [1981] and Hughes and McCormick [1987].
9Hughes and McCormick [2000] in a later work argue that these eects may have less-
ened.
10Munch et al. [2006], Van Vuuren [2009] and Battu et al. [2008], which represent the
most updated analysis of the Oswald's hypothesis have disregarded one or both of these
issues.
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tween mortgage and outright, and among renters, between social and private.
Our focus is on the job search intensity, unlike the empirical literature,
which typically has tested the Oswald's hypothesis looking at the hazard rate.
The probability that an unemployed worker will nd a job can be decomposed
as the product of two probabilities: the probability of receiving a job oer
and the probability of this oer being accepted. Job search eort is positively
related to the rst, and to the second through the negative relation with the
reservation wage and maybe also through the positive eect of search on
the quality of job oers. Whatsoever, the relationship between search and
the hazard rate is always positive, so nothing is lost whenever we state the
Oswald's hypothesis in terms of a negative eect of homeownership on the
search intensity.
The empirical evidence we provide is consistent with the theory outlined.
In fact, the Oswald's hypothesis is conrmed in the sense that the search
dierential between outright owners and private renters, the two extremes of
mobility, is negative, even whenever the housing costs eect is netted out.
More in details, though search intensity is usually higher for homeowners
than renters, this dierence is no more meaningful when we rene the resi-
dential status denitions, since it is clear that mortgagers search more than
outright owners and private renters more than social. Anyway, the negative
search dierential between outright owners and private renters manifests it-
self through the owners' lower attachment to the labour market, while no
statistical dierence in search intensity measures is found looking only at
non-employed workers who state to have been looking for work in the last
four weeks. Moreover, housing costs work in the expected direction albeit
with weak impact, and never revert the sign of search dierentials.
Our ndings are very similar to those of Flatau et al. [2003] who, exam-
ining data for Australia, provide strong evidence that the counter-Oswald
results are due to the behaviour of leveraged owners and social tenants. In
fact, while they nd that homeowners have higher probability to exit un-
employment than renters, when they compare outright owners with private
renters they nd strong evidence, particularly for females, that outright own-
ers are slower to become reemployed than private renters.
2.2 The Theoretical Model
In this section we present a simplied model of job search with endogenous
search eort and exogenous wage oer distribution11. In order to investi-
11See Mortensen [1986] for the background of search modeling and Manning [2009] for
a similar version.
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gate the Oswald's explanation for the impact of homeownership on search
behaviour, we ignore housing costs and we just focus on moving costs12.
The eect of homeownership is captured by allowing for two labour mar-
kets which dier geographically as in Munch et al. [2006]. By denition, the
local labour market is the region in which a worker can take a job without
moving. The non local labour market is the rest of the economy. Workers
can have a job only in the region they live in, so if they want to accept a
job oer in the other region they have necessarily to move, i.e. we do not
allow commuting. This setup captures the idea that there exist two distinct
reservation wages, one for the local labour market and one for jobs outside,
which will diverge when moving entails a cost.
To model the lifetime utility of the employed as simple as possible without
aecting our main results, we rule out on-the-job search and we set to zero
the separation rate, that is:
V E(w) =
w

; (2.1)
where w is the wage and  is the discount rate.
The unemployed can increase the job oer arrival rate through search
activity at the cost of an utility loss of Cs. This cost and the job oers
arrival rate dier between the local and non local labour market uniquely for
the search eort exerted in each of them, which we call sl and sn respectively.
We assume that the total cost of search function is additive in the costs of
search in the two labour markets, i.e. Cs = c(sl) + c(sn), where c0 > 0 and
c00 > 013. The arrival rate of job oers in the local and non local labour
markets are respectively (sl) and (sn), where 0 > 0 and 00 < 0. Wage
oers are sampled from the c.d.f. F (w) which we assume identical for both
markets. When choosing how to distribute search eort in the two labour
markets, the unemployed must take into account the cost of moving, that is
the cost he would incur if he found and accepted a job in the other region.
The dierence in this cost for homeowners and renters is precisely what
captures the Oswald's eect in the model. For simplicity, we set this cost
to zero for renters since we need only that it is higher for homeowners. The
value equation for the unemployed renter is:
V U = b  c(sl)  c(sn) + ((sl) + (sn))
Z
wr
(V E(w)  V U) dF (w); (2.2)
12See Arzilli and Morescalchi [2011] for an endogenous search model which includes
also the housing costs eect. When comparing search outcomes of homeowners (outright
owners) and renters in this set-up, housing costs simply reinforces the negative eect of
homeownership due to moving costs.
13The assumptions on c yield a standard convex total cost of search function. The model
may be enriched by allowing higher costs of search in the non local labour market, but this
is irrelevant for the comparison between search behaviours of homeowners and renters.
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where wr is the reservation wage for the renter and b is the unemployment
benet. The unemployed sets the reservation wage and the search eort levels
in order to maximise his lifetime utility. As the renter can move without
costs, he is indierent between accepting a job in the local labour market or
outside, so the reservation wage is the same in both. Given risk neutrality,
the reservation wage will be such that wr = V
U . Replacing this and equation
2.1 in equation 2.2, and rearranging we have:
wr = b  c(sl)  c(sn) +
((sl) + (sn))

Z
wr
(w   wr) dF (w): (2.3)
Dierentiating 2.3 with respect to sl and sn we get the rst order conditions
for the maximum:
c0(sl ) = 
0(sl )A; (2.4)
c0(sn) = 
0(sn)A; (2.5)
where we set A =  1
R
wr
(w wr) dF (w). It is easy to show that the unemployed
renter will exert the same search eort in both markets. In fact, from 2.4
and 2.5 we get c0(sl )=
0(sl ) = c
0(sn)=
0(sn), which is true only when s

l = s

n
14.
In this simple setup, with no additional costs of search far from home and
no costs of moving, the renter is indierent between search locally and in a
distant area.
If the unemployed is homeowner he has to consider the cost m which he
would run into if he accepted a job in the non local labour market15. The
discounted lifetime utility for the unemployed homeowner is:
 ~V U = b c(sl) c(sn)+(sl)
Z
w
l

w

  ~V U

dF (w)+(sn)
Z
wn

w

  ~V U  m

dF (w);
(2.6)
where we have already replaced V E(w) = w=. Now, we have two distinct levels
of the reservation wage, one for each of the two markets. The reservation wage
for the local labour market is wl =  ~V
U , while the reservation wage for the job
oers outside the local labour market is wn =  ~V
U + m: to accept a job oer
which requires a move, the unemployed homeowner needs a compensation
14Alternatively, since sl and sn have the same impact on the cost and the revenue for
the unemployed renter, we may maximise with respect to the total search eort s subject
to the constraint s = sl + sn.
15The cost of moving will be the same whether the homeowner moves to another owner-
occupied housing or to a rental accommodation, hence, this model captures only the lower
mobility due to the cost of selling a home. We may enrich the model by dierentiating
between moves to a rental and to an owner-occupied accommodation (with higher costs
for the latter), but this higher complexity will not come with any benets for our purposes.
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for the cost of moving. Equation 2.6 can be rewritten as
wl = b  c(sl)  c(sn) +
(sl)

Z
w
l
(w   wl ) dF (w) +
(sn)

Z
wn
(w   wl   m) dF (w):
(2.7)
The optimal search levels in the two markets are determined by the following
rst order conditions:
c0(sl ) = 
0(sl )B; (2.8)
c0(sn) = 
0(sn)C; (2.9)
where we set B =  1
R
w
l
(w   wl ) dF (w) and C =  1
R
wn
(w   wn) dF (w). Since
wl < w

n, B > C holds for any w. From 2.8 and 2.9, B > C implies c
0(sl )=
0(sl ) >
c0(sn)=
0(sn). Given that c is convex and  is concave, the latter inequality
implies sl > s

n. Unlike the renter, for the homeowner is optimal to search
harder in the local labour market than outside.
Up to this point we have found that the renter chooses the same level of
optimal search in both markets, which we indicate as sr, while the homeowner
sets sl > s

n. To identify the eect of housing tenure we compare now the
search eort of the renter and the homeowner in both markets. A rst result
is stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 sl > s

r > s

n.
Proof :
(a) sl > s

r. To prove this we calculate the derivative of s

l with respect to
m by means of the implicit function theorem. At rst, we need to calculate
dwl =dsl and dw

l =dm and evaluate these functions at the optimum.
Dierentiating equation 2.7 with respect to wl and sl we obtain:
dwl
dsl
=
 10(sl)
R
w
l
(w   wl )F 0(w)dw   c0(sl)
1 +  1(sl)[1  F (wl )] +  1(sn)[1  F (wn)]
: (2.10)
It can be easily shown that this derivative is zero for sl = sl , since the numer-
ator is zero as follows directly from the rst order condition for sl . Moreover
dwl =dsl > (<)0 if sl < (>)s

l . Dierentiating equation 2.7 with respect to w

l
and m we obtain:
dwl
dm
=   (sn)[1  F (w

l + m)]
1 +  1(sl)[1  F (wl )] +  1(sn)[1  F (wn)]
< 0: (2.11)
This derivative is negative for any value of sl. Intuitively, as the moving
cost increases, the reservation wage in the local labour market for the home-
owner drops since the acceptation of a job far from home comes with a lower
expected surplus. We rewrite now the rst order condition for sl as
(sl ;m) = c
0(sl ) 
0(sl )

Z
w
l
(s
l
;m)
[w   wl (sl ;m)]F 0(w)dw = 0: (2.12)
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Applying the implicit function theorem we have16
dsl
dm
=  m
s
l
=  
 10(sl )
R
w
l

dwl
dm

F 0(w)dw
c00(sl )   100(sl )
R
w
l
(w   wl )F 0(w)dw
> 0: (2.13)
As expected, the higher is the moving cost, the higher is the search of the
homeowner in the local labour market. Since the relation between sl and
m is positive for any value of m, this will be true in particular when m = 0,
that is when the optimal search locally (and non locally) is sr = s

l . Thus,
when m increases from zero to a positive number, which captures a shift
from tenant to owner status, the unemployed will increase search in the local
labour market from sr to s

l .
(b) sn < s

r. As in the previous case we calculate the derivatives dw

n=dsn
and dwn=dm and we study the sign of ds

n=dm. Dierentiating the equation
wn = w

l + m with respect to w

n and sn we obtain:
dwn
dsn
=
 10(sn)
R
wn
(w   wn)F 0(w)dw   c0(sn)
1 +  1(sl)[1  F (wl )] +  1(sn)[1  F (wn)]
: (2.14)
Given the rst order condition for sn, this derivative is zero when sn = s

n.
Moreover dwn=dsn > (<)0 if sn < (>)s

n. Dierentiating with respect to w

n and
m we obtain:
dwn
dm
=
+ (sl)[1  F (wl )]
1 +  1(sl)[1  F (wl )] +  1(sn)[1  F (wn)]
> 0: (2.15)
This derivative is positive for any value of sn. A rise in the moving cost
requires a higher wage to induce the homeowner to move for a job. We
rewrite the rst order condition for sn as
	(sn;m) = c
0(sn) 
0(sn)

Z
wn(sn;m)
[w   wn(sn;m)]F 0(w)dw = 0: (2.16)
16When computing sl we remark that
sl = c
00(sl ) 
00(sl )

Z
wl
(w   wl )F 0(w)dw +
0(sl )

Z
wl

dwl
dsl

F 0(w)dw =
= c00(sl ) 
00(sl )

Z
wl
(w   wl )F 0(w)dw > 0;
where the simplication is allowed given that dwl =dsl = 0 when sl = s

l . This derivative
is clearly positive since c00 > 0, 00 < 0, F 0 > 0. Also, m is negative since 0 > 0, F 0 > 0
and dwl =dm < 0.
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Applying the implicit function theorem we have17
dsn
dm
=  	m
	sn
=  
 10(sn)
R
wn

dwn
dm

F 0(w)dw
c00(sn)   100(sn)
R
wn
(w   wn)F 0(w)dw
< 0: (2.17)
The relation between sn and m is negative for any value of m, thus, when m
increases from zero to a positive number the unemployed will reduce search
in the non local labour market from sr to s

n.
The rationale of this proposition is straightforward. When the unem-
ployed has to face a cost of moving to accept a job oer far from home,
he search less outside and centres his eort on the local area to reduce the
probability of incurring this cost18. Whether or not the homeowner search
in general less than the renter depends on the balance of these two oppo-
site eects, whose net result can be identied within this framework, unlike
in Munch et al. [2006]. Before to tackle this point, we show the relations
between the reservation wages of homeowners and renters in both markets,
which is the counterpart of Proposition 1. That is stated in the following
proposition19:
Proposition 2 wl < w

r < w

n.
Proof : We only need to look at the rst order conditions 2.4, 2.5, 2.8, 2.9
and to remark the result of Proposition 1 and that c0()=0() is an increasing
function.
wl < w

r  ! B > A !
c0(sl )
0(sl )
>
c0(sr)
0(sr)
 ! sl > sr ;
wn > w

r  ! C < A !
c0(sn)
0(sn)
<
c0(sr)
0(sr)
 ! sn < sr :
In order to compare the total search level of the homeowner and the
renter, that is the impact of housing tenure on search, we just have to com-
pare the sum of search levels in the local and in the non local market for
both. The search level of the homeowner will be higher, equal or lower than
that of the renter as far as sl + s

n R 2sr. The only thing which dierentiates
17In the computation of 	sn we make use of the fact that dw

n=dsn = 0 when sn = s

n.
The sign of 	m is positive since dw

n=dm > 0.
18Commuting would be another mechanism which implies that homeowners may search
locally more than renters. Given the higher costs of moving, homeowners would be willing
to commute longer so that their local labour market would be larger. Anyway, no major
changes would take place for our purposes if we allowed for commuting in this set-up.
19This result is the same of what Munch et al. [2006] obtain in a model of search very
similar to ours except that they do not endogenise search eort.
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the homeowner from the renter is the moving cost, so we may expect that an
increase of the moving cost from zero to a positive number, which represents
just a shift from renter to owner tenure, comes with a reduction of the total
search. The rationale is that, although this cost is incurred only if the home-
owner actually moves, it increases the expected cost of search, which in turn
makes unemployment more valuable. Thus, despite the incentive to search
harder locally, this expected cost has to be covered by an extra reduction in
the non local search (from sr to s

n) with respect to what would be needed
to compensate the increase in the local search (from sr to s

l ). The following
proposition supports this insight:
Proposition 3 2sr > s

l + s

n.
Proof : Since we cannot derive a closed form for the optimal search levels,
the device of the demonstration is to study the derivatives of sl and s

n with
regards to m evaluated at m = 0. In fact, when m = 0 the optimal search is
identical in both the local and non local markets, so by deriving the optimal
search levels with respect to m we can compare the magnitude of the (op-
posite) marginal variations, which can be interpreted simply as \marginal"
dierences in each market's search levels between homeowner and renter.
Then we just need to show that the magnitude of the marginal decrease in
the non local search is higher, in absolute terms, than the marginal increase
in the local search. Let's look at equations 2.13 and 2.17 which represent
the marginal variations of the homeowner's local and non local search re-
spectively. When m = 0, we have sl = s

r = s

n thus the two derivatives are
identical expect for the derivatives of the reservation wage in the numerator,
which have opposite sign:
dsl
dm
(m = 0) =  
 10(sr)
R
wr

dwl
dm
(m = 0)

F 0(w)dw
c00(sr)   100(sr)
R
wr
(w   wr)F 0(w)dw
; (2.18)
dsn
dm
(m = 0) =  
 10(sr)
R
wr

dwn
dm
(m = 0)

F 0(w)dw
c00(sr)   100(sr)
R
wr
(w   wr)F 0(w)dw
: (2.19)
Making use of equations 2.11 and 2.15 we can evaluate the derivatives of the
reservation wages at the optimal values of search when m = 0:
dwl
dm
(sr ;m = 0) =  
(sr)[1  F (wr ]
1 +  1(sr)[1  F (wr)] +  1(sr)[1  F (wr)]
; (2.20)
dwn
dm
(sr ;m = 0) =
+ (sr)[1  F (wr)]
1 +  1(sr)[1  F (wr)] +  1(sr)[1  F (wr)]
: (2.21)
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It is easy to show that  > 0 implies dw

n
dm
(sr ;m = 0) > j dw

l
dm
(sr ;m = 0)j, which
in turn implies j dsn
dm
(m = 0)j > dsl
dm
(m = 0). This means that, for small m, the
dierence in the non local search between homeowner and renter is higher, in
absolute value, than the dierence in the local search, that is sr   sn > sl   sr,
which rearranging is identical to the proposition. This holds for every m so
the proposition is proved.
Unlike the model of Munch et al. [2006], but like Van Vuuren [2009],
we can make clear predictions also on the whole job nding rates of the
homeowner and the renter20. The renter's job nding rate is two times
hr = (s

r) [1  F (wr)], which is the common job nding rate for both mar-
kets, while the owner's job nding rate is the sum of hl = (sl ) [1  F (wl )]
and hn = (sn) [1  F (wn)], which refer respectively to the local and to the
non local market. In order to compare job nding rates, we rst point out
that, given Propositions 1 and 2, hl > hr > hn. Thus, unemployed living in
owner-occupied accommodation are expected to have a higher exit rate from
unemployment towards jobs which require a move, but a lower exit rate to-
wards employment in the local labour market. The main mechanism of the
Oswald's hypothesis works in this setup, since homeownership reduces the
chances to nd an acceptable job far from home by hampering residential
mobility. Can we also state that renters have a higher exit rates than home-
owners in general? This is the case if 2hr > hl+hn, which again can be showed
to be true within this framework. The logic of the demonstration is similar
to that of Proposition 3 and relies on its results.
Proposition 4 2(sr) [1  F (wr)] > (sl ) [1  F (wl )] + (sn) [1  F (wn)].
Proof : We just need to prove the negative sign of the derivative of (hl + hn)
with respect to m at the optimal values of search when m = 0. Dening
20Van Vuuren [2009] shows that in the model of Munch et al. [2006] the hazard rate to
exit unemployment for homeowners is unambiguously lower than that for renters. Any-
way, in the generalized version of the model Van Vuuren [2009] allows for dierences in
the unemployment benet duration between homeowners and renters which brings non-
stationarity into the model of Munch et al. [2006]. In particular they assume that home-
owners receive benets for only T periods of unemployment, while renters receive benets
for the whole unemployment spell. This implies a reduction in the relative reservation
wages of homeowners from T onwards. As a consequence, though homeowners have higher
exit rates from unemployment than renters in the local labour market, the reverse is no
more necessarily the case in the non local labour market. Thus, as long as the benet
exhaustion assumption holds, the model of Van Vuuren [2009] yields ambiguous results as
in Munch et al. [2006] pointing out the need for empirical research. But whit no unem-
ployment benet exhaustion, as in the stationary framework of Munch et al. [2006] and in
the ours, this indeterminacy is eliminated.
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dwl
dm
(sr ;m = 0) = L
w, dw

n
dm
(sr ;m = 0) = N
w, ds

l
dm
(m = 0) = Ls and ds

n
dm
(m = 0) = N s,
we have:
d(hl + hn)
dm
(sr ;m = 0) = 
0(sr) [1  F (wr)]Ls   (sr)F 0(wr)Lw+
+ 0(sr) [1  F (wr)]N s   (sr)F 0(wr)Nw =
= 0(sr) [1  F (wr)] (Ls +N s)  (sr)F 0(wr)(Lw +Nw) < 0;
(2.22)
where the latter inequality holds since (Ls +N s) < 0 and (Lw +Nw) > 0, which
are results of Proposition 3.
To conclude, the theoretical section delivers us a clear message: mobility
costs imply lower search and exit rates from unemployment for homeowners,
thus the local versus non local search explanation is not able alone to revert
the argument underlying the Oswald eect. In the empirical section 2.4 we
will provide some evidence for this by abstracting from the role of housing
costs.
2.3 Methodology and Data
We draw our data set from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS),
a nationally representative annual panel survey which has been carried out
continuously since 1991. A random sample of around 5,500 households, ac-
counting for around 10,000 adult members, was drawn at the start of the
survey, then all residents of those households were traced and re-interviewed
each year up to now. Each wave there are ows in and out of the survey, so
the panel is highly unbalanced21. At time of writing the last wave released
refers to 2007, so we have 17 waves at our disposal.
The BHPS contains detailed information about the economic activity
status of an individual. We focus on the group of non-employed, that is
people who state not to have a job, and among these we distinguish between
unemployed and people out of the labour force, the rst being essentially
job seekers and the second non-job seekers. Our denition of unemployment
is similar but not identical to the standard ILO denition. We classify as
21If a member of the original sample drops o the original household, all adult members
of his new households will also be interviewed. Moreover, the original sample has been
supplemented with a number of \boost" groups, including major additional subsamples
from Wales and Scotland (1999 onwards), and Northern Ireland (2001 onwards). Many
people out of the original sample and out of those who are subsequently added, may drop
o the survey due to various reasons such as move abroad, death, co-residents of original
sample members who no longer live with a sample member and so on.
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unemployed those without a job who have been looking for work in the last
four weeks, which is one of the two ILO's requirements, but, unlike the
second, we do not drop out of the pool people who are not available to start
a new job within the following two weeks22. The BHPS provides two dierent
measures of job search intensity for unemployed. On the one hand, they are
asked whether they searched for work in the last week or in the last four. On
the other hand, they are asked which search methods they used so we can
derive the total number of methods (from 0 to 5). We use these categorical
measures as dependent variables and we regress them on the housing tenure
dummies controlling for several individual (or household) characteristics23.
Since our dependent variables are categorical, either binary or ordinal,
we run non linear panel regressions, using in particular a random eects pro-
bit model24. Unfortunately it is very problematic to perform a xed eects
analysis for non linear models such as probit or logit. This is due to the so
called \incidental parameters problem" which prevents to consistently esti-
mate the parameters of the index function along with the individual eects
when the number of cross sections is small25. While a solution to get consis-
tent estimates for xed eects logit models has been found (see for example
Chamberlain [1980]), this is not the case for the xed eects probit. The
usual device is to nd a sucient statistic for the unobserved eects which
allows these to be conditioned out of the likelihood function. Such a sucient
statistic does not exist for the xed eects probit. An unconditional xed
eects probit maybe estimated just plugging in a large number of individual
dummies, but estimates would be biased26.
Though xed-T-consistent estimators have been derived for panel logit
models, these methods have some drawbacks. In particular, given the way the
sucient statistic is build, only observations for individuals who switch status
between two subsequent periods can be kept in the computation. Then they
22The problem is that the related question is asked only since wave 6.
23See Wadsworth [1991] for a reduced form estimation of search intensity measures
on data drawn from the UK Labour Force Survey. He used as dependent variable
the number of search methods too, but in a simpler econometric set-up. See also
Schmitt and Wadsworth [1993] and Gregg and Wadsworth [1996]
24The motivation for using non linear rather than linear models for categorical dependent
variables is typically that in the linear model the predicted probabilities are not guaranteed
to lie in the unit interval. Moreover, in a panel setting the linear model would also require
an unnatural assumption on the unobserved heterogeneity (see Wooldridge [2010]).
25See Wooldridge [2010] and Baltagi [2008] for an exhaustive treatment of estimation
techniques and problems in applying panel models with a discrete dependent variable.
26See Fernandes-Val [2009] for a discussion of the magnitude of the xed eects probit's
bias. He argues that the magnitude of the bias of the marginal eects' estimates may be
small for a range of distributions of regressors and individual eects, even for small T.
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do not provide estimates for individual eects, thus precluding estimation
of other quantities of interest such as marginal eects. Also, unlike the
probit approach, these xed eects logit models require a conditional serial
independence assumption for consistency, which may be even less appealing
when several time periods are available (see Wooldridge [2010], pag. 492).
In the end, the random eects probit turned out to be the most reliable
technique we have come up with, although of course it puts restrictions on
the relation between the regressors and the unobserved eects. The choice of
a panel rather than a pooled analysis is motivated by the better properties of
the random eects model in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, which
is always detected by the likelihood ratio test of  in our regressions.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Unemployed Sample
In our sample we can observe search measures only for unemployed, that
is for those who searched for work in the last four weeks27. At rst, we
report estimates of random eects probit models for both of search measures
within the unemployed sample. Then we discuss the sample selection bias
issue which arises when inactive people, for whom search intensity is zero by
denition, are excluded from the sample. In fact we can think of inactive
people as workers who have chosen a degree of search intensity equal to
zero due to the same set of variables which aect the search intensity of
unemployed, at least after controlling for other characteristics which may be
crucial in determining the choice of being out of the labour force, such as
full-time education, retirement or disability. The nal specication will thus
include also inactive and the fairly larger sample will allow us to get more
precise results28.
Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 report estimates for the unemployed sample. The
dependent variable used in table 2.1 is a dummy which takes 1 if the un-
employed searched in the last week and 0 if searched in the last 4 weeks
but not in the last. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report estimates which focus on the
number of search methods, the former using an ordinal variable (from 0 to 5
methods), the latter grouping these numbers in a dummy which takes 1 for
high numbers (3, 4 and 5 methods), and takes 0 for low numbers (0, 1 and 2
methods). The rst two columns of each table refer to models which include
27We restrict the sample to people in working age, i.e. males in age range 16-64 and
females in age range 16-59.
28See appendix A for a description of the variables selected.
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Table 2.1
Unemployed: search last week or last 4 weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 9.1** 7.6*
mortgager 11.2** 9.1*
outright owner 1.7 3.3
housing costs 3.1* 2.5
equivalized hh income 1.1 -0.0 0.7 -0.1
hh size 0.3 -0.1 0.3 -0.1
dep. child -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 -0.6
claimant 18.3*** 18.9*** 18.4*** 18.8***
nancial sit. 7.3*** 7.0*** 7.2*** 7.0***
female -8.8** -9.0*** -8.6** -8.9**
young (16-24) -7.1 -7.7 -7.3 -7.8
elderly (50-64) 7.7 8.3 9.3 9.0
disability benf. -26.0*** -25.4*** -25.9*** -25.4***
pension 46.0 46.8 46.4 46.8
full-time education -35.4*** -36.9*** -35.7*** -36.8***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner -0.6 -0.4 -0.8 -0.5
child 12.8** 14.4** 13.7** 14.6**
other 2.8 -3.7 3.1 0.3
duration since last job
6-12 months -15.2** -15.2** -15.2** -15.2**
1-3 years -21.3*** -20.6*** -21.0*** -20.5***
3 years or more -30.0*** -29.4*** -29.9*** -29.4***
never had job -11.5* -11.0* -11.4* -10.9*
education
1st degree or higher 21.9*** 22.2*** 22.5*** 22.8***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 14.1 12.9 14.4 13.3**
a level 12.1* 11.0* 12.3** 11.3*
o level 14.4*** 14.5*** 14.5*** 14.6***
cse 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.9
other qlf 2.3 1.7 2.3 1.8
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 7124 7062 7124 7062
 9.8*** 9.1*** 9.8*** 9.1***
Notes:
1. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
2. The Table reports marginal eects (at regressors means) from the random eects probit. Coef-
cients are expressed in percentage points, expect for housing costs and equivalized household
income for which we report semi-elasticities.
3. Sample: people in working age without job who searched in last four weeks. Dependent variable:
search in the last week or in the last four but not in the last. The last row reports the likelihood
ratio test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity; the  statistic is the portion of variance of
the composite error due to the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualication.
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Table 2.2
Unemployed: search methods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 14.3*** 13.1***
mortgager 17.3*** 15.3***
outright owner 3.8 6.7
housing costs 0.0** 0.0
equivalized hh income 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0
hh size -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5
dep. child -5.9 -5.5 -6.5 -5.9
claimant 26.9*** 28.2*** 27.2*** 28.1***
nancial sit. 10.2*** 10.1*** 10.1*** 10.0***
female -24.7*** -24.4*** -24.5*** -24.3***
young (16-24) 11.4** 11.1** 11.2** 11.0**
elderly (50-64) -17.9*** -15.9** -15.7** -14.8**
disability benf. -35.3*** -34.1*** -35.1*** -34.1***
pension 54.6** 55.0** 56.3** 55.8**
full-time education -44.6*** -45.2*** -44.9*** -45.1***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner 5.9 5.4 5.7 5.4
child -11.4* -10.5* -10.2* -10.1
other -3.1 -6.1 -2.6 -5.2
duration since last job
6-12 months -26.4*** -25.9*** -26.4*** -26.1***
1-3 years -31.2*** -31.0*** -31.0*** -31.0***
3 years or more -56.3*** -55.2*** -56.1*** -55.3***
never had job -29.3*** -28.7*** -29.3*** -28.6***
education
1st degree or higher 24.9*** 24.8*** 26.0*** 25.7***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 15.3 13.5 16.1 14.2
a level 9.2 7.9 9.4 8.4
o level 11.0** 10.2* 11.2** 10.4*
cse -13.7** -14.2* -13.8* -14.3*
other qlf 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.0
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 4651 4591 4651 4591
 19.0*** 18.0*** 19.1*** 18.1***
Notes:
1. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
2. The estimated model is a random eects ordered probit. The calculation is run by using the
reoprob Stata package. Reported coecients are those of the index function thus do not have a
straight economic interpretation.
3. Sample: people in working age without job who searched in last four weeks. Dependent variable:
number of search methods, 6 categories (0-5). Since the question on search methods is asked only
since 1996, the sample shrinks to 12 waves, that is from 6 to 17 waves. The last row reports the
likelihood ratio test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity; the  statistic is the portion of
variance of the composite error due to the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualication.
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Table 2.3
Unemployed: dummy for search methods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 11.6** 10.5**
mortgager 12.2** 9.6*
outright owner 9.8 13.3
housing costs 3.6* 4.0*
equivalized hh income 3.0 1.9 2.9 1.9
hh size -1.2 -1.0 -1.1 -1.0
dep. child -10.2* -10.4* -10.3* -10.2*
claimant 34.6*** 35.5*** 34.6*** 35.5***
nancial sit. 9.6*** 9.4*** 9.6*** 9.5***
female -26.8** -26.0*** -26.8*** -26.1***
young (16-24) 6.0 6.3 6.0 6.3
elderly (50-64) -16.0** -14.2* -15.6* -14.6*
disability benf. -31.1*** -31.4*** -31.1*** -31.4***
pension 60.1* 60.6* 60.3* 60.4*
full-time education -49.1*** -50.6*** -49.2*** -50.6***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner 7.3 6.3 7.3 6.4
child -7.8 -7.8 -7.6 -8.0
other -1.9 -5.4 -1.8 -5.9
duration since last job
6-12 months -38.5*** -38.3*** -38.5*** -38.3***
1-3 years -34.5*** -34.1*** -34.5*** -34.0***
3 years or more -61.0*** -60.4*** -60.9*** -60.4***
never had job -31.6*** -30.6*** -31.6*** -30.6***
education
1st degree or higher 26.3*** 26.6*** 26.5*** 26.2***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 21.1* 19.5 21.2* 19.3
a level 11.4 10.0 11.4 9.8
o level 15.0** 14.8** 15.1** 14.7**
cse -18.1** -19.3** -18.2** -19.3**
other qlf -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 4651 4591 4651 4591
 17.5*** 16.5*** 17.6*** 16.5***
Notes:
1. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
2. The table reports marginal eects (at regressors means) from the random eects probit. Coef-
cients are expressed in percentage points, expect for housing costs and equivalized household
income for which we report semi-elasticities.
3. Sample: people in working age without job who searched in last four weeks. Dependent variable:
dummy which takes 1 for numbers of methods between 3 and 5 and takes 0 for numbers between
0 and 2. As in table 2.2 the sample includes only from 6 to 17 waves. The last row reports the
likelihood ratio test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity; the  statistic is the portion of
variance of the composite error due to the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualication.
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the dummy owner for housing tenure, which pools both outright owners and
mortgagers, while in models (3) and (4) we use two housing tenure dummies,
mortgager and outright owner, in order to distinguish between these two
categories: the coecient of each of these dummies captures the dierence
in search between the category which names the dummy and the reference
category, i.e. renters. In models (1) and (3) there is no control for housing
costs, while in models (2) and (4) we add the housing costs variable in order
to check how it aects the coecients of the housing tenure dummies.
Table 2.1 shows that owners as a whole have a higher probability than
renters to search in the last week. Anyway, in models which distinguish
between the two owners categories we see that this dierence is driven by
the higher probability of mortgagers, while there is no signicant dierence
between outright owners and renters. Housing costs have a positive impact
on search as expected, but the eect is not signicant when we allow for the
mortgager dummy (see column 4). Moreover, when we add the housing costs
variable to model (3), the coecient of mortgager slightly drops while the
coecient of outright owner slightly increases. These results are even more
evident when we look at search methods. Table 2.2 gives perhaps more precise
results since it exploits all the variation in the number of search methods.
In fact owner and mortgager dummies are highly signicant conrming that
the dierence in search between owners and non owners is explained only by
the higher search of mortgagers. Housing costs are again signicant in model
(2) but not in model (4).
Unfortunately, since coecients reported in table 2.2 are just the coe-
cients of the probit's index function, they do not have a straight meaning in
terms of magnitude, although they give information on the direction and on
the statistical importance of the eect. For ordered probit models like this
one might report the marginal eects on the probability of being in each of 6
statuses but it would be confusing, so we prefer to look at table 2.3 to have
an idea of the magnitude of the eects. In column (4) of table 2.3 we see
that the probability of using a large number of methods for mortgagers is
around 10 percentage points higher than renters, which is very close to the
eect we get when we use the last-week/last-4-weeks variable in table 2.1.
Moreover, a 1% rise in housing costs increases this probability by 4 points,
while the eect in table 2.1 is 2.5 points (for money variables such as housing
costs and equivalized income we always report semi-elasticities)29. There are
also several signicant and interesting eects from other variables which we
prefer to discuss later when we deal with a larger sample.
29For model (4), the housing costs variable is signicant only in table 2.3, though mildly,
while in table 2.1 and 2.2 it is very close to signicance.
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2.4.2 Whole Sample
The analysis so far focuses on the unemployed sample, but we argue that es-
timates are biased unless we allow also for inactive people. Search behaviour
does not concern only the choice of the degree of search, but also the choice
of searching or not in the rst place. For some individuals the outcome of the
set of variables we have allowed for may be no search in the last four weeks,
which means that these drop out of the unemployed sample. This is a clear
example of non-random sample selection, which results in biasing estimates
on the sub-sample. In order to account for individuals who self-select in in-
activity we replicate the same analysis as above for the overall sample, that
is unemployed plus inactive.
Anyway, this strategy must be tackled carefully since the choice of being
inactive depends also on other reasons than those which inuence the search
optimization process, such as housing tenure for example. In fact, for in-
dividuals in working age who are simply not interested in work, the choice
between unemployment and inactivity cannot be interpreted as a matter of
choice about the intensity of search. In order to distinguish within the inac-
tive sample between these individuals and those who would be interested in
working but have set their search level to zero, we use controls for retirement,
full-time education and incapability to work, which should account for most
of the reasons for individuals not being involved in a search choice process.
Table 2.4 reports estimates of the baseline models when we use the larger
sample of unemployed plus inactive and the dependent variable is a dummy
for the status. Since these models include also the three controls, coecients
of the other variables should actually capture the eect on the search choice
for individuals who are actually involved in the search choice process. As ex-
pected, all of these controls are highly signicant and have a very strong im-
pact. Interestingly, outright owners are far less likely to search than renters,
while typically there are not signicant dierences in search intensity when
unemployed as shown before. Thus the mobility eect of homeownership
seems to work by reducing the attachment to the labour market of outright
owners rather than by reducing their search intensity relative to renters.
One alternative strategy to allow for purely inactive individuals, may be
to drop people who are in full-time education, who get retirement pension or
get disability benets. Anyway this strategy does not seem very promising
since the percentage of people in each of these statuses who are actually
inactive is not as high as one may expect. As table 2.5 shows, more than
a half of people in full-time education or getting a retirement pension can
be job seekers or even employed, while for people on disability benets this
is the case for at least 15%. Since a non negligible portion of these people
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Table 2.4
The Choice of Search
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 5.6* 5.0
mortgager 15.2*** 14.4***
outright owner -23.2*** -21.2***
housing costs 3.6*** 1.8**
equivalized hh income -4.7*** -5.6*** -6.1*** -6.3***
hh size -5.3*** -5.9*** -5.5*** -5.8***
dep. child -5.9* -5.1 -8.2*** -7.5**
claimant 51.6*** 52.8*** 51.1*** 52.0***
nancial sit. 18.6*** 18.5*** 18.1*** 18.1***
female -69.6*** -69.0*** -69.7*** -69.2***
young (16-24) 35.4*** 35.7*** 34.5*** 35.1***
elderly (50-64) -77.7*** -75.3*** -70.5*** -69.6***
disability benf. -94.7*** -94.8*** -95.4*** -95.7***
pension -42.9*** -41.3*** -38.4*** -37.7***
full-time education -98.7*** -100.9*** -100.4*** -101.8***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner 5.5 4.6 3.9 3.3
child 65.0*** 67.1*** 67.9*** 68.7***
other 31.5*** 27.0*** 31.6*** 29.4***
duration since last job
6-12 months -28.6*** -28.6*** -28.4*** -28.5***
1-3 years -70.9*** -70.7*** -69.8*** -70.0***
3 years or more -99.6*** -99.2*** -98.9*** -98.8***
never had job -65.9*** -65.8*** -65.0*** -65.1***
education
1st degree or higher 47.3*** 45.9*** 49.5*** 48.6***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 32.2*** 33.1*** 33.7*** 34.9***
a level 21.8*** 20.1*** 22.5*** 21.7***
o level 31.8*** 30.9*** 31.5*** 31.0***
cse 18.0*** 17.8*** 17.2*** 17.4***
other qlf 8.5 8.9 8.7 9.2
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 40184 39876 40184 39876
 40.7*** 40.6*** 40.6*** 40.6***
Notes:
1. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
2. The table reports marginal eects (at regressors means) from the random eects probit. Coef-
cients are expressed in percentage points, expect for housing costs and equivalized household
income for which we report semi-elasticities.
3. Sample: all people in working age without job. Dependent variable: dummy which takes 1 if
searched in last four weeks and 0 if not. The last row reports the likelihood ratio test for the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity; the  statistic is the portion of variance of the composite
error due to the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualication.
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Table 2.5
FT education, retirement pension, disability benefits
all sample FT educ pension disab. ben.
freq. % freq. % freq. % freq. %
employed 124,699 74.8% 4,893 40.3% 542 42.6% 1,089 11.9%
unemployed 7,411 4.5% 1,130 9.3% 34 2.7% 346 3.8%
inactive 34,532 20.7% 6,113 50.4% 695 54.7% 7,730 84.3%
Total 166,642 100% 12,136 100% 1,271 100% 9,165 100%
Notes:
1. The sample refers to all 17 waves and is made of all respondents in working age.
seem to be able to look for work or even to have a job, it is reasonable
that their search behaviour may be inuenced by also other reasons than
being in that status, which arguably are the same which aect the degree of
search intensity of job seekers, such as housing tenure. We thus include in
the sample all inactive people setting their search eort equal to zero30.
Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 report results when we pool unemployed and
inactive. In models of table 2.6 we just add the inactive category to the two
used in the dependent variable of table 2.1: the dependent variable has now
three categories so an ordered probit is required for estimation. Table 2.7
and 2.8 correspond to table 2.2 and table 2.3 respectively, except that in the
0 methods group we include also inactive people.
These three tables conceive the same information on the dierences in
search activity by housing tenure, conrming part of the results found within
the unemployed sample. The dierence in search between homeowners as a
whole and renters is positive and not strongly signicant, but this is clearly
the result of the balancing of two opposite eects as the models in column
(3) and (4) highlight: on the one side, mortgagers search more than renters,
but on the other side, outright owners search less. In fact, the coecient
of outright owner is negative and strongly signicant in table 2.6 and 2.731,
which is in line with results of table 2.4 but at odds with results drawn from
the unemployed sample. Thus it appears that among unemployed there is not
a relevant dierence in search intensity between outright owners and renters,
30People who have not searched in the last four weeks may have searched, for example,
5 or 6 weeks before, but since we cannot observe these measures we set search to zero for
all of them.
31In model (4) of table 2.8 this coecient is signicant only at a 10% level, but here the
eect cannot be captured as precisely as when all the variation in the number of search
methods is exploited
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Table 2.6
Non-employed: search last week, search last 4 weeks or no search
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 6.7** 5.9**
mortgager 15.9*** 14.8***
outright owner -21.2*** -19.2***
housing costs 0.0*** 0.0***
equivalized hh income -0.0*** -0.0*** -0.0*** -0.0***
hh size -4.9*** -5.5*** -5.1*** -5.5***
dep. child -4.9 -4.1 -7.0** -6.3**
claimant 50.3*** 51.6*** 49.9*** 50.8***
nancial sit. 18.5*** 18.4*** 18.0*** 18.0***
female -65.6*** -65.1*** -65.6*** -65.1***
young (16-24) 31.0*** 31.1*** 30.2*** 30.6***
elderly (50-64) -73.5*** -71.1*** -66.4*** -65.6***
disability benf. -92.0*** -92.1*** -92.7*** -93.0***
pension -40.0*** -38.4*** -35.6*** -35.0***
full-time education -94.7*** -96.9*** -96.2*** -98.0***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner 4.2 3.3 2.7 2.2
child 61.0*** 63.2*** 63.7*** 64.6***
other 28.0*** 23.3*** 28.0*** 25.5***
duration since last job
6-12 months -27.7*** -27.6*** -27.5*** -27.6***
1-3 years -68.1*** -67.8*** -67.0*** -67.1***
3 years or more -97.0*** -96.4*** -96.1*** -96.0***
never had job -61.8*** -61.6*** -61.0*** -60.9***
education
1st degree or higher 48.1*** 46.8*** 50.2*** 49.4***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 33.5*** 34.0*** 34.9*** 35.8***
a level 23.8*** 22.2*** 24.4*** 23.5***
o level 32.8*** 31.9*** 32.4*** 31.9***
cse 17.8*** 17.7*** 17.0*** 17.2***
other qlf 9.0 9.3 9.3 9.7
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 40236 39927 40236 39927
 39.2*** 39.0*** 39.0*** 39.1***
Notes:
1. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
2. The estimated model is a random eects ordered probit. The calculation is run by using the
reoprob Stata package. Reported coecients are those of the index function thus do not have a
straight economic interpretation.
3. Sample: all non-employed people in working age. The dependent variable is ordinal with three
categories: search in the last week, search in the last four but not in the last, no search in the last
four. The last row reports the likelihood ratio test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity;
the  statistic is the portion of variance of the composite error due to the variance of the unobserved
heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualication.
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Table 2.7
Non-employed: search methods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 7.2** 6.2*
mortgager 16.8*** 15.4***
outright owner -21.4*** -18.1***
housing costs 0.0*** 0.0**
equivalized hh income -0.0** -0.0*** -0.0*** -0.0***
hh size -5.1*** -5.8*** -5.4*** -5.8***
dep. child -4.9 -4.0 -6.9** -6.0*
claimant 45.8*** 48.1*** 45.4*** 47.0***
nancial sit. 19.5*** 19.3*** 18.9*** 18.9***
female -62.1*** -61.4*** -62.2*** -61.4***
young (16-24) 35.4*** 35.0*** 34.2*** 34.4***
elderly (50-64) -72.2*** -68.2*** -64.8*** -63.4***
disability benf. -88.5*** -88.2*** -89.0*** -89.1***
pension -45.9*** -43.2*** -40.9*** -40.0***
full-time education -85.5*** -87.5*** -86.6*** -87.4***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner 3.5 2.3 2.0 1.5
child 45.2*** 47.7*** 47.8*** 48.4***
other 22.1*** 15.3* 22.2*** 19.0**
duration since last job
6-12 months -29.4*** -28.9*** -29.0*** -28.8***
1-3 years -68.2*** -67.4*** -67.1*** -67.0***
3 years or more -101.7*** -100.3*** -100.9*** -100.1***
never had job -68.6*** -67.8*** -67.4*** -67.0***
education
1st degree or higher 53.2*** 51.3*** 55.4*** 54.3***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 31.1*** 30.8*** 32.6*** 32.9***
a level 23.9*** 21.7*** 24.4*** 23.3***
o level 33.8*** 32.6*** 33.8*** 33.1***
cse 10.5* 10.5* 10.3* 10.5*
other qlf 8.8 9.1 9.1 9.5
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 30639 30344 30639 30344
 38.0*** 37.7*** 37.7*** 37.6***
Notes:
1. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
2. The estimated model is a random eects ordered probit. The calculation is run by using the
reoprob Stata package. Reported coecients are those of the index function thus do not have a
straight economic interpretation.
3. Sample: all non-employed people in working age. Dependent variable: number of search methods,
6 categories (0-5). As in table 2.2 and 2.3 the sample includes only from 6 to 17 waves. The last
row reports the likelihood ratio test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity; the  statistic is
the portion of variance of the composite error due to the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualication.
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Table 2.8
Non-employed: dummy for search methods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 10.2** 8.9**
mortgager 18.3*** 16.2***
outright owner -13.5** -10.0*
housing costs 5.5*** 3.3**
equivalized hh income -2.3 -4.2* -3.4 -4.3*
hh size -5.4*** -6.0*** -5.7*** -6.0***
dep. child -11.5*** -11.0*** -13.1*** -12.5***
claimant 54.7*** 56.5*** 54.4*** 55.7***
nancial sit. 19.5*** 19.3*** 19.0*** 19.0***
female -65.1*** -64.1*** -65.1*** -64.2***
young (16-24) 28.1*** -28.1*** 27.0*** 27.6***
elderly (50-64) -63.1*** -59.2*** -56.9*** -55.4***
disability benf. -87.4*** -87.4*** -87.8*** -88.1***
pension -31.0* -28.5* -26.7 -25.8
full-time education -96.7*** -99.7*** -97.6*** -99.5***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner 7.8* 6.5 6.6 5.8
child 36.7*** 38.7*** 39.1*** 39.5***
other 27.2*** 20.2** 27.5*** 23.3**
duration since last job
6-12 months -43.1*** -42.5*** -42.6*** -42.4***
1-3 years -72.1*** -71.5*** -71.3*** -71.1***
3 years or more -114.1*** -112.8*** -113.4*** -112.8***
never had job -73.3*** -72.0*** -72.2*** -71.4***
education
1st degree or higher 53.9*** 52.4*** 55.8*** 54.8***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 33.3*** 33.3*** 34.5*** 34.8***
a level 26.9*** 24.8*** 27.3*** 25.9***
o level 34.7*** 33.9*** 34.9*** 34.4***
cse 3.0 2.4 3.0 2.6
other qlf 9.0 9.1 9.4 9.5
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 30639 30344 30639 30344
 32.4*** 32.0*** 32.1*** 31.9***
Notes:
1. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
2. The table reports marginal eects (at regressors means) from the random eects probit. Coef-
cients are expressed in percentage points, expect for housing costs and equivalized household
income for which we report semi-elasticities.
3. Sample: all non-employed people in working age. Dependent variable: dummy which takes 1 for
numbers of methods between 3 and 5 and takes 0 for numbers between 0 and 2. As in table 2.2,
2.3 and 2.7 the sample includes only from 6 to 17 waves. The last row reports the likelihood ratio
test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity; the  statistic is the portion of variance of the
composite error due to the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualication.
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but once we allow for the eect of housing tenure on the choice to search, the
dierence gets negative and signicant. To have an idea of the magnitude of
the eect, in column (4) of table 2.8 is shown that outright owners are less
likely than renters by 10 percentage points to use a high number of search
methods.
Are these dierences in search intensity driven by mobility or by housing
costs? Something can be said by analysing the housing costs variable. Its
coecient is always positive and signicant, which means that the higher
the housing costs the higher the pressure to nd a job thus the higher the
search intensity. In particular, a 1% increase in housing costs implies 3.3
points more in the probability of using a high number of search methods
(see table 2.8, model 4). Typically, the housing costs eect decreases and is
fairly less signicant when we split the owner dummy in two dummies32. In
fact, when mortgagers and outright owners are pooled as in model (2), the
variation in search due to the dierence in their individual characteristics is
left unexplained, and this eect is captured by the housing costs variable.
Moreover, when we add the housing costs variable in the model with two
housing tenure dummies, the coecient of mortgager drops while that of
outright owner increases; clearly, since mortgagers and outright owners have,
respectively, higher and lower housing costs than renters, if we omit the
housing costs variable the coecient of the former is biased upwards while
the coecient of the latter is biased downwards, given the positive eect of
housing costs on search. Anyway, the change in these coecients whenever
we add the control for housing costs is always slight and the signs are never
reverted: this means that housing costs matter but also that much of the
search dierentials are still unexplained.
To sum up, it appears that renters search more than outright owners
since they have housing costs to cope with, but whenever we control for this
eect, the dierential in search is still high which is probably due to renters'
higher mobility. This negative dierential in search between outright owners
and renters is precisely what the Oswald eect calls for. Right here comes
the reconciliation between theory and evidence argued in the title. In fact,
on the one hand, our theoretical model conrms the old idea that the lower
mobility of homeowners implies lower search eort, once we abstract from
32This is clear both in the unemployed sample, as discussed above, and in the non-
employed sample. Reported coecients In table 2.6 and 2.7 are just those of the index
function, so we cannot state how large is an eect though we can state if the eect of a
variable is larger in a specic model. The coecient of housing costs is always 0.0 in these
tables (since we are measuring the eect of an only one pound increase in the variable)
thus the lowering of the size from model (2) to model (4) cannot be identied. Anyway, if
we look at omitted decimals we can state that this is the case for both tables.
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the role of housing costs. On the other hand, we observe in the data, even
after controlling for housing costs, higher search measures for renters than
outright owners, for whom the mobility eect is the only one operating, and
even at its maximum.
2.4.3 Social vs Private Renters
Anyway, given that mobility matters, we would not expect also that mort-
gagers search more than renters whenever we net out the housing costs eect.
One partial explanation for this counterintuitive nding can be sought in the
nature of rent. In fact, when comparing renters to the other categories we
should be aware that renters' search outcome may be dierent between social
and private renters, since the former may actually be less prone to move for
job reasons due to lock-in eects similar to those which hamper homeown-
ers' mobility33. In our whole sample of non-employed, 73% of renters occupy
social housing, thus our analysis so far may be seriously confounded unless
social housing does not hamper mobility. In order to control if the \lock-in"
eect of social housing really matters, we replicate the previous estimations
splitting the renter sample in two distinct groups. In particular, we add a
dummy for social renters to the specication with the housing costs variable
and with dummies for outright owners and mortgagers. The omitted group
consists of private renters, thus the coecient of the groups included is to be
interpreted as the search dierential with respect to them.
Table 2.9 reports results for ve of the regressions previously discussed:
each regression is identical to that of the correspondent table except for
the social renter dummy. The rst two models use the unemployed sample
and refer to the dummy for search last week or last 4 weeks, and to the
number of search methods variable, respectively (see table 2.1 and table 2.2
respectively). Again, when unemployed, mortgagers search more than every
other category notwithstanding the control for social housing, while there
are no signicant dierences among the other categories. But if we look at
regression III, which models the probability of being a job seeker, we notice
that the dierence between mortgagers and private renters disappears, while
both social renters and outright owners are less likely to be unemployed than
private renters. These results are conrmed in the subsequent two models
which account also for the dierent degree of search among unemployed.
Moreover, the hypothesis that the coecients of the three housing tenure
dummies are identical in pairs are strongly rejected, which means that we
33Moreover, social renting comes at below market rent or even rent-free. In our whole
sample of non-employed, 48% of social renters pay zero rent. Anyway this eect on search
dierentials should be captured by the housing costs variable.
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Table 2.9
Mortgagers vs Outright vs Social Renters vs Private Renters
unemployed non-employed
I II III IV V
last week, search the choice last week, search
last 4 weeks methods of search last 4 weeks, methods
no search
mortgager 12.3** 17.0*** 4.0 5.5 6.3
outright owner 7.0 8.6 -32.4*** -29.1*** -28.2***
social renters 4.9 2.6 -16.1*** -14.4*** -14.3***
housing costs 2.7 0.0* 1.4* 0.0** 0.0**
equivalized hh income -0.1 -0.0 -6.2*** -0.0*** -0.0***
hh size -0.1 -0.6 -5.8*** -5.4*** -5.7***
dep. child -1.1 -6.2 -5.9* -4.9 -4.7
claimant 18.8*** 28.1*** 52.4*** 51.1*** 47.3***
nancial sit. 7.0*** 10.1*** 18.2*** 18.0*** 18.9***
female -8.8** -24.2*** -69.2*** -65.2*** -61.5***
young (16-24) -7.4 11.1** 34.0*** 29.6*** 33.5***
elderly (50-64) 8.6 -15.0** -68.6*** -64.7*** -62.6***
disability benf. -25.6*** -34.2*** -95.3*** -92.5*** -88.7***
pension 46.8 55.7** -37.9*** -35.0*** -40.2***
full-time education -36.1*** -44.8*** -103.7*** -99.2*** -88.9***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner -0.6 5.3 3.4 2.3 1.6
child 13.8** -10.5* 71.5*** 67.1*** 50.6***
other 0.7 -5.0 27.3*** 23.7*** 17.5**
duration since last job
6-12 months -15.3** -26.1*** -28.5*** -27.6*** -28.8***
1-3 years -20.5*** -31.0*** -70.0*** -67.1*** -67.0***
3 years or more -29.5*** -55.3*** -98.4*** -95.7*** -99.9***
never had job -10.9* -28.6*** -65.2*** -61.1*** -67.2***
education
1st degree or higher 23.6*** 26.2*** 45.9*** 46.9*** 52.0***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 13.8 14.5 33.0*** 34.1*** 31.1***
a level 11.8** 8.6 19.5*** 21.6*** 21.5***
o level 14.8*** 10.6* 29.9*** 31.0*** 31.1***
cse 5.1 -14.2** 16.9*** 16.8*** 10.2
other qlf 1.9 2.1 8.5 8.5 8.9
regional dummies X X X X X
time dummies X X X X X
number of observations 7062 4591 39876 39927 30344
 9.0*** 18.1*** 40.6*** 39.0*** 37.5***
Notes:
1. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
2. For model I and III, coecients reported are marginal eects evaluated at means, for the other
models they are straight coecients of the index function.
3. Model I: see table 2.1; model II: see table 2.2; model III: see table 2.4; model IV: see table 2.6;
model V: see table 2.7.
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can identify a clear pattern of search eort levels: (1) private renters search
as much as mortgagers; (2) mortgagers and private renters search more than
both social renters and outright owners; (3) social renters search more than
outright owners. Anyway, we remark that this pattern of search behaviour
work through a dierent degree of attachment to the labour market, while
the results within the unemployed sample are not clear cut.
In conclusion, the distinction between social and private renters can at
least in part explain why the dierence in search between mortgagers and
renters as a whole is so high. But it is still unexplained why mortgagers,
who are homeowners, are the category with the highest search measures. In
the rst place, we should take into account that the mobility eect for some
mortgagers may be not as strong as that for outright owners (and social
renters). In fact it seems reasonable to believe that outright owners have a
stronger attachment to the accommodation since time spent in the current
accommodation should be longer on average and since they may have higher
transaction costs for moving home. With regards to the housing cost eect,
some possible explanations may be that the housing costs variable of the
BHPS has some measurement errors, or that it cannot capture what increases
the search of mortgagers relative to renters who pay the rent. However, the
most likely explanation is that the pressure to pay the mortgage is far higher
than the pressure to pay the rent and this dierent pressure may not be
simply captured by treating housing costs in the same way for both.
2.4.4 The Eect of the Other Covariates
In order to shed some light on the reliability of our conclusions, we discuss
now the estimated eects of the economic and demographic variables on
search eort. Estimates are consistent with economic interpretation, which
is a valid signal of the goodness of our specication. We refer to results of
table 2.9 as models reported here distinguish among all of the housing tenure
categories, and allow for housing costs. In particular we select model V since
the dependent variable is the most precise. Moreover, if we look at model
V in combination with models II and III, we can also understand whether
the impacts work through an inuence on labour force participation, on the
intensity of search, or on both.
Variables which increase the reservation wage imply lower search, hence,
as expected, the eect of the household income is negative and the eect of
the variable which captures the perceived individual's nancial situation is
positive, where a higher value means a worse situation. More educated work-
ers search more than less educated or with no qualications, as education
increases the probability of nding a job and the return from employment.
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Females search less than males due to the lower participation to labour mar-
ket, but this eect is clear even within the unemployed sample. Individuals
who live in households within which there is at least one dependent child
search less, but the eect is not signicant: in theory, the need to look af-
ter children may aect labour force participation of at least one household
member, who is typically a female (no wonder, this eect is signicant in
model III). The fact that this eect should work mainly for females and not
for males, may explain why the coecient is not signicant given that we
include a dummy for gender34.
Search intensity drops as the number of household members rises. In
theory the eect of the household size on search activity should work through
the inuence on the household income, but as our measure of household
income is scaled controlling for the number of members, this eect should
no more appear in the household size variable. So this variable is probably
capturing a residual eect not accounted for by the scaling of the household
income or by other variables related to the household size.
The eect of age on search is negative and monotonic, given that prime-
age workers search more than older and less than younger ones. The rationale
is that the return from search is lower the lower the time horizon. However,
while the eect of the elderly dummy is very strong, the dierence between
young and prime-age workers is typically smaller (see table 2.8), given that
workers at the start of their career may experience some inactivity spells35.
The duration eect is very clear: the higher the duration since last job the
lower search eort due to the deterioration of skills and the discouragement
eect36. People who have never had a job search less than those with low
duration, but their coecient is not as high as that of the last category since
some of them may be young workers about to enter the labour market with
strong motivations.
The dummies which capture the relationship with the head of household
show that children search more than the head of household and his/her part-
ner, and that between the latter there is no dierence (see appendix A for
the groupings in these dummies). In theory we should expect that more
responsible members, i.e. those with stronger commitments to the home or
34Wadsworth [1991] found a negative and signicant eect on search in the sample of
females, while the eect was not signicant in the sample of men.
35These ndings are similar to those of Wadsworth [1991]. He found that old workers
search signicantly less than their prime-age counterparts, and that young workers search
more if males and less if females, though the latter two eects are not signicant.
36These ndings partly disagree with those of Wadsworth [1991], who found a hump-
shaped relation in the sense that search eort increases in the initial stages of unemploy-
ment and then drops.
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the household, search more, thus it appears strange that children are more
active in the job search. However, this does not imply that the commitment
eect is not operating once we take into account that a not negligible per-
centage of head of households live alone within the household (11% within
the non-employed sample), for whom commitments are denitely lower, and
that the child dummy may be capturing part of the negative eect of age.
Moreover, it is worth pointing out that in the unemployed sample the sign
of the child dummy is negative, which means that the positive coecients
in the whole sample reects a higher attachment to the labour market for
children rather than a stricter job search behaviour.
Unemployed benet claimants search more than non-claimants and the
eect is strongly signicant in all models we tested. It can be argued that
claimants are able to keep closer ties with the labour market due to the
nancial support (see Wadsworth [1991]). However, there is also a reverse
causality issue: non-employed who search more are more likely to meet the
requirements for the benet eligibility. This channel is even more important
from 1996, when the UK Jobseeker's Allowance was introduced37.
To conclude, one concern about the reliability of the estimated dierence
in search between renters and outright owners may arise. In the literature
it has been argued that housing tenure may be endogenous since it may be
correlated with unobservable factors which in turn help determine labour
market outcomes. For example, individuals may self-select housing tenure
on the ground of their intrinsic mobility, as well as of their greater desire
to retain proximity to family members or friends, so that people who are
more mobile may prefer to chose rented accommodations. Moreover, housing
tenure choice may be inuenced by unaccounted wealth eects or unobserved
skill gaps which as well increase search intensity. Depending on which are
the most important sources of endogeneity, the true dierences in search
between residential statuses may be larger or smaller than what we estimated.
Unfortunately, if one is willing to exploit the panel dimension of data at hand,
there is not a simple way to control for endogeneity in this econometric set-up
given that the xed eects analysis for discrete response models is not well
developed.
37The Jobseekers' Allowance involved notable tightenings of search criteria which have
to be met for the unemployment benet eligibility. See Manning [2009], Petrongolo [2009]
and Arzilli and Morescalchi [2011]
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the old argument that homeownership reduces
exit rates from unemployment by hampering residential mobility, which is
known under the name of Oswald's eect. While the empirical literature on
this point has conrmed that unemployed homeowners are less prone than
renters to move for job reasons, the typical nding is that homeowners have
lower unemployment duration, which is exactly the reverse of the Oswald
hypothesis. By exploring the reasons for these falsications of the Oswald
hypothesis, we provide a more rened empirical evidence which is consistent
with the underlying theory.
At rst, we develop a search theory which is in accordance with the
Oswald eect. In particular this model overcomes an ambiguity which may
arise in models which distinguish between local and non local labour markets.
In these models homeownership reduces the job nding rate in the non local
labour market but it increases the local job nding rate, so that the latter
eect may dominate empirically. By allowing for endogenous search we show
that, as net result, homeownership unambiguously reduces the optimal search
and the job nding rate.
Then, in the empirical analysis we allow for housing costs and for the
dierent nature of tenure, both among owners and among renters, in order
to point out the true eect of owners' lower mobility. In particular, within
the homeowners' group we distinguish between outright owners and owners
who pay the mortgage, and within the renters' group we distinguish between
social and private. Once the housing costs eect is controlled for, the results
show that, while homeowners search more than renters as found in the earlier
literature, outright owners alone search less than renters, and the dierence is
even higher when we compare them to private renters. This dierence works
mainly through a lower attachment to the labour market of outright owners,
while there are not signicant dierences within the unemployed sample.
Housing costs work in the expected direction, though the eect is not as
strong as expected. Moreover, once we control for housing costs, mortgagers
have a similar search to the supposed more mobile private renters, which
means that the higher level of housing costs cannot explain alone why mort-
gagers search so much. The most likely explanation is that the pressure to
pay the mortgage is far higher than the pressure to pay the rent and this
pressure cannot simply be captured by treating housing costs in the same
way for both.
In brief, we argue that tests of the Oswald hypothesis which compare
homeowners and renters as if they were two distinct groups are misleading,
since some individuals who belong to one of these share common features
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with some individuals belonging to the other. If we group individuals in only
two dierent categories the empirical eect is confounded, but if we allow for
proper distinctions, some evidence in favour of the Oswald hypothesis can be
provided.
Chapter 3
Housing Tenure and Individual
Labour Market Outcomes. An
Empirical Assessment Based on
the UK Labour Force Survey
3.1 Introduction
The empirical literature which has investigated the relationship between
homeownership and labour market outcomes has plenty of ndings at odds
with the so-called \Oswald thesis", which would suggest worse employ-
ment prospectus for homeowners than renters (Oswald [1996], Oswald [1997],
Oswald [1999]). The idea is that residential mobility constraints imposed by
homeownership hamper the propensity to move for job reasons. The conse-
quences should be less intense job search and lower job nding rates.
This claim has been further rened allowing for more precise denitions
of the residential status. In fact, owners who have to comply with mortgage
payments have higher nancial constraints than outright owners, that can
counteract reduced mobility due to ownership. A similar distinction may
hold for private and social renters as the latter should experience lock-in
eects similar to those which hamper owners mobility. Below-market rent,
long waiting lists, security of tenure and the restricted transferability within
social housing may harm relative employment performance of social renters.
In this vein, the Oswald thesis can be tested simply comparing outright
owners and private renters, as representative of the typical homeowners and
renters who one should have in mind for the main mechanism underlying the
Oswald thesis to emerge.
79
80 Chapter 3. Probability of Unemployment and Unemployment Duration
With micro data, the Oswald hypothesis has been tested mainly looking
at two dierent dimensions of labour market performance: the probability to
be unemployed and, more often, the unemployment duration1. The typical
approach consists in modeling such outcomes as a function of the residential
status, either being a binary variable for homeownership or a multinomial
variable which splits both owners and renters in more categories (owners
outright or with mortgage, social and private renters, and sometimes also
free-renters).
As regards the rst dimension, the typical nding is that homeownership
reduces the probability to be unemployed, both when it is assumed exoge-
nous (Coulson and Fisher [2002], Arulampalam et al. [2000]2) and when it is
allowed to be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity (Flatau et al. [2003]
and Coulson and Fisher [2009]). Flatau et al. [2003] use also a rened deni-
tion of residential status and conclude that owners with mortgage are far less
likely to be unemployed than owners outright, that the latter are even less
likely than private renters, and that social and free renters have the highest
probability instead. Anyway, results of Flatau et al. [2003] can be criticized
since they use only age dummies an education dummies as instruments for
the residential status, which are likely to be correlated with unemployment
outcomes as well. Moreover the statistical method is questionable, as for
the two-step approach to produce consistent estimates, one should apply a
(complicated) correction which apparently has not been carried out3.
Empirical investigations of the eect of residential status on the unem-
ployment duration are more controversial. This may be a consequence of
the dierent empirical strategies employed. Most reliable studies have esti-
mated this eect explicitly accounting for endogeneity. There are two ba-
sic approaches to deal with it. The traditional approach consists in per-
forming two step procedures in which identication is achieved through ex-
clusion restrictions. In the rst step, residential status, either binary or
multinomial, is modeled as a function of regressors used in the second step
and instruments which aect housing tenure choice but are hopefully not
important in explaining unemployment duration once the eect of regres-
sors is partialled out (Green and Hendershott [2001a], Flatau et al. [2003],
Brunet and Lesueur [2009], Brunet et al. [2007]).
1For an excellent survey of all various tests of the Oswald hypothesis see
Havet and Penot [2010].
2Arulampalam et al. [2000] take individual heterogeneity into account estimating a
random eects probit on a sample of British male drawn from the BHPS for the period
1991-1995.
3See Wooldridge [2010], chapter 15, for a textbook discussion and Rivers and Vuong
[1988] for the correct method to perform the two-stage.
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More recent contributions use a simultaneous estimation method in which
multiple spells data are exploited to identify the residential status eect
(Munch et al. [2006], Battu et al. [2008], Van Vuuren [2009])4. The theoret-
ical fundament of these studies is the local versus non-local labour market
argument outlined by Munch et al. [2006]. Unemployment spells are distin-
guished between those who end up in jobs in the local and in jobs in the
non-local labour market, where the dierence is simply that the latter re-
quire a residential move. Then, competing-risk hazard models are jointly
estimated with a tenure choice equation to compare the eect of residential
status on exits to local jobs and to non-local jobs. While homeownership
is expected to hamper exits to jobs which require a move, the underlying
theory would suggest a positive eect on hazard to local jobs.
Typically, as for the probability to be unemployed, homeowners have
higher hazard rates into employment than renters (Goss and Phillips
[1997], Coulson and Fisher [2002], Flatau et al. [2003]5, Munch et al. [2006],
Van Vuuren [2009]), but this is not always the case. For example,
Brunet and Lesueur [2009] with French data and Green and Hendershott
[2001a] with US data, adopting a dierent estimation method both nd
that homeownership lengthens the unemployment duration, i.e a result
in favour of the Oswald hypothesis. In the analysis of Munch et al. [2006]
and Van Vuuren [2009] the counter-Oswald eect is anyway driven by a larger
eect for exits to local jobs: homeownership hampers exits to non-local jobs
but favours exits to local jobs, and the latter eect outweights the former6.
When more rened denitions of residential status are used, the most
robust nding is that mortgagers have the highest probability to escape un-
employment. The comparison between outright owners and private renters
is ambiguous. Flatau et al. [2003] on US data and Battu et al. [2008] on UK
data nd no signicant dierences7. Brunet et al. [2007] conrm results of
Battu et al. [2008] on UK data, but for French data they nd that outright
owners reenter employment more slowly than private renters. Social rent-
4This approach requires data such that a sucient number of individuals experience
unemployment spells in a dierent residential status.
5Flatau et al. [2003] obtain a signicant eect for males, but not for females. These
results are based on the assumption of exogenous homeownership since in a rst analysis
exogeneity of homeownership cannot be not rejected. Exogeneity of housing tenure is not
rejected when the use a 5-fold classication of residential status either.
6Munch et al. [2006] use data for Denmark and Van Vuuren [2009] for the Netherlands.
In the latter both eects are smaller and the negative eect on non-local jobs is even not
signicant.
7Flatau et al. [2003] cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of housing tenure after
a formal test, so their results are based on that assumption. Battu et al. [2008] nd no
signicant dierences both for exits to local and non-local jobs.
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ing instead seems to lengthen unemployment duration relative to private, as
found by Flatau et al. [2003], Battu et al. [2008] and Brunet et al. [2007] for
the UK. For France, in Brunet et al. [2007] the eect is positive too but not
signicant.
Our goal in this study is to take simultaneously into account two impor-
tant issues, in order to assess the empirical eect of housing tenure on both
labour market outcomes: the potential endogeneity of residential status, and
the renement in its denition distinguishing in particular between owners
with mortgage and outright, and between social and private renters. We
carry out the analysis on UK data drawn from the Labour Force Study. This
is not the rst application on UK data, but the LFS had never been used
before for this purpose.
A typical econometric problem which arises in this literature when allow-
ing for endogeneity is that the standard two-stage least squares estimator
is strictly only applicable to situations with linear and continuous outcome
and endogenous regressors, both of which are not appropriate when study-
ing the eect of housing tenure on labour market outcomes, such as unem-
ployment status or unemployment duration. As for binary models, we opt
for simultaneous estimation methods, which allow eciency gains in esti-
mation and account for unobserved heterogeneity which can correlate with
housing tenure. In particular, we make use of an endogenous multinomial
treatment eects method developed by Deb and Trivedi (Deb and Trivedi
[2006a], Deb and Trivedi [2006b]). As for the unemployment duration, we
refer to a discrete time proportional hazard model with normal distributed
unobserved heterogeneity. We estimate two main hazard models with exits
to employment and to inactivity. Since the hypothesis of absence of un-
observed heterogeneity cannot be rejected in both models, we do not even
need to control explicitly for potential sources of correlation between housing
tenure and the error term, which otherwise would be very complex in this
framework.
The paper is organized in four main sections. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 discuss
respectively the data and sample used, and the methodology. Each section
looks separately at the probability to be unemployed and the unemployment
duration. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 discuss results for the former an for the latter
respectively. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data and Preliminary Evidence
We use a data set drawn from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS), a quarterly
national-wide survey which collects address-based interviews of about 60,000
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households for each quarter. Each individual is interviewed in ve consecutive
quarters on a rotating panel basis. The sample we use spans the period Spring
1999 (March to May) to Winter (December to February) 2005 so that we have
28 quarters of observations8.
For both analysis of labour market outcomes we select a sub-sample of
respondent male head of households in working age (aged 16-64). Moreover
we drop a small number of observations for people who have never had paid
job, or get retirement or old age pension, or are in full-time education or
occupy the household rent-free9.
The reason why we prefer to focus only on head of households is that in
order to model an individual tenure choice, we need individuals for whom the
residential status is actually the outcome of an individual choice, which is
typically the case for people responsible for the accommodation in the sense
that either the accommodation is owned in their name or they pay the hous-
ing costs10. For some not head of households it may be misleading to seek for
a causal link from housing tenure to labour market behaviour given that the
former may not reect the outcome of an individual choice11. For example,
a young still living in the family home and dependent on their parents in an
owner-occupied accommodation can hardly have a labour market behaviour
assimilable to the typical homeowner. Of course this may be the case also
for young adults (even older than 24) living in the family home even though
they are no more notionally dependent on the parents and they are supposed
to make an independent tenure choice. In the latter case, we may keep them
in the sample and assume they live in a rent-free status (Flatau et al. [2003],
Brunet and Lesueur [2009]), but we believe it is somewhat dicult to single
out a rule to identify correctly free-renters since the choice would be highly
8In accordance with EU regulations, the LFS moved from seasonal (Spring, Sum-
mer, Autumn, Winter) quarters to calendar quarters (January-March, April-June, July-
September, October-December) in 2006. We use the old seasonal quarters les to avoid
major problems which may arise with the calendar ones before 2006 due to discontinuities
in some relevant variables.
9Given the subjective nature of questions relating unemployment status or duration we
prefer to drop proxy responses and whenever possible we use LFS sampling weights which
are designed to allow also for non-response.
10This is the LFS denition of household: \A household is dened as a single person, or
a group of people living at the same address who have the address as their only or main
residence and either share one main meal a day or share the living accommodation (or
both)". The LFS uses this denition of head of household: \Head of household (HOH) is
dened as either the man or the husband/male partner of the woman in whose name the
accommodation was owned or rented. Where two people have equal claim the either the
oldest male is selected or, in all female households, the oldest female".
11Nor may be an individual choice the residential status of some head of households, but
this issue can be handled using controls at the household level in the empirical analysis.
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arbitrary. More in general, it is also questionable to include other kinds of not
head of households treating their residential status as that of the household,
at least so long as we model housing tenure as an individual choice.
3.2.1 Labour Market Status
According to the ILO denitions, we dene three labour market statuses:
employed, unemployed, inactive. Employed are workers with paid job; un-
employed are without paid job but both they have been looking for it in the
last four weeks and they are available to start a new job within the follow-
ing two weeks; inactive are people in working age who do not stick to the
unemployment denition.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report descriptive statistics on the labour market status
distribution by housing tenure. The most striking evidence are the high
employment rates of mortgagers (92.8%) and private renters (81%), especially
if compared to the low rates of outright owners (64.5%) and social renters
(48.4%). However, it is clear that the low numbers of the latter are driven
by a very high propensity to be out of the labour force, being 32.7% for
outright owners and 39.2% for social renters. This means that if we look
at notional unemployment rates, intended as the percentage of unemployed
in the labour force, the relative performance can change signicantly. In
fact, outright owners have an unemployment rate of 4.2%, which is nearly a
half of private renters rate (8.3%), while mortgagers (1.9%) and social renters
(20.4%) are at the opposite extremes. It is thus striking that 14.2% of renters
are unemployed, against only 2.3% of homeowners.
For binary labour market status models, we are interested, along the
line of the related literature, in examining how the housing tenure aects
the probability of being unemployed. As we can easily understand from the
tables discussed above, the outcomes of this kind of analysis depend crucially
on what denition of unemployed we choose or/and on what sub-sample we
condition on to make comparisons. For example, so long as we are interested
in studying the chances of a particular worker to have a job given that he
is in the labour force, it is appropriate to run a binary model (unemployed
versus employed) on a restricted sub-sample without inactive people.
Anyway this strategy clearly involves a sample selection issue since the
rule by which workers choose to be out of the labour force may be not random,
but may depend on individual characteristics such as housing tenure, as it
seems very likely according to our sample statistics. In fact both outright
owners and social renters do have higher propensity to be inactive. The
key point here is that some people are out of the labour force since they do
not want to work, but some other drop o the labour force because a weak
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Table 3.1
Sample statistics: Labour Market Status by Housing Tenure
Labour Force status
Housing Tenure Employed Unemployed Inactive Total
owned outright 49,061 2,151 24,907 76,119
mortgage 245,333 4,818 14,342 264,493
rented social 29,070 7,442 23,497 60,009
rented private 35,502 3,234 5,095 43,831
Total 358,966 17,645 67,841 444,452
owned 294,394 6,969 39,249 340,612
rented 64,572 10,676 28,592 103,840
Total 358,966 17,645 67,841 444,452
Notes:
1. The sample is made of respondent male head of households in working age. Observations are
quarterly from Spring 1999 (March to May) to Winter (December to February) 2005. A small
number of observations is dropped regarding people who have never had paid job, or get retirement
or old age pension, or are in full-time education or occupy the household rent-free.
Table 3.2
Sample statistics: Labour Market Status by Housing Tenure
(percentages)
Labour Force status
Housing Tenure Employed Unemployed Inactive Total
owned outright 64.5 2.8 32.7 100
mortgage 92.8 1.8 5.4 100
rented social 48.4 12.4 39.2 100
rented private 81.0 7.4 11.6 100
owned 86.5 2.0 11.5 100
rented 62.2 10.3 27.5 100
Notes:
1. See note 1 to table 3.1.
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labour market position discourages them to look for work though they would
be willing to have a job. If outright owners and social renters are more likely
to be inactive for the latter reason, the procedure outlined above would yield
biased estimates, since if they were in the labour force they would lower the
employment probability of their category.
For this reason it is important to make a distinction within inactive be-
tween workers who would like to have a paid job but do not stick to the ILO
unemployment denition, and ex-workers who do not search since basically
they do not want to work. The former may be notionally non ILO unem-
ployed since either they are searching for work but are not available to start
a job at once, or they are not currently seeking for it since, for example,
they are discouraged, temporarily sick or disabled, waiting for results of an
application, or just stopped, say, ve weeks ago.
The LFS allows us to make this distinction and to look thoroughly into
the reason why people do not want to work. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 give insights
on this point splitting inactive people on the basis of the response to this
specic survey question: \Even though you were not looking for work in the
4 weeks ending Sunday the [date], would you like to have a regular paid job
at the moment, either a full or part-time job?". Results show clearly that
the percentage of inactive who respond to be not interested in paid job is
remarkably higher for homeowners (76.5%), especially for outright owners
(82.7%). Tables 3.5 and 3.6 focus on the main reason why inactive respond
to be not interested in paid job. In general, the most important reasons are
long-term sickness/disability and retirement from paid work. However, it is
interesting to notice that while renters attribute a far larger importance to
the rst reason, the reverse is true for outright owners. Moreover, 7.1% of
outright owners say they do not need a job while the percentage is negligible
for renters.
To summarize, we think the most proper strategy to identify the eect of
housing tenure on the employment probability is to compare employed versus
non-employed conditioning on workers who would like a paid job. Thus
as a test of the Oswald hypothesis, we include in the sample also inactive
workers willing to work and pool them with unemployed in dening the
binary variable.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the distribution of labour market status by hous-
ing tenure, where we distinguish inactive people according to the question
above, yielding a 4-fold categorization for the status. The bar graphs show
that the statuses distribution varies remarkably and that we cannot iden-
tify even one status with a roughly constant percentage over housing tenure.
Mortgagers distinguish themselves for the highest employed percentage, so-
cial renters for the highest percentages of unemployed and of inactive who
3.2. Data and Preliminary Evidence 87
Table 3.3
Sample statistics of inactive workers: Willingness to work by
Housing Tenure
Would like a paid job
Housing Tenure No Yes Total
owned outright 20,389 4,254 24,643
mortgage 9,055 4,773 13,828
rented social 13,156 9,793 22,949
rented private 2,685 2,139 4,824
Total 45,285 20,959 66,244
owned 29,444 9,027 38,471
rented 15,841 11,932 27,773
Total 45,285 20,959 66,244
Notes:
1. See note 1 to table 3.1.
2. The sample is restricted to individuals out of the labour force. Results are derived from this specic
survey question: \Even though you were not looking for work in the 4 weeks ending Sunday the
[date], would you like to have a regular paid job at the moment, either a full or part-time job?".
Table 3.4
Sample statistics of inactive workers: Willingness to work by
Housing Tenure (percentages)
Would like a paid job
Housing Tenure No Yes Total
owned outright 82.7 17.3 100
mortgage 65.5 34.5 100
rented social 57.3 42.7 100
rented private 55.7 44.3 100
owned 76.5 23.5 100
renter 57.0 43.0 100
Notes:
1. See notes to table 3.3.
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Table 3.5
Sample statistics of inactive unwilling to work: main reason why
does not want a regular full/part-time job by housing tenure
Housing Tenure
owned mort- rented rented
Main Reason outright gage social private Total
waiting application 0 2 7 1 10
student 44 77 90 87 298
look after fam/home 589 862 1,585 275 3,311
temp. sick/injured 110 165 422 129 826
long-term sick/disabled 6,060 4,349 9,851 1,687 21,947
doesn't need work 1,461 490 38 38 2,027
retired from paid work 11,808 2,766 822 273 15,669
other 451 455 363 213 1,482
Total 20,523 9,166 13,178 2,703 45,570
Notes:
1. See note 1 to table 3.1.
2. The sample has been restricted to inactive people who declares not to want a regular paid job,
either full-time or part-time. Then results are derived from this specic survey question: \What
was the main reason that you did not want work (in the last 4 weeks)?".
Table 3.6
Sample statistics of inactive unwilling to work: main reason why
does not want a regular full/part-time job by housing tenure
(percentages)
Housing Tenure
owned mort- rented rented
Main Reason outright gage social private
waiting application 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
student 0.2 0.8 0.7 3.2
look after fam/home 2.9 9.4 12.0 10.2
temp. sick/injured 0.6 1.8 3.2 4.8
long-term sick/disabled 29.5 47.4 74.7 62.4
doesn't need work 7.1 5.4 0.3 1.4
retired from paid work 57.5 30.2 6.2 10.1
other 2.2 5.0 2.8 7.9
Total 100 100 100 100
Notes:
1. See notes to table 3.5.
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Figure 3.1
Labour Market Status by Housing Tenure
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Notes:
1. The sample is made of respondent male head of households in working age. Observations are
quarterly from Spring 1999 (March to May) to Winter (December to February) 2005. A small
number of observations is dropped regarding people who have never had paid job, or get retirement
or old age pension, or are in full-time education or occupy the household rent-free.
Figure 3.2
Labour Market Status by Housing Tenure
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Notes:
1. See note 1 to gure 3.1.
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Figure 3.3
Labour Market Status by Housing Tenure - Employed, Unemployed,
Inactive want job
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Notes:
1. The sample is made of respondent male head of households in working age. Observations are
quarterly from Spring 1999 (March to May) to Winter (December to February) 2005. A small
number of observations is dropped regarding people who have never had paid job, or get retirement
or old age pension, or are in full-time education or occupy the household rent-free.
Figure 3.4
Labour Market Status by Housing Tenure - Employed, Unemployed,
Inactive want job
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Notes:
1. See note 1 to gure 3.3.
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want a paid job, outright owners for the highest percentage of inactive who
do not want job. The distribution of private renters is somehow similar to
that of mortgagers given a very high employed percentage and small por-
tions of the other statuses. Moreover, these gures corroborate the view that
the collapse of the four residential statuses to yield the classical dichotomy
homeowners-renters would be misleading since many features of the housing
tenure story would be lost.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the distribution of labour market status focusing
on the sample we shall use in the analysis, i.e. without those unwilling to
work. Social renters are by far the least likely to be employed, while mort-
gagers are the most likely. Employment rates are very similar for outright
owners and private renters but it is evident that the former tend to stay more
out of the labour force than the latter when without a job. Thus, if we did
not include inactive willing to work, employment rates of outright owners
would be remarkably higher relatively to private renters. The econometric
analysis will yield more rened results on this comparison by controlling for
observable and unobservable characteristics.
3.2.2 Unemployment Duration
In order to perform an unemployment duration analysis by means of the LFS,
we exploit a survey variable which heavily relies on the information provided
by the respondent. This variable reports the minimum of the length of the
time the respondent states to have been looking for work and the length
of time since his last job12. Durations are grouped in 8 time intervals: 0-3
months, 3-6 months, 6-12 months, 1-2 years, 2-3 years, 3-4 years, 4-5 years, 5
years or more. We use as measure of the spell length the value reported in the
last interview associated with the unemployed status before a switch. The
status in which the spell ends up may be either employment or inactivity, or
may be unemployment when the interview is the last, that is the spell is right
censored. Regressors are assumed spell constant and their values refer to the
last interview before the exit (or the last interview for censored spells)13.
Apart from the discrete nature of this variable, the choice to refer to the
last interview as unemployed leads to an underestimation of the spell since
the precise day in which the spell ends can be whatever else up to the day
of the next interview. Yet, this underestimation is of minor concern for our
analysis since the error derives from an asynchrony between the spell window
12This is the LFS durun variable.
13In the sample there are some individuals with multiple unemployment spells, but since
they are too few to be exploited we treat multiple spells as spells of dierent individuals.
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Figure 3.5
Cumulative Hazard to employment: Kaplan-Meier estimate
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1. Non parametric estimate of the cumulative hazard function for exits to employment.
Figure 3.6
Cumulative Hazard to employment: Kaplan-Meier estimate
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1. Non parametric estimate of the cumulative hazard function for exits to employment.
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Figure 3.7
Cumulative Hazard to inactivity: Kaplan-Meier estimate
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1. Non parametric estimate of the cumulative hazard function for exits to inactivity.
Figure 3.8
Cumulative Hazard to inactivity: Kaplan-Meier estimate
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1. Non parametric estimate of the cumulative hazard function for exits to inactivity.
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and the interviews intervals, which is likely to be random14.
To prevent interferences in the causal link from housing tenure to un-
employment duration we focus on a sub-sample with stable housing tenure
data over the spell. In particular, we drop spells for individuals who switch
housing tenure in the quarter either immediately preceding or following that
in which the spells ends. The rst correction rules out situations such when
long unemployment spells end right after the entrance in a residential status
which favours the exit (either into employment or inactivity). The second
one rules out also situations when the change in housing tenure takes place
right after the end of the spell. However this sample restriction is of minor
importance since the decrease in the sample size is negligible. Before the
restriction, we have 9,353 spells of which 3,023 end in employment, 1,326
end in inactivity and 5,000 are right censored. After the restriction we have
9,230 spells of which 2,973 end in employment, 1,297 end in inactivity and
4,960 are right censored.
We analyse separately spells ending up into employment and into inactiv-
ity. First we produce some basic evidence for both spells analysis. Figures 3.5
and 3.6 report the Kaplan-Meyer estimates of the cumulative density func-
tion for exits to employment. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 report the Kaplan-Meyer
estimates for exits to inactivity. A rst evaluation of the hazards without
controlling for observable or unobservable characteristics suggests that the
cumulative probabilities both of nding a job and of stopping to look for
work are always higher for mortgagers and outright owners than for social
and private renters. In particular, exits into employment are always more
likely for mortgagers than outright owners, while similar for private and so-
cial renters. Exits into inactivity are always more likely for outright owners
than for mortgagers, while similar for private and social renters.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Labour Market Status
For the purpose of estimating the eect of housing tenure on the probabil-
ity of having a job, we model a binary outcome equation which compares
14There may be a second method to generate unemployment spells from the LFS, which
consists of adding up 3 months for each consecutive quarter in which the individual is
unemployed (Stam and Long [2010]). This method would be more precise in that the
status would be checked quarter by quarter instead of relying on the memory of the
interviewed, but it would have the drawback of ignoring short spells occurring in between
two consecutive quarters.
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non-employed against employed. Notional ILO unemployed are pooled with
workers no more in the labour force but who would like a paid job.
When trying to estimate the causal eect of housing tenure on the prob-
ability to be non-employed, one should keep in mind that housing tenure
may be endogenous. In fact some unobserved factors which aect the labour
market outcomes are likely to be correlated with housing tenure. In that
case it is important to isolate the true impact of housing tenure from that of
unobserved factors which are correlated with it.
In binary outcome models endogeneity could be addressed applying non
standard two stage approaches, such as those introduced in Rivers and Vuong
[1988]. They consist in a rst stage equation, which models the housing
tenure discrete choice as a function of the exogenous variables and some
suitable instruments, and in a second stage equation, by which the binary
outcome is modeled as a probit using the exogenous variables and the pre-
dicted errors from the rst stage as regressors. The Rivers-Vuong approach
also turns out to be a very useful and simple tool to test for endogeneity,
since the t-statistic of the predicted error terms in the second stage represents
a valid test for the null hypothesis of exogeneity.
In the empirical literature, some studies have attempted to allow for this
source of bias adopting a very similar method (see Flatau et al. [2003] and
Coulson and Fisher [2009]). Unfortunately this two stage approach is typi-
cally less ecient than simultaneous estimation methods and requires com-
plicated calculations to get second step consistent average partial eects and
standard errors, which is mostly true when the endogenous regressor is dis-
crete (see Wooldridge [2010], section 15.7). For these reasons we prefer to
adopt a joint estimation method of the two sets of equations, though the
Rivers-Vuong two-step approach will be employed to test for endogeneity.
In particular, we make use of an endogenous multinomial treatment eect
estimation method developed by Deb and Trivedi (Deb and Trivedi [2006a],
Deb and Trivedi [2006b]) which turns out to be the most suitable method we
are aware of for our case15. This method can be used to analyze the eects
of an endogenous multinomial treatment on a binary outcome variable. In
our framework the treatments are represented by the four housing tenure
statuses. More precisely, we set private renting as the control group (i.e.
base category) and we interpret property owned outright, mortgage holding
and social renting as three dierent kinds of treatment whose dierential
eect on the probability of being non-employed we aim at estimating.
The model specication comprises an outcome equation with a structural-
15The method is implemented using the Stata routine mtreatreg provided by the ref-
erence.
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causal interpretation and other equations that model the generating process
of treatment variables (see appendix B for a formal representation). The
estimation method relies on the specication of a joint distribution for the
outcome and the endogenous treatment choice. Latent factors enter into the
outcome and treatments equations in the same way as observed covariates
and incorporate unobserved characteristics related both to the housing tenure
choice and to the probability of being unemployed. Since the latent factors
enter the likelihood function but are unknown, the maximization of the like-
lihood function is performed through simulation by drawing several random
numbers from a standard normal distribution16. The housing tenure choice
is modeled with a mixed multinomial logit, while the probability density of
the outcome variable is assumed to follow a logistic function.
The identication of the parameters of the model is achieved through
exclusion restrictions, that is we include in the tenure choice model a
set of instruments which are excluded in the outcome equation17. Valid
instruments should satisfy two conditions: rst, they should be rel-
evant, that is substantially correlated with the endogenous regressors;
second, they should be exogenous, that is uncorrelated with the out-
come except through their eect on the endogenous regressors. The lit-
erature which has attempted to identify the causal link from housing
tenure to labour market outcomes has plenty of examples of instruments
for housing tenure, such as regional homeownership rates (Munch et al.
[2006], Brunet and Lesueur [2009], Van Leuvensteijn and Koning [2004]),
father's occupation (Battu et al. [2008], Brunet and Lesueur [2009]), age
dummies (Flatau et al. [2003]), the ratio of the user owner cost to the
rent (Flatau et al. [2003]), the state marginal tax rate (Coulson and Fisher
[2009]), number of families within the household (Coulson and Fisher [2009]),
sex of rst two children born in the household (Coulson and Fisher [2009]),
housing tenure of parents (Munch et al. [2006]), housing tenure in the
city of birth (Munch et al. [2006]), price of rents in the neighborhood
16Provided that the number of draws is suciently large, maximization of the simulated
log likelihood is equivalent to maximizing the log likelihood (Gourieroux et al. [1984]).
See Deb and Trivedi [2006a] and Deb and Trivedi [2006b] for a discussion on the choice
of the number of draws. In order to save on computing time, the program uses quasi-
random draws based on Halton sequences instead of standard methods based on pseudo-
random draws. The former have been proved to be more eective for maximum simulated
estimation as they can provide the same accuracy with fewer draws (see Bhat [2001] and
Train [2003]).
17In principle the parameters of the model are identied even if the regressors included
in the outcome equation are identical to those in the treatment equations. However,
Deb and Trivedi [2006a] and Deb and Trivedi [2006b] recommend using traditional exclu-
sion restrictions for more robust identication.
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(Brunet and Lesueur [2009]), vacancy rates (Brunet and Lesueur [2009]), av-
erage distance to jobs (Brunet and Lesueur [2009]), age of entry into the
housing (Brunet and Lesueur [2009]).
Our data allow us to select a set of three instruments: the number of
family units within the household, the sex of the rst two children born in
the household and an aggregate house price index at regional level.
First, the number of family units should be related to housing tenure,
since single-family detached units are more likely to live in owner-occupied
dwellings while multifamily dwellings are more likely to live in rented ac-
commodation. Yet there is no reason to expect an inuence of the number
of family units on labour market outcomes, once controlling for the other
regressors.
Second, given parental preferences for a mixed sibling-sex composi-
tion, the sex of the rst two children is used to create a valid instrument
for housing tenure as proposed by Angrist and Evans [1998] and used in
Coulson and Fisher [2009]. In particular, we create a dummy which takes
one for households in which the sex of the rst two children born is the same
and zero otherwise. Parents with same-sex siblings are more likely to have
an additional child so we expect the dummy to be signicant in a housing
tenure choice model given that the presence of children is well known to
be correlated with a propensity to become owner (see Coulson and Fisher
[2009]). Yet, this dummy should be redundant in an unemployment status
binary model once housing tenure is controlled for.
Third, we use a quarterly house prices real index at regional level which
should predict the regional and time variation in the propensity to home-
ownership18. The choice to buy a home or to live in rented accommodation
depends of course on the price of houses. In fact the propensity to become
homeowner should drop as the house prices increase across regions and/or
over quarters. Yet, there is no a-priori reason to expect an eect of house
prices on individual labour outcomes other than that transmitted by housing
tenure (or by other covariates).
In principle we may use also regional housing tenure rates (as sometimes
is found in the literature) which of course should be strongly correlated with
individual housing tenure. Anyway there is no warranty that these rates
are even not related with individual labour market outcomes, since, after
all, the original formulation of the Oswald hypothesis argues for an aggre-
gate correlation between home ownership rates (most of all at country level)
and unemployment rates, whose micro foundation must be found out in the
individual causal link from housing tenure towards labour market outcomes.
18This is derived from the Halifax House Price Index (Halifax [2010]).
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3.3.2 Unemployment Duration
With regards to the unemployment duration analysis we model two hazard
equations, one for exits into employment and one for exits into inactivity,
where the duration variable is drawn from a specic question which groups
answers in trimester basis time units. We estimate these equations by a
discrete time proportional hazard model with piecewise constant baseline
hazard.
When duration data comes in discrete time as in this case, the typical
approach for estimation is to apply standard binary choice models to stacked
data, such as the complementary log-log (clog-log) or the logit regression.
We use the clog-log model which represents the discrete-time analogue of the
well-known Cox proportional hazards model (Prentice and Gloeckler [1978]).
The hazard is assumed to be constant over the duration intervals.
In order to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity (\frailty")
the method we use incorporates a random variable which enters the hazard
specication as a multiplicative scale factor (see Jenkins [2008], lecture 7).
This random variable summarises the impact of omitted variables on the
hazard rate and is assumed to follow a normal distribution. However, a
crucial assumption in this model is that the random variable is distributed
independently of both the regressors and time19. As matter of fact, we are
estimating a random eects panel model with a clog-log link function.
3.4 Empirical Results: The probability of Be-
ing Non-Employed
Table 3.7 reports results of four dierent models for the probability of non-
employment. The rst two use the traditional homeownership binary vari-
able, while the subsequent use the more precise 4-fold categorization. For
both cases we estimate at rst a standard binary model ignoring the potential
endogeneity of housing tenure, and then a simultaneous model which explic-
itly accounts for it. As set of controls we include disability/sickness benets
19In the literature the consequences of mistakenly ignoring unobserved heterogeneity
have been investigated mainly with reference to continuous time proportional hazard
model. The main results suggested in terms of parameters estimation are (Jenkins [2008],
lecture 6): (1) Overestimation of the degree of negative duration dependence, and under-
estimation of the degree of positive duration dependence; (2) The proportionate eect of a
given regressor on the hazard rate is no longer constant and independent of survival time;
(3) Underestimation (overestimation) of the positive (negative) eect of a regressor. How-
ever the magnitude of the biases should be attenuated when a fully exible specication
for the baseline hazard is assumed.
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Table 3.7
Probability of being non-employed
(1) Probit (2) Endog. Probit (3) Logit (4) Endog. Logit
 std. err.  std. err.  std. err.  std. err.
homeowner -0.762** 0.008 -1.7** 0.026
outright owner -0.579** 0.028 -1.986** 0.280
mortgager -1.227** 0.022 -5.626** 0.558
social renter 0.719** 0.023 3.448** 0.329
disability benf. 1.805** 0.013 1.520** 0.016 3.192** 0.024 6.944** 0.569
marriage status
married - spouse in emp. -0.322** 0.009 -1.400** 0.010 -0.687** 0.018 -0.764** 0.066
married - spouse non emp. 0.133** 0.010 0.202** 0.010 0.198** 0.019 0.567** 0.066
age dummies
age 35-44 0.099** 0.010 0.201** 0.009 0.092** 0.020 0.487** 0.064
age 45-54 0.200** 0.010 0.326** 0.010 0.221** 0.021 0.712** 0.082
age 55-64 0.526** 0.011 0.670** 0.011 0.706** 0.024 1.350** 0.143
last occupation type
Managers/Senior O. -0.257** 0.014 -0.030* 0.014 -0.395** 0.028 0.053 0.066
Professional -0.377** 0.017 -0.160** 0.018 -0.649** 0.036 -0.538** 0.087
Assoc. Prof./Technical -0.381** 0.016 -0.173** 0.016 -0.643** 0.033 -0.539** 0.080
Admin./Secretarial -0.274** 0.019 -0.104** 0.018 -0.480** 0.038 -0.369** 0.087
Skilled Trades -0.165** 0.013 0.004 0.013 -0.252** 0.025 0.026 0.059
Personal Service -0.273** 0.020 -0.199** 0.020 -0.476** 0.040 -0.755** 0.108
Sales -0.126** 0.020 -0.019 0.020 -0.176** 0.040 0.102 0.094
Operatives -0.141** 0.013 -0.012 0.013 -0.235** 0.025 -0.027 0.059
education (highest)
Degree -0.203** 0.014 -0.066** 0.014 -0.391** 0.029 -0.293** 0.064
Higher educ. -0.160** 0.015 -0.015 0.015 -0.287** 0.032 -0.068 0.068
GCE -0.157** 0.010 -0.018 0.010 -0.288** 0.019 -0.097* 0.044
GCSE -0.064** 0.011 0.052** 0.011 -0.113** 0.022 0.188** 0.054
seasonal dummies X X X X
yearly dummies X X X X
regional dummies X X X X
OUT 0.551* 0.250
MORT 3.608** 0.415
SOC -2.189** 0.264
number of observations 382,778 382,778 382,778 382,778
Notes:
1. * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%. See appendix C for the base categories of discrete regressors. See note 1
to table 3.1 for sample restrictions. See appendix B for a formal representation of model (4). s are coecients
of the index function and are informative on the sign of the eects but not on the magnitude.
2. The dependent variable is a dummy for non-employment (unemployed and inactive who would like paid job)
versus employment status. Four dierent estimation methods are used (sampling weights are always used). (1)
Probit regression. (2) Bivariate probit, where a probit for non-employment is estimated jointly with a probit
for homeownership choice (homeownership is instrumented with famnum and hpinsareal). (3) Logit regression.
(4) Multinomial endogenous treatment eects, where a logit for non-employment is estimated jointly with a
mixed multinomial logit for the housing tenure choice (housing tenure is instrumented with famnum samesexhh and
hpinsareal). -s are loading factors of the latent terms and positive (negative) j (j 2 OUT;MORT; SOC)
indicates that unobserved characteristics which increase the probability of treatment j-th relative to private
renting also lead to higher (lower) probability of non-employment relative to that.
receipt, marriage status, age dummies, type of last occupation, education,
and seasonal, yearly and regional dummies.
When housing tenure takes the form of a simple binary homeownership
choice, we address endogeneity using a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit
model (see Wooldridge [2010] and Greene [2003]). A probit for unemployment
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and a probit for homeownership are estimated jointly making use of a set of
instruments. Errors in the two equations are potentially correlated and are
assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution. In column (1) and (2)
of table 3.7 we report estimates from the standard probit and the bivariate
probit respectively. Endogeneity of homeownership is supported both by
the evidence of correlation in the two error terms of the bivariate probit
and by the Rivers-Vuong two stage test20. In both columns the negative
eect of owning the accommodation on the probability of non-employment
is evident21.
The binary denition of housing tenure is anyway too simplistic and re-
sults of models (1) and (2) may be misleading. Model (3) of table 3.7 per-
forms a standard logit regression using the three housing tenure dummies
as regressors (the base category is private renter). Estimated coecients of
the index function suggest that after controlling for observable characteris-
tics, mortgagers and outright owners are less likely to be non-employed than
private renters, while social renters are more likely.
However these results may be spurious since they ignore endogeneity due
to potential selection into residential status based on unobservables. En-
dogeneity of housing tenure dummies is tested using the Rivers-Vuong two
step method. The coecients of predicted errors from the rst stage hous-
ing tenure choice model turn out to be jointly statistically signicant, which
allow us to reject the hypothesis of exogeneity22.
Column (4) of table 3.7 reports maximum simulated likelihood estimates
from the multinomial treatment eect model which accounts for endogene-
ity23. The table reports coecients of the logit index function which are
20The Rivers-Vuong test is carried out running in the rst stage a probit model of
homeownership in which are used as instruments famnum and hpinsareal (samesexhh is
not signicant thus it is not included in the nal specication). In the second stage a probit
regression for non-employment is run including as further regressor the predicted error term
from the rst stage (coecients are biased under endogeneity). Under the null hypothesis
of exogeneity the coecient of the error term is zero but the test suggests endogeneity of
homeownership since the hypothesis is statistically strongly rejected. Results of this test
are available upon request.
21Homeownership is instrumented using only famnum and hpinsareal since samesexhh
is not signicant both in the bivariate probit and in the rst stage of the Rivers-Vuong test.
In the homeownership binary choice model both instruments are signicant and negative
suggesting that the probability of becoming homeowner is lower for multi-family detached
units and decreases with house prices. Results of the homeownership choice probit are
available upon request.
22In the rst stage we estimate a multinomial logit and then plug predicted errors in
the outcome equation. Results are available upon request.
23Latent factors are simulated drawing 1,200 random variables from the standard normal
distribution. Standard errors are robust in the sense that take simulation error into account
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informative on the direction of the eects but cannot be readily interpreted
in terms of their magnitude. Overall, there is evidence of selection on un-
observables since -s coecients of the latent factors are jointly highly sig-
nicant, which supports again a rejection of the hypothesis of exogeneity24.
In particular, both the coecients mort and out are positive suggesting that
individuals who are more likely to own the accommodation, either with a
mortgage or outright, relative to privately rented dwellings, are also more
likely to be non-employed on the basis of their unobserved characteristics.
Conversely, soc < 0 suggests that individuals who are more likely to occupy
the accommodation on social renting basis than private, are less likely to
be non-employed on the basis of their unobserved characteristics. In other
words, when  is positive (negative), it means that unobserved characteristics
that increase the probability of being in that particular treatment relative
to the control, also lead to higher (lower) probability of non-employment for
treated individuals.
Estimates of the endogenous logit are reliable in terms of the direction
of the eects, both as regards the outcome equation and the tenure choice
model. In the outcome equation, the probability of being non-employed is
enhanced by sickness/disability benets, by living with spouse without job
and by previous occupations as Managers/Senior ocials, on Skilled Trades
or on Sales, while the probability is reduced by young age (16-34), by higher
education, by living with spouse with a job and by previous occupations as
Professional, Associate Prof/Technical, Administrator/Secretarial, on Per-
sonal Service and as Operative. In the housing tenure choice model (see table
D.1 in appendix D), instruments are generally signicant and consistent with
our expectations: the number of family units within the household is lower in
private rented dwellings, siblings of same sex are less likely in private rented
dwellings and higher house prices reduce propensity to homeownership.
As regards the treatment eects of housing tenure, they maintain the
same sign as in the exogenous case, where mortgagers and outright owners
are less likely to be non-employed than private renters, and social renters are
more likely. To have an idea on the magnitude of the treatment eects, and
how they change after accounting for endogeneity, we report also estimates
of the marginal eects for both models. Marginal eects give the percentage
points increase in the probability of being unemployed for the change in status
between the base (i.e. private renter) and the current, given a specic set
(Deb and Trivedi [2006a], Deb and Trivedi [2006b]).
24A simple likelihood-ratio test for endogeneity corresponds to the test of the joint signif-
icance of the three coecients. The null hypothesis that the coecients are simultaneously
equal to zero is rejected which is strong evidence in favour of endogeneity (Deb and Trivedi
[2006a], Deb and Trivedi [2006b]).
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of values of the regressors25. Table 3.8 report marginal eects calculated at
sample means of the regressors, while tables 3.10 and 3.11 report marginal
eects at representative values of regressors (see appendix B for a formal
representation of marginal eects in the endogenous case).
Interestingly, table 3.8 shows that while signs of treatment eects are
maintained once endogeneity is accounted for (as we have already pointed
out), the magnitude gets smaller in absolute terms and the relative eect
of owning the accommodation outright is even no more signicant at 5%.
In particular, the reduction eect on the non-employment probability for
mortgagers shrinks from 6 to 2.1 points, and the incremental eect for social
renters shrinks from 3.8 to 1.2 points. How can we interpret these changes in
impact? One likely explanation is that in our specication we fail in modeling
some sort of skills-gaps which enhance the relative labour market position
of mortgagers and outright owners while weaken that of social renters. So,
when housing tenure is assumed exogenous, treatment eects are inated
as they capture also the eect of unobserved skills gaps. We believe that
this nding is quite relevant, since explanations of rescaling in eects after
accounting for endogeneity are quite unsatisfactory in the related literature.
In fact, previous studies which attempted to estimate the causal eect of
housing tenure on the probability to be unemployed, either did not focus on
multinomial tenure (Coulson and Fisher [2009]) or did not tackle rigorously
the endogeneity problem (Flatau et al. [2003]26).
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 report marginal eects when the set of regressors
values is chosen discretionally instead of at sample means. In these calcula-
tions, we always hold x marriage status (non married), disability benets
receipt (no receipt), season (Winter) and year (2005), while Region varies
across tables (South East or London), and age (16-34 or 45-54), education
(GCE or Degree) and occupation (Managers/Senior O. or Professional)
vary within tables. The rule of selection is representativeness, in the sense
that we choose most frequent and relevant values (see table 3.9). Again,
we observe in these cases that treatment eects for mortgagers and outright
owners shrink after accounting for endogeneity. Anyway, unlike marginal
25A more syntectic measure of the eect maybe the average partial eect, which averages
over individuals the marginal eect of the variable for every individuals using observed
values. Anyway, for the treatment eect model in which simulated latent factors are
added to the outcome equations, average partial eect would require to recover the actual
simulated values, while with marginal eects we can get around it setting them at xed
values such as zero.
26However, Flatau et al. [2003] nd for males that the marginal eect gets larger for
mortgagers, remains similar for outright owners and becomes not signicant for social
renters. The marginal eect for social renters becomes not signicant even in the females
sample.
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Table 3.8
Marginal Effects of Housing Tenure, at means
Logit - Exogenous Housing Tenure
dy=dx std. error P-value [ 95% Conf.Int. ]
outright owner -1.92** 0.0008 0.000 -2.07 -1.77
mortgager -6.03** 0.0013 0.000 -6.29 -5.77
social renter 3.76** 0.0016 0.000 3.44 4.07
Logit - Endogenous Housing Tenure
dy=dx std. error P-value [ 95% Conf.Int. ]
outright owner -0.06 0.0004 0.081 -0.13 0.01
mortgager -2.11** 0.0058 0.000 -3.23 -0.98
social renter 1.15* 0.0047 0.014 0.23 2.07
Notes:
1. * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%. Reported marginal eects are multiplied by 100.
2. Statistics are from the models (3) and (4) of table 3.7. Marginal eects are computed at sample
means of regressors and latent factors are set to zero.
Table 3.9
Sample means of regressors
variables means variables means
married - spouse in emp. 0.4467 2000 0.1699
married - spouse non emp. 0.1299 2001 0.1693
disability benets 0.0356 2002 0.1554
age 35-44 0.3275 2003 0.1157
age 45-54 0.2429 2004 0.1100
age 55-64 0.1458 2005 0.1051
Managers/Senior O. 0.2020 East Anglia 0.1009
Professional Occupations 0.1441 East Midlands 0.0728
Assoc. Professional and Tech. 0.1345 London 0.1095
Administrative and Secretarial 0.0523 North West 0.1011
Skilled Trades 0.1827 North 0.0418
Personal Service 0.0357 South East 0.1469
Sales and Customer Service 0.0325 South West 0.0888
Operatives 0.1298 Scotland 0.0902
Degree 0.2200 West Midlands 0.0880
Higher education 0.0986 Wales 0.0447
GCE 0.3021 Yorkshire & Humberside 0.0901
GCSE 0.1657 famnum 1.06
Summer 0.2503 samesexhh 0.1161
Autumn 0.2531 hpinsareal 1485.3
Winter 0.2414
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Table 3.10
Marginal Effects of Housing Tenure, Region of South East
Logit endogenous Logit
dy=dx std. error P-value dy=dx std. error P-value
age 16-34 - GCE - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -2.51** 0.0015 0.000 -0.68** 0.0024 0.004
mortgager -4.1** 0.0019 0.000 -0.79** 0.0029 0.007
social renter 5.5** 0.0028 0.000 19.28** 0.0248 0.000
age 16-34 - GCE - Professional
outright owner -1.98** 0.0013 0.000 -0.38* 0.0015 0.011
mortgager -3.23** 0.0017 0.000 -0.44* 0.0018 0.017
social renter 4.44** 0.0025 0.000 11.77** 0.0200 0.000
age 16-34 - Degree - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -2.28** 0.0014 0.000 -0.56** 0.0020 0.005
mortgager -3.73** 0.0018 0.000 -0.65** 0.0025 0.009
social renter 5.05** 0.0027 0.000 16.47** 0.0234 0.000
age 16-34 - Degree - Professional
outright owner -1.8** 0.0011 0.000 -0.31* 0.0013 0.014
mortgager -2.93** 0.0014 0.000 -0.36* 0.0016 0.020
social renter 4.06** 0.0023 0.000 9.9** 0.0178 0.000
age 45-54- GCE - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -3.05** 0.0019 0.000 -1.38** 0.0040 0.001
mortgager -5.02** 0.0023 0.000 -1.6** 0.0049 0.001
social renter 6.58** 0.0032 0.000 32.26** 0.0312 0.000
age 45-54 - GCE - Professional
outright owner -2.43** 0.0016 0.000 -0.77** 0.0026 0.003
mortgager -3.97** 0.0021 0.000 -0.89** 0.0032 0.005
social renter 5.35** 0.0029 0.000 21.19** 0.0266 0.000
age 45-54 - Degree - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -2.79** 0.0018 0.000 -1.14** 0.0035 0.001
mortgager -4.57** 0.0022 0.000 -1.32** 0.0043 0.002
social renter 6.06** 0.0032 0.000 28.31** 0.0302 0.000
age 45-54 - Degree - Professional
outright owner -2.21** 0.0014 0.000 -0.63** 0.0022 0.004
mortgager -3.61** 0.0018 0.000 -0.73** 0.0027 0.007
social renter 4.91** 0.0027 0.000 18.17** 0.0242 0.000
Notes:
1. * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%. Reported marginal eects are multiplied by 100.
2. Statistics are from the models (3) and (4) of table 3.7. Marginal eects are computed for eight
dierent sets of values for regressors chosen discretionally. Age, education and occupation can
take on two dierent values while the other covariates are held xed across sets of values. Fixed
values are: non married, no disability benets, Winter, 2005 and South East as Region.
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Table 3.11
Marginal Effects of Housing Tenure, Region of London
Logit endogenous Logit
dy=dx std. error P-value dy=dx std. error P-value
age 16-34 - GCE - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -3.25** 0.0018 0.000 -0.85** 0.0028 0.003
mortgager -5.35** 0.0022 0.000 -0.98** 0.0035 0.005
social renter 6.95** 0.0033 0.000 22.78** 0.0265 0.000
age 16-34 - GCE - Professional
outright owner -2.59** 0.0016 0.000 -0.47** 0.0018 0.009
mortgager -4.24** 0.0020 0.000 -0.54* 0.0022 0.014
social renter 5.67** 0.0030 0.000 14.17** 0.0222 0.000
age 16-34 - Degree - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -2.97** 0.0017 0.000 -0.7** 0.0024 0.004
mortgager -4.87** 0.0020 0.000 -0.81** 0.0030 0.007
social renter 6.41** 0.0032 0.000 19.59** 0.0251 0.000
age 16-34 - Degree - Professional
outright owner -2.36** 0.0013 0.000 -0.39* 0.0015 0.011
mortgager -3.86** 0.0016 0.000 -0.45* 0.0019 0.017
social renter 5.21** 0.0026 0.000 11.98** 0.0198 0.000
age 45-54- GCE - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -3.93** 0.0024 0.000 -1.7** 0.0047 0.000
mortgager -6.5** 0.0028 0.000 -1.97** 0.0059 0.001
social renter 8.21** 0.0037 0.000 36.86** 0.0326 0.000
age 45-54 - GCE - Professional
outright owner -3.16** 0.0020 0.000 -0.95** 0.0031 0.002
mortgager -5.19** 0.0025 0.000 -1.1** 0.0038 0.004
social renter 6.77** 0.0034 0.000 24.91** 0.0286 0.000
age 45-54 - Degree - Managers/Senior O.
outright owner -3.6** 0.0022 0.000 -1.41** 0.0041 0.001
mortgager -5.94** 0.0026 0.000 -1.63** 0.0051 0.001
social renter 7.61** 0.0036 0.000 32.67** 0.0314 0.000
age 45-54 - Degree - Professional
outright owner -2.88** 0.0018 0.000 -0.79** 0.0027 0.003
mortgager -4.72** 0.0021 0.000 -0.91** 0.0033 0.005
social renter 6.24** 0.0031 0.000 21.52** 0.0259 0.000
Notes:
1. * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%. Reported marginal eects are multiplied by 100.
2. Statistics are from the models (3) and (4) of table 3.7. Marginal eects are computed for eight
dierent sets of values for regressors chosen discretionally. Age, education and occupation can
take on two dierent values while the other covariates are held xed across sets of values. Fixed
values are: non married, no disability benets, Winter, 2005 and London as Region.
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eects computed at sample means, the treatment eect for outright owners
remains always signicant at 5%, and the treatment eect for social renters
becomes much larger. As regards the latter, it is interesting to note that the
size becomes very large, around 30 points, when age is set to 45-54, occu-
pation is set to Managers/Senior Ocials, and education is set to GCE, i.e.
all categories that are relative more strongly associated to non-employment.
Though these marginal eects partly disagree with those computed averaging
over the whole sample, such results cannot be ruled out either.
3.5 Empirical Results: Unemployment Dura-
tion
3.5.1 Exit to Employment
Table 3.12 reports estimates of a discrete time proportional hazards model
using the sample of spells which either end into employment or are right
censored. Marginal eects measure the impacts of the covariates on the
probability to nd a job when the set of regressor is evaluated at sample
means. We report also hazard ratios for ready interpretation, which for
dichotomous variables represent the ratio of hazards between the selected and
the base category27. The rst column reports estimates of the clog-log model
without controlling for frialty. These estimates suggest that mortgagers and
outright owners have a probability to nd a job, respectively, two times larger
and 55% larger than private renters. There is not a signicant dierence in
probabilities between social and private renters.
The second column of table 3.12 refers to the proportional hazard model
in which normally distributed unobserved heterogeneity is allowed for. Esti-
mates are almost identical to those of the rst model. In fact the likelihood
ratio test suggests that the unobserved heterogeneity is unimportant since
the  statistic is negligible and not signicantly dierent from zero28. Hence
we cannot refuse the null hypothesis that heterogeneity is absent. As a ro-
bustness check, we estimated dierent models with alternative specications.
Using a logistic model with Normal distributed errors, unobserved hetero-
geneity is not signicant as well, and using a proportional hazard model
27For continuous variables the hazard ratio gives the percentage increase (if the ratio is
greater than one; decrease if less than one) in the hazard rate for a unit increase in the
covariate.
28The reported  is the ratio of the heterogeneity variance to one plus the heterogeneity
variance.
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Table 3.12
Probability of exiting unemployment: spells ending in employment
or censored
(1) Hazard (2) Hazard
with frailty without frailty
dy=dx hazard ratio hazard ratio
outright owner 2.69** 1.552** 1.584**
mortgager 4.51** 2.045** 2.057**
social -0.31 0.942 0.964
claimant -1.89** 0.705** 0.712**
disability benf. -2.70** 0.506** 0.524**
married 1.22** 1.257** 1.247**
baseline hazard dummies
3  6 months -1.50** 0.726** 0.716**
6  12 months -3.77** 0.394** 0.394**
1  2 years -5.96** 0.199** 0.196**
2  3 years -5.87** 0.112** 0.113**
3  4 years -6.00** 0.052** 0.053**
4  5 years -5.23** 0.102** 0.103**
5  over years -4.45** 0.196** 0.200**
age dummies
25-34 -0.32 0.940 0.957
35-49 -1.42** 0.757** 0.783**
50-64 -3.61** 0.450** 0.471**
last occupation type
Managers/Senior O. 1.33** 1.263** 1.258**
Professional 0.48 1.094 1.078
Assoc. Prof./Technical 0.77 1.151 1.110
Admin./Secretarial 1.66* 1.327** 1.327**
Skilled Trades 0.95* 1.190* 1.187*
Personal Services 0.46 1.089 1.083
Sales 0.32 1.063 1.122
Operatives 1.24** 1.249** 1.237**
education (highest)
Degree 1.49** 1.297** 1.310**
Higher 0.54 1.104 1.131
GCE 1.76** 1.366** 1.373**
GCSE 0.66* 1.130* 1.153*
seasonal dummies X X
yearly dummies X X
regional dummies X X
number of observations 31008 31,008
 0.00003
Notes:
1. * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%. See the appendix C for the base categories of discrete regressors.
2. Column (1) reports estimates (marginal eects evaluated at means and hazard ratios) of the clog-log model.
Column (2) reports estimates (hazard ratios) of the random eects clog-log model. The dependent variable is a
dummy for the failure event: it takes 1 if the spell ends in employment and zero if right censored. Spells ending
in inactivity are dropped. Sampling weights are used in estimations only for model (1).
3. See note 1 to table 3.1 for sample restrictions. Covariates are time-constant and refers to the last quarter of
the unemployment spell. Also people who have a dierent housing tenure either in previous or in the following
quarter are excluded. The  statistic is a test for the presence of frailty.
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Figure 3.9
Hazard to employment. Out-of-sample prediction: non-claimants
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1. Predicted hazards have been estimated after the clog-log non-frailty model (table 3.12, column
1) attributing specic values to the covariates. Results must be interpreted for a representative
head of household unemployed with these features: non claimant, aged 25-49, non married, not
getting disability benets, professional occupations, GCSE qualication, resident in Inner London,
in Summer, in 2005.
Figure 3.10
Hazard to employment. Out-of-sample prediction: claimants
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1. Predicted hazards have been estimated after the clog-log non-frailty model (table 3.12, column 1)
attributing specic values to the covariates. Results must be interpreted for a representative head
of household unemployed with these features: claimant, aged 25-49, non married, not getting
disability benets, professional occupations, GCSE qualication, resident in Inner London, in
Summer, in 2005.
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with a Gamma distribution for frailty the likelihood does not converge29. In
conclusion, we have no signicant evidence of unobserved individual charac-
teristics which aect the probability of nding a job, thus we do not even
need to control for confoundness originating from unobservables.
As the baseline hazard dummies suggest, the hazard function exhibits a
non-monotonic behaviour (see model 1). In particular, unemployed have the
highest probability to nd job in the rst three months of job seeking. The
probability decreases steadily with duration up to four years, and increases
slightly afterwards. This gure is consistent with the commonly perceived
wisdom that as the unemployment spell lengthens, unemployed loose skills
and attachment to the labour market, and/or employed are less willing to
hire unemployed due to a stigma eect.
The estimated eect of the other covariates is in line with standard eco-
nomic interpretations. People claiming unemployed or sickness/disability
benets have longer unemployment spells. Married unemployed are 25.7%
more likely to nd a job than non married. Least educated unemployed have
the lowest chance to escape unemployment. Workers who were previously
employed in elementary occupations have lower probabilities to reenter em-
ployment than the other types of workers, being the dierence signicant for
Managers and Senior Ocials, Administrative and Secretarial occupations,
Skilled Trades Occupations, and Process, Plant and Machine Operatives.
The probability to nd a job decreases with age, though the dierence be-
tween unemployed aged 16  24 and aged 25  34 is not signicant.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 plot hazard estimates for exits to employment by
housing tenure. These estimates are out-of-sample predictions computed af-
ter running the clog-log model (with no frailty), and refer to two representa-
tive unemployed with identical characteristics, but one being an unemployed
benet claimant and the other not. In the second plot the hazards are shifted
downwards by a same amount given that claimants have lower exit proba-
bilities30. The decay in the hazard looks actually marked though after four
years it increases mildly.
29Results of the random eects logit are very similar and are available upon request.
The failure to achieve convergence with a gamma distributed frailty may be due to a very
small variance of the frailty.
30The dierence in the level of the two plots is larger than the estimated marginal eect
of the claimant dummy reported in table 3.12. In fact, while the marginal eects are
computed at the means of the regressors, the plots refer to a representative unemployed
with characteristics chosen at our discretion: aged 25-49, non married, not getting dis-
ability benets, professional occupations, GCSE qualication, resident in Inner London,
in Summer, in 2005.
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3.5.2 Exit to Inactivity
Table 3.13 reports the proportional hazard model estimates when spells can
end up into inactivity or are censored. In this case, outright owners have
the highest probability of leaving the unemployed state. In particular they
are 75.5% more likely than private renters, who have the lowest probability.
Mortgagers and social renters behave basically the same way.
Even in this case, unobserved heterogeneity is not signicant suggesting
that ignoring it is not a major problem31.
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show the counterparts of gures 3.9 and 3.10 for
exits into inactivity. The hazard function of stopping looking for work has
a similar U-shape form to that for exits into employment, in that it decays
up to the same interval, and it is higher afterwards. In the last interval
the failure probability is very high but this result must be interpreted with
caution since the interval dummy is not signicant. Anyway, the extent of
the decay is less marked if compared to exits into employment gures as
the hazard ratios of the interval dummies suggest. Moreover, if we look at
the marginal eects in tables 3.12 and 3.13 and at the y-axis on the plots,
we see that the changes in the hazard are small in absolute terms since the
probability of leaving unemployment for a job is, on average, much higher
than for inactivity.
As a matter of fact, unemployed people have the highest probability to
leave the labour force in the rst 3 months window, which suggests that
unemployed who decide to drop o the labour force do it mostly soon after
the start of the spell. Of course this result does not take into account that
unemployment periods can alternate with periods out of the labour force,
thus the evidence of most frequent jumps to inactivity in the rst time interval
can be consistent with soon leavers being more prone to reenter the status
at some point. Anyway, in general, it does seem that after four years of
unemployment the job seeker is at a crossroads: either nds a job, or drop
o the labour force.
As regards the eect of the covariates on the hazard rate table 3.13 show
some interesting results. Unemployed benet claimants are 52% less likely
to stop being unemployed. This result is easily understood since job seeking
is a requirement for benet eligibility and the utility of the benet can oset
in most cases the disutility of the compliance to the benet system rules.
Instead, unemployed on sickness/disability benets are 58% more likely to
end up out of labour force. Married unemployment are more likely to drop
o the labour force. Elementary occupations are associated with the lowest
31No relevant changes take place if we use a random eects logit model. Converge was
not achieved using a proportional hazard model with a Gamma distributed frailty.
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Table 3.13
Probability of exiting unemployment: spells ending in inactivity or
censored
(1) Hazard (2) Hazard
with frailty without frailty
dy=dx hazard ratio hazard ratio
outright owner 1.98** 1.755** 1.776**
mortgager 0.96** 1.359** 1.365**
social 0.84** 1.335** 1.349**
claimant -2.01** 0.517** 0.518**
disability benf. 1.58** 1.579** 1.645**
married 0.61** 1.228** 1.221**
baseline hazard dummies
3  6 months -0.68** 0.769** 0.762**
6  12 months -1.36** 0.573** 0.552**
1  2 years -2.25** 0.375** 0.367**
2  3 years -2.28** 0.311** 0.310**
3  4 years -2.28** 0.281** 0.274**
4  5 years -1.98** 0.348** 0.329**
5  over years -0.40 0.860 0.854
age dummies
25-34 0.08 1.030 1.030
35-49 -0.13 0.956 0.959
50-64 0.06 1.023 1.026
last occupation type
Managers/Senior O. 0.96* 1.349* 1.347*
Professional 0.51 1.180 1.159
Assoc. Prof./Technical 0.49 1.173 1.108
Admin./Secretarial 1.15* 1.413* 1.328
Skilled Trades 0.65 1.239 1.236*
Personal Services 1.42* 1.512* 1.460*
Sales 0.41 1.144 1.142
Operatives 0.72* 1.264* 1.243*
education (highest)
Degree -0.01 0.998 1.038
Higher -0.10 0.964 1.001
GCE 0.05 1.016 1.050
GCSE -0.05 0.982 1.002
seasonal dummies X X
yearly dummies X X
regional dummies X X
number of observations 29,041 29,041
 0.00001
Notes:
1. * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%. See the appendix C for the base categories of discrete regressors.
2. Column (1) reports estimates (marginal eects evaluated at means and hazard ratios) of the clog-log model.
Column (2) reports estimates (hazard ratios) of the random eects clog-log model. The dependent variable is a
dummy for the failure event: it takes 1 if the spell ends in inactivity and zero if right censored. Spells ending in
employment are dropped. Sampling weights are used in estimations only for model (1).
3. See note 1 to table 3.1 for sample restrictions. Covariates are time-constant and refers to the last quarter of
the unemployment spell. Also people who have a dierent housing tenure either in previous or in the following
quarter are excluded. The  statistic is a test for the presence of frailty.
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Figure 3.11
Hazard to inactivity. Out-of-sample prediction: non-claimants
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Notes:
1. Predicted hazards have been estimated after the clog-log non-frailty model (table 3.13, column
1) attributing specic values to the covariates. Results must be interpreted for a representative
head of household unemployed with these features: non claimant, aged 25-49, non married, not
getting disability benets, professional occupations, GCSE qualication, resident in Inner London,
in Summer, in 2005.
Figure 3.12
Hazard to inactivity. Out-of-sample prediction: claimants
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Notes:
1. Predicted hazards have been estimated after the clog-log non-frailty model (table 3.13, column 1)
attributing specic values to the covariates. Results must be interpreted for a representative head
of household unemployed with these features: claimant, aged 25-49, non married, not getting
disability benets, professional occupations, GCSE qualication, resident in Inner London, in
Summer, in 2005.
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probability of leaving the labour force, which is signicantly lower than that
associated to Managers and Senior Ocials, Administrative and Secretarial
occupations, Personal Service, and Process, Plant and Machine Operatives.
Age and education dummies are not signicant.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we perform two tests of the Oswald hypothesis. First we es-
timate the eect of housing tenure on the probability to be non-employed.
Second we estimate the eect on the hazard out of unemployment, both for
exits to employment and exits to inactivity. The tests are employed assuming
exogeneity of housing tenure and then allowing for unobserved heterogeneity.
In the rst exercise, the null hypothesis of exogeneity of housing tenure is
strongly rejected. Thus we estimate an endogenous multinomial treatment
eects model to account for the eects of unobserved heterogeneity which can
be correlated with housing tenure. Marginal eects estimates suggest that
mortgagers are less likely and social renters more likely to be non-employed
than private renters. Owning the accommodation outright reduces the prob-
ability to be non-employed relative to private renting, but the eect is only
close to be statistically signicant when marginal eects are computed at
sample means. The size of treatment eects is larger when housing tenure is
assumed exogenous, suggesting that we may have omitted in the specication
some unobserved skills which enhance the relative labour market position of
mortgagers and outright owners while weaken that of social renters. When
marginal eects are computed at representative values, the eect of outright
ownership turns out to be statistically signicant though quite small. Also,
for these particular cases, the incremental eect of social renting turns out
to be very large.
In the hazard analysis, unobserved heterogeneity seems unimportant and
estimated eects change negligibly once it is explicitly accounted for. Thus
we do not even attempt to control for confounding eects. Estimated eects
on the proportional hazard rate to employment suggest that mortgagers have
the highest probability to escape unemployment and that outright owners are
more likely to exit than both private an social renters. Exit rates of private
and social renters are not statistically dierent. As regards exit rates to
inactivity, outright owners have the highest probability, while private renters
have the lowest. Mortgagers and social renters behave the same way.
Flows from unemployment to inactivity concern in part workers with par-
ticularly low employment prospects who give up search, and in part workers
who decide to drop o the labour force independently. Unfortunately our
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empirical strategy in estimating exits to employment cannot account for sit-
uations such the rst, which may contribute to keep job nding rates high
(low) for categories more (less) prone to end up into inactivity. For example,
since exit rates to inactivity are higher for outright owners and lower for
private renters, it may be the case that job nding rates for outright owners
and private renters are, respectively, overestimated and underestimated.
Overall, what is left from these exercises is that mortgagers have typically
the best labour market performance, while social renters the worst. As re-
gards private renters and outright owners, whether the former perform better
than the latter is a matter of debate. While we have no evidence in favour
of this claim, the evidence in favour of the opposite is only modest.
Appendix A
Description of Variables
(Chapter 2)
Housing Tenure dummies
Housing tenure related questions refer to the household. Then the
outcome of the household is imputed to all individuals belonging to it
at the date of interview.
owner: selects all individuals whose household owns the accommo-
dation, either outright or with mortgage.
mortgager: accommodation owned with mortgage.
outright owner: accommodation outright owned.
renter: accommodation rented.
social renter: accommodation rented from Local Authorities or Hous-
ing Associations.
private renter: accommodation rented from private.
Housing costs
Measures net monthly mortgage or rent costs as paid in the last month
instalment. For renters who receive housing benet, either partial or
complete, includes the rent after the rebate. Variable is zero for houses
rent free or owned outright. This is an household variable, so the
housing costs for the household are imputed to all individuals within it
at the date of interview. As all monetary variables, this is adjusted for
ination using a Retail Prices Index (the czbh series at the ONS web
site).
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Equivalized household income
As household income we use the sum of the gross individual incomes
perceived last month. It is a gross variable in that we refer to incomes
before deductions for income tax, NI, pension contributions and local
taxes have been made. For each household income we apply the Mc-
Clements' scale factor to account for the eects of household size and
composition on needs in making income comparisons. Thus the eect
of our equivalized income measure should not be sensitive either to the
household size or to its composition.
Household size
Number of people living within the household at the time of interview.
Dependent child
This is a dummy for households with at least one dependent child, that
is those up to 18, if they are still in (non-advanced) full-time education.
Claimant
This is a dummy for people claiming unemployment-related benet. On
the 7th October 1996 it was introduced the Job Seeker's Allowance who
replaced the old unemployment benet system. With JSA unemployed
can claim both cont-JSA, which replaced the old contribution-based
Unemployment Benet (UB), and inc-JSA, which replaced the old re-
tributive element, i.e. Income Support for unemployed. While after
1996 there is a clear question which asks directly if the respondent is
claiming JSA (whether cont-JSA or inc-JSA), before that it is more
complicated to identify claimants for the retributive element, since the
question on income support benets is general and does not specify
the reasons for the claim. The strategy is thus to count in the unem-
ployment benet claimants pool also people who get income support,
both before and after JSA. Of course this has the shortcoming that also
people who get IS for reasons other than unemployment (for example
since they have just low income) are counted as unemployment benet
claimants. But it is not so problematic for our analysis, given that the
eect on search eort of the unemployment benet may be similar to
that of income-related benets, which may be lost as well when the
unemployed nds a job and his income rises.
Financial Situation
This variable captures a subjective evaluation of respondent nancial
situation. Precisely it refers to the question: \How well would you
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say you yourself are managing nancially these days?". The responses
may be ve, where the higher is the number, the worse is the nancial
situation: (1) Living comfortably; (2) Doing alright; (3) Just about
getting by; (4) Find it quite dicult; (5) Find it very dicult.
Age
The base age range in the regressions is 25-49, then we use dummies
for young (16-24) and elderly (50-64) people. The sample is restricted
to all people in working wage, that is 16-64 for males and 16-59 for
females.
Disability Benets
This is a dummy which selects people getting incapacity benets or
severe disablement allowance. In 1996 the incapacity benet assembled
under a unied system invalidity and sickness benets.
Pension
This dummy takes one if respondent gets NI retirement pension or
private pension or annuity.
Full-time education
This dummy identies people who are in full-time education.
Relation with head of household
This identies the relation between the respondent and the head of
household. The BHPS uses the concept of Household Reference Per-
son (HRP), dened as the person legally or nancially responsible for
the accommodation, or the eldest of two people equally responsible.
The head of household (hoh) is dened in general (for example by
the General Household Survey) as the principal owner or renter of the
property, where (if there is more than one) the male takes precedence,
and (if there is more than one potential hoh of the same sex) the el-
dest takes precedence. The BHPS HRP denition is similar except
that only the age criterion is used to distinguish multiple potential
HRPs. In our analysis we use the hoh denition which requires only
minor replacements by sex with respect to the HRP denition. We
identify three other categories: (1) lawful spouse or live-in partner; (2)
children: hoh's child (natural, adopted, foster, step-child), partner's
child, daughter/son-in-law, any grand-child, any nephew; (3) other liv-
ing within the household, whether or not member's relatives. The base
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group in the regressions is made of head of households, then we include
3 dummies in the regression to control for the other categories.
Duration since last job
We created ve categories depending on time past since last occupation:
from now to 6 months ago, from 6 to 12 months, from 1 to 3 years,
from 3 years or more, and the last refers to people who have never had
a job. The base category in the regressions is the rst.
Education
These are 7 levels of education attained: (1) rst or higher degree; (2)
HND, HNC, teaching qualication; (3) GCE a level; (4) GCE o level;
(5) cse; (6) other qualication; (7) no qualication. The base category
is the last.
Regional dummies
Regions are 19: (1) Inner London; (2) Outer London; (3) Rest of South
East; (4) South West; (5) East Anglia; (6) East Midlands; (7) West
Midlands Conurb (8) Rest of West Midlands; (9) Greater Manchester;
(10) Merseyside; (11) Rest of North West; (12) South Yorkshire; (13)
West Yorkshire; (14) Rest of Yorks & Humber; (15) Tyne & Wear; (16)
Rest of North; (17) Wales; (18) Scotland; (19) Northern Ireland.
Appendix B
The Endogenous Multinomial
Treatment Eect Model
We give a formal representation of the model for the non-employment bi-
nary outcome described in the methodological section (Subsection 3.3.1) and
whose estimates are reported in table 3.7, column (4) (see Deb and Trivedi
[2006a] and Deb and Trivedi [2006b]).
Each individual i chooses a residential status j from a set of four choices
(j = 0; 1; 2; 3), where j = 0 is the control group (private renters). Let EV ij
denotes the utility associated with the j -th residential status and
EV ij = z
0
ij + jlij + ij ; (B.1)
where zi denotes a set of exogenous covariates with parameters j, ij are i:i:d
error terms, and lij are latent factors which incorporate unobserved charac-
teristics common to the individual i 's status choice and outcome. The lij
are assumed to be independent of ij. As a normalization EV i0 = 0, so the
expected utility of j -th status is the dierential utility relative to private
renters.
Let dj be binary selection variables representing the observed tenure
choice and di = (di1; di2; di3). Also let li = (li1; li2; li3). Then the mixed multino-
mial logit structure for the probability of tenure choice can be represented
as
P (dijzi; li) = exp(z
0
ij + jlij)
1 +
PJ
k=1 exp(z
0
ik + klik)
: (B.2)
Estimates of this model are reported in appendix D in table D.1.
The expected binary outcome equation for individual i is formulated as
E(yi) = (x0i +
3X
j=1
jdij +
3X
j=1
jlij); (B.3)
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where xi is a set of exogenous variables and j denote the treatment eects
relative to private renters. The expected probability to be non-employed is
a function of the latent factors lij so that it is aected by unobserved charac-
teristics which aect the selection into housing tenure as well. The function
 is assumed to have a logit form: exp()=(1+exp()). The interpretation of the
factor-loading parameters j is the following: when j is positive (negative),
unobserved factors which increase the probability of selecting j -th residential
status also increase (reduce) the probability of being non-employed.
In order to estimate parameters of the model, latent factors are assumed
to be i:i:d draws from the standard normal distribution and simulation-based
method are used to maximize the log likelihood. Provided the number of
draws is suciently large (we select 1,200 draws), maximization of the simu-
lated log likelihood is equivalent to maximizing the log likelihood. Parameters
of this model are identied when zi = xi, but Deb and Trivedi recommend
including some variables in zi which are not included in xi.
In the text we report estimates of the marginal eects for the housing
tenure dummies. Marginal eect of the s-th treatment relative to the base
category is the dierence in the probability of non-employment between in-
dividuals in the two statuses. Formally
E(yjds = 1)  E(yjd = 0) = (x0 + s +
3X
j=1
jlj)  (x0 +
3X
j=1
jlj): (B.4)
Once , s and j-s are estimated, point estimates of this dierence can be
calculated replacing x and lj-s with appropriate values. In the tables we
report point estimates when lj-s are zero (their expected value) and x = x,
where x contains either sample means or representative values of regressors.
So we compute
(x0^ + ^s)  (x0^); (B.5)
which clearly has the same sign of ^s.
Appendix C
Description of Variables
(Chapter 3)
Housing Tenure dummies
Housing tenure related questions refer to the household. Then the
outcome of the household is imputed to all individuals belonging to it
at the date of interview.
homeowner: selects all individuals whose household owns the ac-
commodation, either outright or with mortgage.
outright owner: accommodation outright owned.
mortgager: accommodation owned with mortgage.
social renter: accommodation rented from Local Authorities or Hous-
ing Associations.
private renter: accommodation rented from private.
Unemployment duration
The variable is derived from the LFS durun variable which reports the
minimum of the length of time looking for work and the length of time
since the respondent's last job. The LFS variable groups durations in
8 time intervals: 0-3 months, 3-6 months, 6-12 months, 1-2 years, 2-3
years, 3-4 years, 4-5 years, 5 years or more.
Claimant
This is a dummy for people claiming unemployment-related benets.
On the 7th October 1996 it was introduced the Job Seeker's Allowance
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who replaced the old unemployment benet system. With JSA unem-
ployed can claim both cont-JSA, which replaced the old contribution-
based Unemployment Benet (UB), and inc-JSA, which replaced the
old retributive element, i.e. Income Support for unemployed. The
dummy selects all individuals claiming contributory JSA, or income
based JSA (or both), or national insurance credits.
Disability Benets
This is a dummy which selects people getting disability or sickness
benets.
Marriage Status
People are grouped in legally married (not separated) versus non mar-
ried. Among currently married we distinguish according to the spouse
being in employment or not. Sometimes in the analysis we do not make
this distinction since it does not seem to matter. The base category
are non married.
Age
The sample is made of male in working age (16-64). The base age range
in the regressions is always the youngest.
Last Occupation Type
Employed workers are grouped according to the current job occupa-
tional category, while non-employed workers according to the last job.
People who have never had paid job are dropped. Occupational cat-
egories are: (1) Managers and Senior Ocials; (2) Professional Occu-
pations; (3) Associate Professional and Technical; (4) Administrative
and Secretarial; (5) Skilled Trades Occupations; (6) Personal Service
Occupations; (7) Sales and Customer Service Occupations; (8) Pro-
cess, Plant and Machine Operatives; (9) Elementary Occupations. The
default is Elementary Occupations.
Education
These are 5 levels of highest qualication attained: (1) Degree or Equiv-
alent; (2) Higher Education; (3) GCE A level or equivalent; (4) GCSE
grades A*-C or equivalent; (5) other or no qualication. The base
category is the last.
Seasonal dummies
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These are quarterly dummies for seasons: Spring (March-May), Sum-
mer (June-August), Autumn (September-November), Winter (December-
February).
Yearly dummies
Yearly dummies for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005.
Regional dummies
For the binary outcome models we use this classication: (1) East
Anglia; (2) East Midlands; (3) London (4) Northern Ireland (5) North
West; (6) North; (7) South East (8) South West; (9) Scotland; (10)
West Midlands; (11) Wales; (12) Yorkshire & Humberside. The base
category is Northern Ireland.
For the duration analysis we use a deeper classication: (1) Tyne &
Wear; (2) Rest of North East; (3) Greater Manchester; (4) Merseyside;
(5) Rest of North West; (6) South Yorkshire; (7) West Yorkshire (8)
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside; (9) East Midlands; (10) West Mid-
lands Metropolitan County; (11) Rest of West Midlands; (12) East of
England; (13) Inner London; (14) Outer london; (15) South East; (16)
South West; (17) Wales; (18) Strathclyde; (19) Rest of Scotland (20)
Northern Ireland. The base category is Northern Ireland.
Famnum
This variable records the number of family units within a household.
According to the LFS denition a \family unit comprises either a sin-
gle person, or a married or cohabiting couple on their own, or with
their never-married children who have no children of their own, or lone
parents with such children".
Samesexhh
This is a dummy which takes one for households in which the rst two
children born are same sex.
Hpinsareal
This is a quarter-varying region-varying aggregate index for (non sea-
sonally adjusted) real house prices derived from the Halifax House Price
Index (HPI). The Halifax HPI is the UK's longest running monthly
house price series covering the whole country from January 1983. The
Index is derived from mortgage data relative to transactions nanced
by the Halifax Bank itself, which represents the country's largest mort-
gage lender and provides a fairly representative sample of the entire UK
124 Chapter C. Description of Variables (Chapter 3)
market (see Halifax [2010] for the methodology and access to data).
Regional indices for the 12 standard planning regions of the UK are
produced on a quarterly basis. The index groups Regions in this way:
(1) East Anglia; (2) East Midlands; (3) Greater London; (4) North Ire-
land; (5) North West; (6) North; (7) South East; (8) South West; (9)
Scotland; (10) West Midlands; (11) Wales; (12) Yorks & Humberside.
We select the non seasonally adjusted index covering all houses and
all buyers. The index is then deated using a quarterly Retail Price
Index and expressed in terms of purchasing power of the 4th quarter
of 20101. Since the index is produced on a calendar quarter basis and
we use seasonal quarters we match each individual (i.e. each Region)
with the appropriate quarter index observation using the information
on the date of interview provided by the LFS.
1We use as RPI the CBZW series provided by the Oce for National Statistics (ONS)
and available online at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=21.
Appendix D
Housing Tenure Choice Model
In table D.1 we report estimates of the mixed multinomial logit discussed in
appendix B. This model is estimated jointly with a binary non-employment
equation by a multinomial endogenous treatment eect technique. Results
of the binary outcome equation are reported in column (3) of table 3.7.
We report Relative Risk Ratios (RRR) for ready interpretation. Co-
ecients must be read in relation to the base category, i.e. private
rented dwelling. Given the variable x and the residential status j (j 2
fOUT;MORT; SOC;PRIg), the RRR is dened as P1(y=jjX)
P1(y=PRIjX)=
P0(y=jjX)
P0(y=PRIjX) , where
P0(y = jjX) and P1(y = jjX) are the probabilities of selecting the j-th status
respectively when x is equal to a given value and x increments marginally
(or shifts from 0 to 1 for dummies). For the multinomial logit it can be
easily showed that the RRR does not depend on x. In fact when y is just
dichotomous the RRR collapses to the odds ratio. For example, for a one
unit increase of a variable (or a shift from 0 to 1 for dummies) in the rst
column, the risk of being outright owner relative to private renter is RRR
times more likely if RRR > 1, or 1 RRR times less likely if RRR < 1.
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Table D.1
Housing Tenure Choice Model. Mixed Multinomial Logit
OUTRIGHT MORTGAGER SOCIAL R.
RRR p-value RRR p-value RRR p-value
famnum 0.541** 0.000 0.419** 0.000 0.34** 0.000
samesexhh 1.132** 0.000 1.672** 0.000 2.311** 0.000
hpinsareal 1.000* 0.016 1.000** 0.000 1.000 0.436
disability benf. 0.749** 0.000 0.482** 0.000 3.001** 0.000
marriage status
married, sps. in emp. 3.314** 0.000 5.532** 0.000 0.923** 0.000
married, sps. no emp. 2.621** 0.000 1.872** 0.000 1.437** 0.000
age dummies
age 35-44 4.577** 0.000 2.353** 0.000 1.848** 0.000
age 45-54 19.837** 0.000 3.056** 0.000 2.332** 0.000
age 55-64 94.392** 0.000 2.150** 0.000 2.507** 0.000
last occupation type
Managers/Senior O. 1.834** 0.000 2.776** 0.000 0.202** 0.000
Professional 1.470** 0.000 2.265** 0.000 0.161** 0.000
Assoc. Prof./Tech. 1.257** 0.000 1.948** 0.000 0.214** 0.000
Admin./Secretarial 1.498** 0.000 1.837** 0.000 0.471** 0.000
Skilled Trades 1.917** 0.000 2.177** 0.000 0.681** 0.000
Personal Service 0.760** 0.000 1.027 0.483 0.578** 0.000
Sales 1.129* 0.018 1.282** 0.000 0.474** 0.000
Operatives 1.479** 0.000 2.106** 0.000 0.942* 0.048
education (highest)
Degree 2.330** 0.000 1.936** 0.000 0.294** 0.000
Higher educ. 2.149** 0.000 2.372** 0.000 0.500** 0.000
GCE 1.964** 0.000 2.221** 0.000 0.679** 0.000
GCSE 1.750** 0.000 2.078** 0.000 0.891** 0.000
seasonal dummies X
yearly dummies X
regional dummies X
number of observations 382,778
Notes:
1. * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%.
2. Notes to table 3.7 apply here.
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